

MINUTES OF THE ADJOURNED MEETING OF THE  
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT

November 16, 2022

An Adjourned Meeting of the Board of Directors of Vista Irrigation District was held on Wednesday, November 16, 2022, at the offices of the District, 1391 Engineer Street, Vista, California.

**1. CALL TO ORDER**

President Miller called the meeting to order at 9:11 a.m.

**2. ROLL CALL**

Directors present: Miller, Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, and MacKenzie (until 11:19 a.m.).

Directors absent: None.

Staff present: Brett Hodgkiss, General Manager; Lisa Soto, Secretary of the Board; Frank Wolinski, Director of Operations and Field Services; and Shallako Goodrick, Director of Administration. Don Smith, Director of Water Resources and Randy Whitmann, Director of Engineering were also present via teleconference. General Counsel Elizabeth Mitchell of Burke, Williams & Sorensen was also present.

Other attendees: Friends and family members of the two retiring employees, Manny Macias and Donald Gordon; and Tom Kennedy, Rainbow Municipal Water District.

**3. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE**

Director Vásquez led the Pledge of Allegiance.

**4. APPROVAL OF AGENDA**

Director MacKenzie requested that the agenda be reordered such that agenda Item 10 could be considered prior to Item 9, noting that she had to leave the meeting early to travel to Sacramento for another meeting and would like to participate in the discussion of Item 9.

22-11-116	<i>Upon motion by Director MacKenzie, seconded by Director Vásquez and unanimously carried (5 ayes: Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, MacKenzie and Miller), the Board of Directors approved the agenda as reordered for Item 10 to precede Item 9.</i>
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**5. ORAL COMMUNICATIONS**

No public comments were presented on items not appearing on the agenda.

**6. CONSENT CALENDAR**

Director of Engineering Randy Whitmann provided clarification regarding Consent Calendar Item 6.B stating that the accessory dwelling was located outside of the area covered by the encroachment permit so it was not shown on the map.

22-11-117 *Upon motion by Director Vásquez, seconded by Director Kuchinsky and unanimously carried (5 ayes: Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, MacKenzie and Miller), the Board of Directors approved the Consent Calendar, including Resolution Nos. 22-40 and 22-41, honoring DeAna Verbeke and approving disbursements, respectively.*

A. Resolution honoring retiring Helix Water District Director DeAna Verbeke

See staff report attached hereto.

*The Board adopted Resolution No. 22-40 honoring retiring Helix Water District Director DeAna Verbeke for her dedicated service to her agency and its customers and representing the best interests of San Diego County water agencies at regional and statewide levels, by the following roll call vote:*

*AYES: Directors Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, MacKenzie, and Miller  
NOES: None  
ABSTAIN: None  
ABSENT: None*

*Resolution No. 22-40 is on file in the official Resolution book of the District.*

B. Encroachment Permit

See staff report attached hereto. Staff recommended and the Board approved Encroachment Permit (134) for a dedicated specific easement over a single-family residence, consisting of approximately 0.63 gross acres owned by Michael William Akira Ward and Christine Lee Ward, located at 1516 Lovely Lane, Vista (LN 2022-046; APN 183-060-66; DIV NO 3).

C. Excavator purchase

See staff report attached hereto. Staff recommended and the Board approved the purchase of a hydraulic excavator from Volvo Construction Equipment and Services (VCES) – Lakeside in the amount of \$115,098.97.

D. Minutes of Board of Directors meeting on November 2, 2022

The minutes of November 2, 2022 were approved as presented.

E. Resolution ratifying check disbursements

**RESOLUTION NO. 22-41**

**BE IT RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of Vista Irrigation District does hereby approve checks numbered 70741 through 70841 drawn on Union Bank totaling \$419,522.72.**

**FURTHER RESOLVED that the Board of Directors does hereby authorize the execution of the checks by the appropriate officers of the District.**

**PASSED AND ADOPTED unanimously by a roll call vote of the Board of Directors of Vista Irrigation District this 16<sup>th</sup> day of November 2022.**

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**7. RESOLUTION HONORING RETIRING VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT EMPLOYEE MANNY MACIAS**

See staff report attached hereto.

Director of Operations and Field Services Frank Wolinski provided information about retiring Vista Irrigation District employee Manny Macias’s work history and accomplishments with the District. He commented that Mr. Macias has been an inspiring leader who is well respected by his fellow employees. Mr. Wolinski wished Mr. Macias well in his retirement; Mr. Hodgkiss and the Board joined in thanking Mr. Macias for his service to the District and its customers and wished him all the best for his future.

22-11-118 *Upon motion by Director Kuchinsky, seconded by Director MacKenzie the Board of Directors adopted Resolution 22-42 honoring Manny Macias for 32 years of service to the District and its customers, by the following roll call vote:*

*AYES: Directors Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, MacKenzie and Miller*  
*NOES: None*  
*ABSTAIN: None*  
*ABSENT: None*

*A copy of Resolution 22-42 is on file in the official Resolution Book of the District.*

Mr. Macias was presented a framed copy of the resolution adopted in his honor and a gift from the Board. Mr. Macias thanked the Board, the District, Mr. Hodgkiss, and Mr. Wolinski, and he stated that he considers his time with the District a blessing. He also thanked his family, especially his wife.

**8. RESOLUTION HONORING RETIRING VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT EMPLOYEE DONALD L. GORDON**

See staff report attached hereto.

Mr. Wolinski provided information about retiring Vista Irrigation District employee Donald Gordon’s work history and accomplishments with the District. He stated that Mr. Gordon has been very committed to the District, his staff, and his own professional development. Mr. Wolinski expressed appreciation for Mr. Gordon’s selflessness, always putting the District’s best interest first even if it meant losing an employee to another department and having to backfill a position. He wished Mr. Gordon well in his retirement; Mr. Hodgkiss and the Board joined in thanking Mr. Gordon for his service to the District and its customers and wished him all the best for his future.

22-11-119 *Upon motion by Director Sanchez, seconded by Director Vásquez the Board of Directors adopted Resolution 22-43 honoring Donald L. Gordon for 30 years of service to the District and its customers, by the following roll call vote:*

*AYES: Directors Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, MacKenzie and Miller*  
*NOES: None*  
*ABSTAIN: None*  
*ABSENT: None*

*A copy of Resolution 22-43 is on file in the official Resolution Book of the District.*

Mr. Gordon was presented a framed copy of the resolution adopted in his honor and a gift from the Board. Mr. Gordon thanked the Board, the District, Mr. Hodgkiss, and Mr. Wolinski, and he stated that his time with the District has been a blessing. He thanked God, his family and his wife.

A brief break was taken from 9:41 a.m. to 9:59 a.m. Upon return from break, present in the Boardroom were District employees Frank Wolinski and Shallako Goodrick, as well as Tom Kennedy of Rainbow Municipal Water District (Rainbow). Mr. Rich Williamson of the San Luis Rey Indian Water Authority joined the meeting during the break via teleconference and was present for the remainder of the meeting.

## **10. ELECTION OF OFFICERS**

See staff report attached hereto.

The Board discussed its practice for electing the Board President and First Vice President annually at its organizational meeting. All Board members expressed satisfaction with the current practice, which has been to consider the previous year's First Vice President for nomination to be elected as Board President and the Board member who has served the longest in the position of Vice President to be considered for nominated to be elected as First Vice President. The previous year's Board President along with any newly elected Board members become Vice Presidents equally. The consensus of the Board was to leave its practice for electing its Board President and First Vice President unchanged.

## **9. FALLBROOK PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT AND RAINBOW MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT PROPOSED REORGANIZATIONS**

See staff report attached hereto.

President Miller welcomed Rainbow Municipal Water District (Rainbow) General Manager Tom Kennedy to the podium to address the Board on the subject of the proposed reorganizations of Fallbrook Public Utility District (Fallbrook) and Rainbow. Mr. Kennedy presented his comments and perspective on the San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission's (LAFCO's or LAFCO) prospectus regarding the proposed reorganizations, acknowledging that most of the San Diego County Water Authority (Water Authority) member agencies' concerns will be centered on the financial impact of said reorganizations. He stated that he believes there will be no financial impact to the member agencies, at least not in the first five years, because Rainbow and Fallbrook will pay an exit fee to mitigate the financial impact to the Water Authority and its member agencies. Mr. Kennedy commented briefly on Dr. Michael Hanemann's report on the matter. The Board thanked Mr. Kennedy for sharing his perspective. President Miller stated that the position the Board chooses to take regarding its comments to LAFCO regarding the proposed reorganizations would be a business decision, and he hopes he and Fallbrook General Manager Jack Beebe would not take the Board's position personally. Mr. Kennedy indicated that he understood; he thanked the Board and left the meeting.

General Manager Brett Hodgkiss presented an overview of the matter, emphasizing that there will be a cost to the District's ratepayers should this reorganization go through. He stated that he believes the financial impacts are understated in the prospectus, and the exit fee should be tied to longer term financial commitments made to secure water supplies or construct major infrastructure. The Board discussed the future increased costs not accounted for in the current estimates such as future member agency roll-offs, MWD rate increases, etc.

The Board discussed the comments presented by Mr. Hodgkiss in his staff report and indicated concurrence with all of the analysis and conclusions. President Miller commented that the District's ratepayers should be the top consideration when commenting on this proposed reorganization, noting that it doesn't seem right to ask the District's ratepayers to pay more so that Rainbow's and Fallbrook's customers can pay less. Director Vásquez echoed this comment, and all the Directors agreed. President Miller stated that he believes there is nothing about the proposed detachments that will be good for the



District and its ratepayers. He further stated that he believes there will be a cost, and it will not get better over time and will not go away in five years.

The Board discussed what comments to present to LAFCO, and Mr. Hodgkiss suggested that the District submit comments focused on the financial impacts of the proposed detachments to the District and its ratepayers. General Counsel suggested that all analysis be included in the District's comments because all aspects will be considered when deciding whether to approve the reorganizations, the outcome of which could increase costs to District ratepayers. The Board requested that staff include in the District's prepared comments its calculations for annual cost increases should the reorganizations take place with no exit fee assessed.

Director MacKenzie suggested that the District's comments include a statement about how long the exit fee should be assessed and why. Director Kuchinsky suggested that it be made clear that the comments on the proposed reorganization/prospectus reflect the discussion and consensus of the Board.

22-11-120      *Upon motion by Director MacKenzie, seconded by Director Kuchinsky and unanimously carried (5 ayes: Vásquez, Kuchinsky, Sanchez, MacKenzie and Miller), the Board of Directors authorized the General Manager to submit comments on the prospectus prepared by LAFCO staff on the proposed reorganizations of Fallbrook and Rainbow, based on his analysis and recommendations, discussed by the Board of Directors, and as indicated within the Board's discussion.*

Following the above discussion, Director MacKenzie left the meeting at 11:19 a.m. in order to travel to another meeting in Sacramento.

**11.    MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY**

See staff report attached hereto.

President Miller reported that he attended a Water Authority tour of several pump facilities and the San Vicente dam. The tour also included a stop at the proposed site for the San Vicente pump storage facility.

President Miller reported that the Water Authority is going to consider hiring a consultant to implement, coordinate and monitor its Project Labor Agreement (PLA) as well as a full time staff person for a limited duration to oversee implementation of the PLA.

President Miller reported on the recent meeting he attended of the Metropolitan Water District (Metropolitan) in which routine business was conducted.

**12.    MEETINGS AND EVENTS**

See staff report attached hereto.

Director Sanchez reported on his virtual attendance at a meeting of the Association of California Water Agencies (ACWA) Federal Affairs Committee, which hosted a question and answer session with the Bureau of Reclamation regarding the bi-partisan infrastructure bill.

Director Vásquez reported on his attendance at a meeting of the District's Public Affairs Committee in which the District's 2022 Annual Report, 2023 Spring Newsletter and the Scholarship Contest were discussed.

Director Kuchinsky reported that he attended a meeting of the City of Vista Chamber of Commerce Government Affairs Committee meeting in which a presentation was provided by the Vista Community Clinic.

Director Kuchinsky stated that he would not be attending the ACWA Conference in Indian Wells November 29-December 1, 2022 or the Colorado River Water Users Association Conference in Las Vegas, December 14-16, 2022 due to the illness of a family member.

**13. ITEMS FOR FUTURE AGENDAS AND/OR PRESS RELEASES**

See staff report attached hereto.

Mr. Wolinski provided clarification regarding the how the District notifies affected customers when a shutdown occurs for pipeline repairs.

**14. COMMENTS BY DIRECTORS**

Director Sanchez commented on the bi-partisan infrastructure bill, and it being a potential source of future funding for the District's Flume Replacement Project.

Director Sanchez commented on the Board's tour on November 14, 2022 of the La Jolla Band of Luiseno Indians (La Jolla Band) Campground and the San Pasqual Undergrounding Project. He thanked staff for the tour and expressed appreciation for the La Jolla Band hosting the tour and providing lunch. He suggested that staff send a letter, on the Board's behalf, thanking the La Jolla Band for its hospitality. Director Kuchinsky echoed Director Sanchez's comments.

Director Sanchez commented that as the District and the City of Escondido continue to develop treatment strategies for the Harmful Algal Blooms (HABs) in Lake Henshaw it may be helpful to think of it as an adaptive plan that could evolve with conditions in the lake as well as the science and technology. Director of Water Resources Don Smith responded that this is how the plan is being developed.

Director Vásquez commented on the monthly regulatory updates provided by ACWA, which he finds to be informative and helpful.

President Miller commented that he learned while at the North County Water Agencies meeting that morning that ACWA is challenging the California Air Resources Board on its Advanced Clean Fleets Regulation. The regulation would require that 50% of new medium and heavy-duty fleet vehicles purchased by state and local governments be zero emissions vehicles (ZEV) by 2024 and 100% be ZEV by 2027.

**15. COMMENTS BY GENERAL COUNSEL**

Ms. Mitchell presented a brief update on legislation including Assembly Bill 2036 regarding the nexus study requirement for connection fees and capacity charges.

**16. COMMENTS BY GENERAL MANAGER**

Mr. Hodgkiss stated that he provided a memo (attached hereto as Exhibit A) regarding the pass through of wholesale water fees and charges from the Water Authority. He noted that the financial impact for customers of the pass through was reduced in accordance with the Board's decision to apply a rebate received from the Water Authority from the Metropolitan Rate Case Litigation over a five-year period. Mr. Hodgkiss stated that customers will be notified of the pass through increase beginning in December 2022.

Mr. Hodgkiss mentioned the flyer provided at the dais (attached hereto as Exhibit B) to save the date for the December 6, 2022 Annual Employee Appreciation event.


Mr. Hodgkiss mentioned an invitation received for the Board to join District Special Counsel, Kronick Moskowitz Tiedermann & Girard, for dinner during the ACWA Conference in Indian Wells; the dinner will be on Wednesday, November 30, 2022.

**17. ADJOURNMENT**

There being no further business to come before the Board, at 12:12 p.m., President Miller adjourned the meeting.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Marty Miller, President

ATTEST:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lisa R. Soto, Secretary  
Board of Directors  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT



**STAFF REPORT**

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Lisa Soto  
**Approved By:** Brett Hodgkiss

**SUBJECT:** RESOLUTION HONORING RETIRING HELIX WATER DISTRICT DIRECTOR DEANA VERBEKE

**RECOMMENDATION:** Adopt Resolution No. 22-XX honoring retiring Helix Water District Director DeAna Verbeke for her dedicated service to her agency and its customers and representing the best interests of San Diego County water agencies at regional and statewide levels.

**PRIOR BOARD ACTION:** None.

**FISCAL IMPACT:** None.

**SUMMARY:** The Board requested that staff draft a resolution honoring Helix Water District Director Deana Verbeke, who will be retiring after 17 years of service to her agency and its customers. Ms. Verbeke also ably represented the interests of San Diego County water agencies at regional and statewide levels during her time as a Director on the Helix Water District Board of Directors

**DETAILED REPORT:** Ms. Verbeke was appointed to the Helix Water District Board of Directors in April 2005 and was subsequently elected to four consecutive four-year terms. She led the Helix Water District Board of Directors as its President twice during her 17 years of service. Ms. Verbeke serves on the Association of California Water Agencies (ACWA) Region 10 Board of Directors for San Diego and Orange counties, previously serving as its Chair, ACWA Membership and Business Development committees and Joint Powers Authority of the Water Conservation Garden in Rancho San Diego. She has also served on the ACWA and the San Diego County Water Authority boards of directors and as Treasurer of the San Diego Chapter California Special Districts Association.

**ATTACHMENT:** Resolution No. 22-XX

RESOLUTION NO. 22-XX

RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
OF THE VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT  
HONORING HELIX WATER DISTRICT DIRECTOR DEANA VERBEKE

WHEREAS, DeAna Verbeke has served on the Helix Water District Board of Directors continuously for 17 years, beginning with her initial appointment in April 2005, including two two-year terms as Board President, and ending with her retirement on November 16, 2022; and

WHEREAS, Ms. Verbeke has ably represented San Diego County water agencies' interests while serving on the Association of California Water Agencies (ACWA) Region 10 Board of Directors for San Diego and Orange counties; and

WHEREAS, Ms. Verbeke's dedicated service extends to her current involvement on the ACWA Business Development and Membership committees and the Joint Powers Authority of the Water Conservation Garden in Rancho San Diego, and her past service on the ACWA and San Diego County Water Authority boards of directors and as Treasurer of the San Diego Chapter California Special Districts Association; and

WHEREAS, Ms. Verbeke's dedication and contributions to the water and special district communities will be sorely missed.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of the Vista Irrigation District do hereby express to DeAna Verbeke their appreciation for her accomplishments and tireless efforts for the benefit of her agency and its customers as well as all San Diego County water agencies during her tenure on the Helix Water District Board of Directors.

PASSED AND ADOPTED by the following roll call vote of the Board of Directors for the Vista Irrigation District this 16<sup>th</sup> day of November 2022.

AYES:  
NOES:  
ABSTAIN:  
ABSENT:

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Marty Miller, President

ATTEST:

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Lisa R. Soto, Secretary  
Board of Directors  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT



## STAFF REPORT

Agenda Item: 6.B

Board Meeting Date:	November 16, 2022
Prepared By:	Robert Scholl
Reviewed By:	Randy Whitmann
Approved By:	Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: ENCROACHMENT PERMIT


RECOMMENDATION: Approve Encroachment Permit (134) for a dedicated specific easement over a single-family residence, consisting of approximately 0.63 gross acres owned by Michael William Akira Ward and Christine Lee Ward, located at 1516 Lovely Lane, Vista (LN 2022-046; APN 183-060-66; DIV NO 3).

PRIOR BOARD ACTION: On August 3, 1988, the Board accepted Grant of Right of Way (D60).


FISCAL IMPACT: None.

SUMMARY: The owners, Michael William Akira Ward and Christine Lee Ward, are in the process of developing an additional dwelling unit on their property located at 1516 Lovely Lane in Vista (APN 183-060-66). Review of the plans and existing site conditions found several site improvements (concrete pad, fence, second story deck overhang, and keystone walls) that encroach into Specific Easement (D60). Approval of the Encroachment Permit (134) will allow the encroachments to remain and the owners to proceed with the additional dwelling unit improvements; in accordance with said permit, any costs to replace the encroachments as the result of a District water main repair will be borne by the permittee.

ATTACHMENT: Map



APN 183-060-66  
 PARCEL 1  
 OF PM10511



**LEGEND**

- EXISTING**
- WATER MAIN
  - PROPERTY LINE
  - EXISTING SPECIFIC EASMENT ENCROACHMENT AREA (D60, PER DOC NO. 88-389700, RECORDED AUGUST 9, 1988 IN BK 300, PG 0851)

**ENCROACHMENT PERMIT NO. 134**

- EXISTING CONCRETE PAD
- EXISTING SECOND STORY DECK OVERHANG
- EXISTING KEYSTONE WALL
- EXISTING FENCE

NOTE: ALL EXISTING ENCROACHMENTS WITHIN VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT EASEMENT ARE APPROXIMATE AND SHOWN FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES ONLY.

**VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT  
 ENCROACHMENT PERMIT NO. 134  
 1516 LOVELY LANE**

OWNER:  
 MICHAEL AND CHRISTINE WARD  
 1516 LOVELY LANE  
 VISTA, CA 92083

APN: 183-060-66	T.B.
SCALE: NONE	L.N. 2022-046
APPD. BY: RS	DATE: 11/04/2022
DRAWN BY: ES/JB	DATE: 10/19/2022
SHEET 1 of 1	MAP: H17
REVISED: 11/8/22 Emalee Sena	



## STAFF REPORT

Agenda Item: 6.C

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Frank Wolinski  
**Approved By:** Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: EXCAVATOR PURCHASE

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the purchase of a hydraulic excavator from Volvo Construction Equipment and Services (VCES) – Lakeside in the amount of \$115,098.97.

PRIOR BOARD ACTION: None.

FISCAL IMPACT: \$115,098.97, including tax and freight. The Fiscal Year 2023 Budget included \$135,000 for the purchase of a hydraulic excavator.

SUMMARY: Staff proposes replacing a backhoe that was purchased in 2000 and is in need of extensive repairs with a compact excavator. Due to its versatility and maneuverability, the compact excavator will be used primarily on mainline replacement projects.

DETAILED REPORT: Staff proposes replacing a backhoe that is 22 years old, has logged over 6,800 hours of operation and needs repairs to the swing cylinders and brakes, costing in excess of \$7,000. It is recommended that the backhoe be replaced with a compact excavator, which has proven to be more efficient than a backhoe for trench excavation on District mainline replacement jobs due to the nature of the excavation work, the capabilities of the machine and space limitations.

The District has two Volvo excavators (mini and compact) in its equipment fleet. Both machines have proven to be reliable, have required only scheduled maintenance and the District's mechanics and equipment operators are familiar with maintenance and their operation. Staff has demoed other excavators from Caterpillar and John Deere and have concluded that Volvo excavators are superior in performance and ease of maintenance. Furthermore, with previous purchases, Volvo's quotes for similar size excavators and options have been lower than Caterpillar and John Deere's.

The Volvo ECR88D excavator (10 ton) is equipped with a Tier 4 Final/Stage V compliant diesel engine, a hydraulic quick coupler, three buckets and a ripper shank. Staff obtained the excavator pricing through Sourcewell's (formerly the National Joint Powers Alliance) cooperative purchasing program. The purchasing program assists with vendor sourcing and allows the District to purchase equipment at a lower cost than can be obtained through traditional procurement procedures; in this case, the 2022 Volvo ECR88D excavator provisioned through Sourcewell is approximately 39% less than Volvo's list price.

As VCES – Lakeside is the only sales distributor for Volvo construction equipment in San Diego County, staff is recommending the excavator to be a sole source purchase in accordance with the District's purchasing policy and procedures.

ATTACHMENT: VCES – Lakeside sole source document



V O L V O

October 13, 2022  
(717) 300-6075

Mr. Frank Wolinski  
Operations & Field Services Manager  
Vista Irrigation District  
1391 Engieer Street  
Vista, CA 92081

**RE: Volvo Construction Equipment & Services ("VCES")**

Dear Mr. Wolinski:

Please be advised that VCES is the only authorized Volvo Construction Equipment North America, LLC ("Volvo CE") Dealer serving in the State of California excluding the counties of Alpine and Mono.

Parts and Service for Volvo Construction equipment are available through VCES. Please recognize VCES as the authorized source for Volvo CE products in the above territory.

Sincerely,



Lisa C. Slocum  
Manager, Legal Department



# Cash Disbursement Report

Payment Dates 10/20/2022 - 11/2/2022

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
70741 - 70744	10/26/2022	Refund Checks 70741 - 70744	Customer Refunds	1,067.71
70745	10/26/2022	Refund Check 70745	Customer Refund	2,277.10
70746	10/26/2022	Amazon Capital Services	Water Sprayer Tank - Truck 85	97.41
	10/26/2022		Tools & Hardware - BeeHive Flume Project	1,283.26
	10/26/2022		Warehouse Supplies	383.88
	10/26/2022		Footwear Program	211.09
	10/26/2022		Office Supplies	63.26
	10/26/2022		Retirement Gift	102.27
	10/26/2022		Warehouse Supplies	60.61
	10/26/2022		Warehouse Supplies	(143.96)
	10/26/2022		Tools for Tight Spaces	150.45
70747	10/26/2022	Bryan and the Bee's	Live Bee Removal (1)	175.00
70748	10/26/2022	Canon Solutions America, Inc	Canon Services & Supplies	15.30
70749	10/26/2022	CARB/PERP	CARB Registration for Portable Generator	735.00
70750	10/26/2022	Cecilia's Safety Service Inc	Traffic Control - Via Teresa	380.00
	10/26/2022		Traffic Control - Cocopah St	498.75
	10/26/2022		Traffic Control - Buena Creek Rd	1,425.00
70751	10/26/2022	Clinical Lab of San Bernardino Inc	Stage 2 DBP Samples	920.00
70752	10/26/2022	Coastal Chlorination & Backflow	Chlorination of Main - San Clemente Way	400.00
70753	10/26/2022	Core & Main	Grease No-Oxide 1 gal (2)	149.38
	10/26/2022		Pipe Lube 5 gal (2)	192.69
	10/26/2022		C900 PVC Pipe (200)	6,605.08
	10/26/2022		C900 PVC Pipe (20)	(660.51)
70754	10/26/2022	Direct Energy	Electric 09/2022 - VID Headquarter	2,526.38
70755	10/26/2022	E&M Electric and Machinery, Inc	SCADA Backup License Upgrade	16,105.00
70756	10/26/2022	Ferguson Waterworks	Corp Stop 1" MIP X Flare (39)	2,810.00
	10/26/2022		DFW Meter Box Lid Large PW6C (VID Stamp) (5)	588.61
	10/26/2022		DFW Meter Box Lid 3.5 DFW36C (VID Stamp) (280)	11,517.80
	10/26/2022		DFW Meter Box Lid 4.5 486SA (VID Stamp) (20)	1,050.03
	10/26/2022		Ell / 0.75" / 45° / Brass (5)	24.95
	10/26/2022		Nut/Bolt/Gasket Kit 6"-8" (6" gskt) 3/4 x 3 1/4 (20)	416.76
	10/26/2022		Plastic Wrap Clear 8 mil 3'x100' (Visqueen) (20)	736.10
70756	10/26/2022	Ferguson Waterworks	Wire 10 Copper (2000)	757.75

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
	10/26/2022		Coupling 8" Macro (15)	6,299.18
70757	10/26/2022	Gillingham Water Planning & Engineering Inc	Flume Replacement Alignment Study 08/29 - 09/12/22	11,600.37
70758	10/26/2022	Habitat Restoration Sciences, Inc	Brush Abatement - VID Flume Roads	5,250.00
70759	10/26/2022	Hello Deli	Lunch 10/20/22 (3) - Construction Supervisor Interviews	51.42
70760	10/26/2022	Jackson & Blanc	Quarterly HVAC Maintenance Service 10/2022 - 12/2022	3,592.50
70761	10/26/2022	Ken Grody Ford Carlsbad	Center Brake Lamp - Truck 63	94.44
	10/26/2022		Turn Signal - Truck 69	137.45
70762	10/26/2022	Lightning Messenger Express	Messenger Service 10/14/22	61.50
70763	10/26/2022	MGM Plastics	Quagga Mussel Coupon Materials	115.51
70764	10/26/2022	MRC, Smart Technology Solutions	Managed Print Services	529.34
70765	10/26/2022	NAPA Auto Parts	Locating Supplies	38.96
	10/26/2022		AC Belt - E1	29.22
70766	10/26/2022	North County Auto Parts	Diesel Exhaust Fluid (6)	149.84
	10/26/2022		Shop Chemicals, Wiper Blades	152.57
	10/26/2022		Mirror Glass - Truck 71	14.78
70767	10/26/2022	Opto 22	PLC Modules	911.48
70768	10/26/2022	O'Reilly Auto Parts	Air Inflator	21.81
70769	10/26/2022	Pacific Pipeline Supply	3/4" Angle Stops (2)	307.54
	10/26/2022		1" Angle Stops (2)	461.51
70770	10/26/2022	Portillo Concrete, Inc	Meter Deposit Refund	649.20
70771	10/26/2022	Premier Chevrolet	Door Check	87.05
70772	10/26/2022	Quadient Leasing USA, Inc.	Postage Meter Lease 09/19/22 - 09/28/23	2,034.28
70773	10/26/2022	RC Auto & Smog	Smog Inspection - Truck 50	50.00
	10/26/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 5	90.00
	10/26/2022		A/C Repair - Truck 39	1,735.39
	10/26/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 79	50.00
	10/26/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 66	50.00
	10/26/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 37	50.00
	10/26/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 18	50.00
70774	10/26/2022	Ryan Herco Flow Solutions	Mud Pump Parts	1,029.82
70775	10/26/2022	San Diego Friction Products	Toolbox Latch Assemblies - Truck 7	76.10
	10/26/2022		Wheel Chocks (10)	510.62
70776	10/26/2022	Save Our Heritage Organisation	WCRH O&M Contribution 10/22/22 - 12/22/22	3,000.00
70777	10/26/2022	SignArt	Door Decals (5 Sets)	347.49
70778	10/26/2022	Southern Counties Lubricants, LLC	Fuel Use 09/01/22 - 09/15/22	10,231.53
	10/26/2022		Fuel Use 10/01/22 - 10/15/22	9,391.97
	10/26/2022		Equipment Grease	107.86
70779	10/26/2022	Sunshine Supply Co Inc	SikaFlex Chalking - BeeHive Flume	3,159.83

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
70780	10/26/2022	Bend Genetics, LLC	HABs Lab Analysis	1,620.00
	10/26/2022		HABs Lab Analysis	3,425.00
70781	10/26/2022	TS Industrial Supply	Wrench Crescent 8" Adjustable (1)	28.15
	10/26/2022		Drill Bits (12)	97.43
	10/26/2022		Impact Adapters (2)	82.90
70782	10/26/2022	Johnson Controls Security Solutions LLC	Burglar & Access Control Monitoring 11/22 - 01/23	3,142.62
70783	10/26/2022	UniFirst Corporation	Uniform Service	273.13
70784	10/26/2022	USF Fabrication, Inc	Access Hatch	2,938.27
70785	10/26/2022	Verizon Wireless	Air Cards	152.04
	10/26/2022		Cell Phones	2,059.02
70786 - 70788	11/02/2022	Refund Checks 70786 - 70788	Customer Refunds	904.36
70789	11/02/2022	A-1 Irrigation, Inc	Plumbing Parts for Cattle Drinker	73.47
	11/02/2022		Painting Supplies	67.52
70790	11/02/2022	Airgas USA LLC	Argon for Welder	196.08
70791	11/02/2022	Amazon Capital Services	Inverters (2)	64.92
	11/02/2022		Warehouse Supplies	(14.06)
	11/02/2022		Portable Vacuum	182.08
	11/02/2022		Car Chargers	29.89
	11/02/2022		UPS Battery	21.64
70792	11/02/2022	ASCE	Membership Renewal	305.00
70793	11/02/2022	Boot Barn Inc	Footwear Program (1)	169.43
	11/02/2022		Footwear Program (1)	180.00
	11/02/2022		Footwear Program (1)	180.00
	11/02/2022		Footwear Program (1)	180.00
	11/02/2022		Footwear Program (1)	180.00
	11/02/2022		Footwear Program (1)	180.00
	11/02/2022		Footwear Program (1)	180.00
70794	11/02/2022	Cecilia's Safety Service Inc	Traffic Control - Grandview Rd	546.25
	11/02/2022		Traffic Control - Warmlands Ave/Grandview Dr	5,700.00
	11/02/2022		Traffic Control - Sycamore Ave/Green Oak Rd	1,235.00
70795	11/02/2022	Certified Laboratories	Rust Inhibitor (8) - VID Facilities	402.33
	11/02/2022		Rust Inhibitor (3) - BeeHive Flume	134.10
70796	11/02/2022	760Print	Door Tags (2000)	315.01
70797	11/02/2022	Citi Cards	Retirement Gift	264.93
	11/02/2022		Refrigerator	1,796.94
	11/02/2022		CAPPO Conference	227.60
	11/02/2022		CAPPO Conference	495.00
	11/02/2022		Kitchen & Restroom Supplies	1,416.73

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
	11/02/2022		SSL Certificate Renewal	624.60
	11/02/2022		GRI Faxmaker - 09/2022	15.00
	11/02/2022		GRI Faxmaker - 08/2022	15.00
	11/02/2022		One Drive Online Service	15.00
	11/02/2022		Employment Advertising - Facilities Supervisor	200.00
	11/02/2022		Employment Advertising - Management Analyst	200.00
	11/02/2022		Employment Advertising - Laborer Trainee	200.00
	11/02/2022		Service Awards (8)	793.38
	11/02/2022		CRUWA Conference - P Kuchinsky	134.92
	11/02/2022		CRUWA Conference - R Vasquez	157.96
	11/02/2022		Union Tribune Digital Subscription	116.00
70798	11/02/2022	City Of Escondido	Escondido Canal Operating Cost 07/2022 - 09/2022	96,496.68
70799	11/02/2022	Core & Main	6" Meter Spools (4)	1,518.39
	11/02/2022		12 x 2 ip 202 B Saddle (2)	573.73
	11/02/2022		Gate Valve 6" FL R/W (3)	2,760.38
	11/02/2022		Ell 8" DI PO 45 Degree (5)	1,109.56
	11/02/2022		Nipple 2x8 Brass (1)	33.56
	11/02/2022		Gate Valve 4" POxFL R/W (1)	698.21
	11/02/2022		Adapter 8" DI POxFL (3)	607.28
	11/02/2022		Fire Hydrant Spool 6x24 DI (2)	487.13
	11/02/2022		Flange 8" SOW (7)	394.03
	11/02/2022		Adapter 6" DI POxFL (2)	303.08
	11/02/2022		Nut Bolt Gasket Kit 6"-8" (6" gasket) 3/4 x 3 1/4 (20)	259.80
	11/02/2022		Fire Hydrant Spool 6x6 DI (2)	253.31
	11/02/2022		Flange 6" SOW 6-hole (4)	151.55
	11/02/2022		Nut Bolt Gasket Kit 4" (4" gasket) (8)	66.25
	11/02/2022		Nipple 2x6 Brass (2)	49.80
	11/02/2022		Fire Hydrant LB400 Check Valve (2)	13,942.60
	11/02/2022		Coupling 2" Brass (7)	131.47
	11/02/2022		DI Spool (1)	352.62
70800	11/02/2022	County of San Diego Registrar of Voters	Gubernatorial General Election 11/08/22	9,000.00
70801	11/02/2022	Craneworks Southwest Inc	Control Lever Knobs - Truck 5	63.89
70802	11/02/2022	Diamond Environmental Services	Portable Restroom Service	73.00
	11/02/2022		Portable Restroom Service	137.56
	11/02/2022		Portable Restroom Service	85.69
70803	11/02/2022	Direct Energy	Electric 10/2022 - Henshaw Buildings & Grounds	347.68
	11/02/2022		Electric 10/2022 - Henshaw Well Field	18,387.77
	11/02/2022		Electric 10/2022 - T & D / Cathodic Protection	46.03

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
	11/02/2022		Electric 10/2022 - Reservoirs	19.94
	11/02/2022		Electric 10/2022 - Pump Stations	2,774.79
	11/02/2022		Electric 10/2022 - Treatment Plants	45.53
70804	11/02/2022	DIRECTV	Direct TV Service	107.99
70805	11/02/2022	Dudek	E Reservoir Replacement & Pump Station 07/2022	20,714.80
	11/02/2022		E Reservoir Replacement & Pump Station 08/2022	2,202.50
70806	11/02/2022	EDCO Waste & Recycling Services Inc	Trash & Recycle 10/2022	440.23
70807	11/02/2022	Electrical Sales Inc	Fluorescent Bulbs	16.37
	11/02/2022		Fluorescent Bulbs	63.87
70808	11/02/2022	Fastenal Company	Nylon Screw Anchors	344.84
70809	11/02/2022	FedEx	Express Shipping	148.13
70810	11/02/2022	Ferguson Waterworks	DFW Meter Box Large DFWPW6C4-12 (5)	727.98
	11/02/2022		DFW Meter Box Lid 3.5 DFW36C (VID Stamp) (50)	2,056.75
	11/02/2022		DFW Meter Box Lid Large PW6C (VID Stamp) (60)	7,063.31
	11/02/2022		DFW Meter Box Lid 4.5 486SA (VID Stamp) (35)	1,837.54
	11/02/2022		DFW Meter Box Large DFWPW6C4-12 (30)	4,367.89
	11/02/2022		Coupling 0.75" Brass (5)	19.59
	11/02/2022		Nipple 0.75" x 2.5" Brass (5)	19.92
	11/02/2022		Coupling 1" Brass (5)	29.77
	11/02/2022		5/8" Brass Nuts (50)	121.78
	11/02/2022		1" Meter Gaskets / 1/8" Thick (128)	48.50
	11/02/2022		8" Pipe Restrainer with T-Bolts (4)	264.13
	11/02/2022		5/8" x 2.5" Brass Bolt (50)	324.75
	11/02/2022		1" Brass Clamps for Anodes (50)	257.09
70811	11/02/2022	Glennie's Office Products Inc	Office Supplies	268.19
70812	11/02/2022	Grainger	Tire Lube Swabs	11.25
	11/02/2022		Locks (2)	33.12
70813	11/02/2022	iFlow Energy Solutions, Inc	6" Ultrasonic Meter (2)	5,270.75
70814	11/02/2022	Joe's Paving	Patch Paving - San Clemente Way, Cambridge, Cocopah	11,814.60
	11/02/2022		Patch Paving - Oak Drive & Monte Mar	20,477.20
70815	11/02/2022	Ken Grody Ford Carlsbad	Brake Master Cylinder Cap - Truck 10	1.40
	11/02/2022		Door Check Arm - Truck 13	36.48
70816	11/02/2022	Lawnmowers Plus Inc	Gas Cans (3)	98.80
70817	11/02/2022	Moodys	Dump Fees (2)	600.00
70818	11/02/2022	Murraysmith, Inc	Deodar Reservoir Rehabilitation Design 08/2022	6,305.75
70819	11/02/2022	NAPA Auto Parts	Filters	26.93
70820	11/02/2022	North County Auto Parts	Shop Chemicals	69.01
	11/02/2022		Engine Belt - Truck 47	38.10

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
	11/02/2022		Degreaser	(106.36)
70821	11/02/2022	North County Rebuilders	Rebuilt Starter	323.67
70822	11/02/2022	O'Reilly Auto Parts	Batteries, Brake Cleaner	541.89
	11/02/2022		Battery Core	(44.00)
	11/02/2022		Water Pump , Parts	236.15
70823	11/02/2022	Parkhouse Tire Inc	Tires (2) - Truck 22	1,179.35
	11/02/2022		Tires (4) - Truck 2	650.57
70824	11/02/2022	Plateau Pest Solutions Inc	Bee & Hive Removal	75.00
70825	11/02/2022	Premier Chevrolet	Mirror Glass - Truck 71	109.44
70826	11/02/2022	Ramco Petroleum	Fuel 09/2022	3,527.47
70827	11/02/2022	Ramona Disposal Service	Trash Service	226.86
70828	11/02/2022	RC Auto & Smog	Smog Inspection - Truck 50	50.00
	11/02/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 12	50.00
	11/02/2022		Smog Inspection - Truck 49	50.00
70829	11/02/2022	Interstate All Battery Center	Solar Batteries - HP Reservoir	936.58
70830	11/02/2022	Revive: A Corporate Wellness Movement, LLC	Health Fair 10/2022	3,280.00
70831	11/02/2022	San Diego Chapter CSDA	Quarterly Dinner Meeting 11/17/22 - R Whitmann	60.00
	11/02/2022		Quarterly Dinner Meeting 11/17/22 - R Vasquez	60.00
70832	11/02/2022	San Diego Gas & Electric	Gas Use 10/2022	515.18
	11/02/2022		Electrical Use 10/2022	5,954.92
	11/02/2022		Electric 10/2022 - Warner Ranch House	63.61
	11/02/2022		Electric 09/2022 - Cathodic Protection & T&D	(63.99)
	11/02/2022		Electric 09/2022 - Reservoirs	(234.69)
	11/02/2022		Electric 09/2022 - Pump Stations	11,993.34
	11/02/2022		Electric 09/2022 - Plants	(104.92)
70833	11/02/2022	SiteOne Landscape Supply, LLC	Irrigation Repair Kit	55.00
70834	11/02/2022	Shred-it	Shredding Services	110.11
70835	11/02/2022	Sunrise Materials Inc	Concrete Accelerator	63.87
	11/02/2022		Concrete Tools	114.75
	11/02/2022		Concrete Accelerator	119.08
70836	11/02/2022	Towshop LLC	Gearbox - T2	413.00
70837	11/02/2022	TS Industrial Supply	Excavation Spray Tips, Vise	531.72
70837	11/02/2022	TS Industrial Supply	Drill Bits (12), Saw Blades (3)	399.68
	11/02/2022		Striping Paint White #710 (24)	182.38
	11/02/2022		Teflon Tape 1/2" x 520" (20)	15.16
	11/02/2022		Fluorescent Marking Paint Orange #222 (12)	69.63
	11/02/2022		Construction Marking Paint White #255 (24)	111.45
	11/02/2022		Striping Paint Blue #750 (24)	182.38

Payment Number	Payment Date	Vendor	Description	Amount
	11/02/2022		Striping Paint Black #770 (24)	182.38
	11/02/2022		2" Pipe Wrap Tape (36)	340.99
	11/02/2022		White Paint Brush 2" (20)	12.56
	11/02/2022		White Paint Brush 4" (15)	36.21
	11/02/2022		Towel Wypall X80 (10)	493.62
	11/02/2022		Blade 14" Diamond Concrete (1)	233.82
	11/02/2022		Plier 8" Lineman's Cut (2)	93.74
	11/02/2022		Shovel Mud (1)	69.93
	11/02/2022		Marking Paint Roller (2)	69.28
	11/02/2022		Wrench 1 1/8" Knocker (1)	66.01
	11/02/2022		Shovel Square Point (1)	31.55
	11/02/2022		Gloves Thickster Nitrile LG 100 per box (10)	281.45
	11/02/2022		Wrench Fire Hydrant (1)	19.91
	11/02/2022		Locks 2029 Master (3)	43.03
70838	11/02/2022	UniFirst Corporation	Uniform Service	273.13
70839	11/02/2022	Verizon Wireless	SCADA Remote Access	383.18
70840	11/02/2022	Water District Jobs	Employment Advertising - Finance Supervisor	145.00
70841	11/02/2022	Xerox Corporation	Xerox Services & Supplies	300.68
<b>Grand Total:</b>				<b>419,522.72</b>





**STAFF REPORT**

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Frank Wolinski  
**Approved By:** Brett Hodgkiss

**SUBJECT:** RESOLUTION HONORING RETIRING VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT EMPLOYEE MANNY MACIAS

**RECOMMENDATION:** Adopt Resolution No. 22-XX honoring Manny Macias for 32 years of service to the District and its customers.

**PRIOR BOARD ACTION:** None.

**FISCAL IMPACT:** None.

**SUMMARY:** Manny will retire with 32 years of exemplary service to the District and its customers on December 2, 2022. The District would like to honor Manny by passing the attached resolution.

**DETAILED REPORT:** Manny started his career as Temporary Utility Worker I with the District on May 29, 1990. Within a few months, he was on boarded as a permanent Utility Worker I and subsequently promoted to a Welder Helper/Equipment Operator in 1997. After refining his equipment operating skills performing various water system repairs, Manny was promoted to Senior Construction Worker in January 2001. He moved into the Engineering Services Department in June 2006 as an Engineering Specialist II and became the District's Engineering Inspector in August 2008. After working as the District's inspector for over ten years, Manny was promoted to Construction Supervisor in September 2018.

During his tenure as Construction Supervisor, Manny successfully managed competing priorities in maintaining an aging water system infrastructure comprising of over 429 miles of pipeline, 28,000 service connections, 3,800 fire hydrants, and close to 10,000 valves. He pioneered the District's fire hydrant replacement program, proactively upgrading over 125 fire hydrants/laterals to current standards. Manny also continued the advancement of the District's valve maintenance program and has been responsible for the ongoing development of a highly skilled and capable workforce.

Manny's career has been personified by pride, hard work and dedication. Not only has he taken the time to mentor and teach his skills to others at the District, but he also coached his kids in youth basketball, softball and football. Even after his kids were grown, he continued to coach high school and youth football and was a member of the coaching staff that led the Vista Vipers to a National Championship and is currently coaching football at Mission Hills High School.

Following retirement, Manny plans to spend time with his wife, Julie, and family. He also plans on enjoying his newest hobby, playing golf, continuing to play bass guitar at church and coaching his current and future grandchildren in sports.

**ATTACHMENT:** Resolution No. 22-XX.

RESOLUTION NO. 22-XX

RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT  
HONORING MANNY MACIAS  
FOR 32 YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE DISTRICT

WHEREAS, Manny Macias, starting as a temporary Utility Worker I and progressively advancing to the position of Construction Supervisor, has provided the District and its customers with 32 years of exemplary service; and

WHEREAS, serving in his many capacities, Manny was charged with the design, inspection, installation, repair and maintenance of the District's extensive infrastructure, facilities and equipment; and

WHEREAS, his dedication and hard work have enabled the District to provide exemplary customer service and superior system reliability; and

WHEREAS, Manny's extensive knowledge of engineering, equipment operations, water main replacement, and leak repair techniques have contributed to the District's impeccable reputation for effectively managing its aging infrastructure; and

WHEREAS, his ongoing support and concern for the personal and professional development of his staff have been instrumental in maintaining a highly skilled and capable workforce; and

WHEREAS, Manny's wide range of abilities, institutional knowledge, creativity and cheerful personality will be sorely missed at the District.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Directors of the Vista Irrigation District does hereby wish Manny Macias a long, healthy and prosperous retirement and expresses its appreciation for his dedication to the District and to its customers for the past 32 years.

PASSED AND ADOPTED by the following roll call vote of the Board of Directors of Vista Irrigation District this 16<sup>th</sup> day of November 2022.

AYES:  
NOES:  
ABSTAIN:  
ABSENT:

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Marty Miller, President

ATTEST:

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Lisa Soto, Secretary  
Board of Directors  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT



**STAFF REPORT**

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Frank Wolinski  
**Approved By:** Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION HONORING RETIRING VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT EMPLOYEE DONALD L. GORDON

RECOMMENDATION: Adopt Resolution No. 22-XX honoring Donald L. Gordon for 30 years of service to the District and its customers.

PRIOR BOARD ACTION: None.

FISCAL IMPACT: None.

SUMMARY: Donald will retire with 30 years of exemplary service to the District and its customers on December 9, 2022. The District would like to honor Donald by passing the attached resolution.

DETAILED REPORT: Donald began his career with the District on September 4, 1990, as a temporary Utility Worker I; shortly thereafter, he was made permanent as a Utility Worker I, performing maintenance on the District's infrastructure for close to a decade before resigning from the District to move with his family overseas. Donald returned to the area and was rehired as a Laborer in 2001. With his previous knowledge of District facilities, Donald was quickly promoted to Maintenance Worker in 2002 and to Senior Facilities Worker in 2006. In this capacity, Donald continued to hone his skill in the Field Services Department until 2008, when he was aptly promoted to Facilities Supervisor.

During his tenure as Facilities Supervisor, Donald successfully managed and maintained District facilities, fleet, headquarters, meter services and administered numerous service contracts. Donald is an effective supervisor and has an inherent desire to teach and mentor others; he has trained many employees on flume leak repair techniques, reservoir maintenance, meter and service installations and meter flow testing. Along with training and mentoring his staff, Donald continuously strived to improve his skills. In 2018, he received a commendation for completing the Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance Authority's Professional Development Program. Donald has also participated on various CA-NV American Water Works Association committees and chaired the San Diego Waterworks Group.

All of us at the District have appreciated Donald's casual personality and his "can do" attitude. He has always put the District's customers and his coworker first and his commitment to service over the years is impeccable.

In retirement, Donald plans to spend time with family, take part in church activities and travel the world.

ATTACHMENT: Resolution No. 22-XX.

RESOLUTION NO. 22-XX

RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT  
HONORING DONALD L. GORDON  
FOR 30 YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE DISTRICT

WHEREAS, Donald L. Gordon, starting as a temporary Utility Worker I and progressively advancing to the position of Facilities Supervisor, has provided the District and its customers with 30 years of exemplary service; and

WHEREAS, in his many capacities, Donald's service at the District has been characterized by his dedication to public service and the support of his coworkers; and

WHEREAS, Donald's knowledge and meticulous nature have ensured that District facilities and fleet were well maintained, reliable and aesthetically appealing; and

WHEREAS, his skill and knowledge of meter services, building maintenance and fleet operations have enabled the District to provide exemplary service to its customers and unparalleled system reliability; and

WHEREAS, Donald maintained positive working relationships with outside service providers and consultants and ensured that District projects were completed in a timely manner and within budget; and

WHEREAS, his professionalism, dedication and tremendous commitment have assisted in creating and maintaining a positive work environment at the District.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Directors of the Vista Irrigation District does hereby wish Donald L. Gordon a long, healthy and prosperous retirement and expresses its appreciation for his dedication to the District and to its customers for the past 30 years.

PASSED AND ADOPTED by the following roll call vote of the Board of Directors of Vista Irrigation District this 16<sup>th</sup> day of November 2022.

AYES:  
NOES:  
ABSTAIN:  
ABSENT:

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Marty Miller, President

ATTEST:

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Lisa Soto, Secretary  
Board of Directors  
VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT



**STAFF REPORT**

**Board Meeting Date: November 16, 2022**  
**Prepared By: Brett Hodgkiss**

**SUBJECT:** FALLBROOK PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT AND RAINBOW MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT PROPOSED REORGANIZATIONS

**RECOMMENDATION:** Submit comments on the prospectus prepared by the San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission staff on the proposed reorganizations of Fallbrook Public Utility District and Rainbow Municipal Water District.

**PRIOR BOARD ACTION:** None.

**FISCAL IMPACT:** On August 11, 2022, the Fallbrook Public Utility District (Fallbrook) and Rainbow Municipal Water District (Rainbow) Detachment Working Group prepared and presented a rate impact summary based on figures contained in Professor Michael Hanemann's report on the Fallbrook and Rainbow reorganization to San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission's (LAFCO's or LAFCO) Advisory Committee on the Rainbow-Fallbrook Reorganization. While the Working Group's summary focused on the cost impacts to the cities of Poway and San Diego and Valley Center Municipal Water District, it did contain a table that could be used to project cost and water rate impacts to the District and its customers.

If Fallbrook and Rainbow were to detach and no exit fee was assessed, the San Diego County Water Authority (Water Authority) would see a net reduction in revenue of about \$12.58 million annually according to Hanemann's report. Assuming the Water Authority collected the reduction in revenue from remaining agencies and purchases remained somewhat consistent with the past five-year rolling averages, the District estimates that it would see a cost increase of \$339,660 (low) or \$377,400 (high) annually, which would increase its commodity rates by approximately five cents and six cents per billing unit respectively. This translates to a typical customer's bi-monthly bill (3/4-inch meter and 24 units) increasing by \$1.20 or \$1.44.

Water Authority staff presented a similar table to the Water Authority Board at its August 25, 2022 meeting. The table escalated the figures contained in Hanemann's report and provided low and high impacts of the detachment. Using the figures contained in the Water Authority's table, the District estimates that it would see a cost increase of \$357,000 (low) or \$475,000 (high) annually, which would increase commodity rates by approximately six cents and seven cents per billing unit respectively. This translates to a typical customer's bi-monthly bill increasing by \$1.44 or \$1.68.

It is important to note that the increases shown above are related to the Fallbrook and Rainbow reorganizations only; these increases would be in addition to any other rate adjustments made by the Water Authority and/or the District in future years.

**SUMMARY:** In March 2020, Fallbrook and Rainbow filed reorganization applications with San Diego LAFCO seeking to transfer wholesale water service from the Water Authority to Eastern Municipal Water District (Eastern) in Riverside County. According to the prospectus, this transfer request necessitates multiple jurisdictional changes and related approvals by LAFCO, namely concurrent detachment from the Water Authority and annexation into Eastern. Fallbrook and Rainbow estimate that the reorganization will reduce their per acre-foot wholesale cost by over \$400.

In May 2020, the Water Authority Board adopted a resolution opposing the detachment unless four issues were shown to be satisfied during the LAFCO process. The four issues are as follows:

1. It can be determined by what means Fallbrook and Rainbow can guarantee all obligations as promised to their own ratepayers can be met;

2. It can be demonstrated that the detachment will not adversely affect its other member agencies and the region financially or environmentally;
3. It can be demonstrated that the reorganization will not increase reliance on the Bay-Delta; and
4. It can be demonstrated that the detachment will not diminish the Water Authority's voting power at Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD).

The Fallbrook and Rainbow proposed reorganizations prospectus covers the administrative review of the applications and summarizes key policy issues underlying the reorganization applications and tentative conclusions by LAFCO staff. According to LAFCO staff, the purpose of the prospectus is to help communicate the policy issues and facilitate input from all interested parties.

**DETAILED REPORT:** To date, the administrative review by LAFCO has included approval of a Memorandum of Understanding with Riverside LAFCO, which designates San Diego LAFCO as the lead, as well as approval of alternate conducting authority proceedings, allowing any proposal approval to bypass the standard protest proceedings and go directly to a confirmation election of registered voters. An Ad Hoc Committee was formed to advise the Executive Director through the administrative review process; their focus has largely been on water supply reliability, ratepayer impacts and exit fees, all of which are addressed in the tentative conclusions contained in the prospectus. Lastly, as a prerequisite to considering proposed jurisdictional changes, a property tax exchange analysis was prepared, a municipal service review (MSR) of the Fallbrook region was completed and an addendum to the most recent MSR for Eastern to bring data current is being prepared.

Based on its analysis to date, LAFCO staff has drawn tentative conclusions on a number of key policy issues (see pages 5 and 6 of the prospectus). District staff has reviewed the tentative conclusions contained in the prospectus as well as other documents that have been submitted in response to the proposed reorganizations and have the prepared the following comments.

**Eastern's Supplies are reliable.** The statement that Eastern's water supply from MWD is "adequate and can reasonably accommodate demands now and going forward for both Fallbrook and Rainbow" is not entirely accurate given current conditions on the Colorado River and in northern California, nor does it consider MWD's current available water supplies. MWD has acknowledged that it is now in the process of preparing to allocate its available water supplies as soon as January 2023. If MWD uses the same model it did in earlier droughts, agricultural water use could be reduced by as much as 90% or be completely prohibited under the Human Health and Safety formula MWD is currently using in other parts of its service area. Fallbrook and Rainbow are heavily agricultural users of water.

**Fallbrook and Rainbow ratepayers will see cost savings.** LAFCO published estimates that the average monthly household savings for Fallbrook and Rainbow ratepayers to be \$20.21 and \$26.79 respectively if the proposed reorganizations are approved. However, as acknowledged during the October 26, 2022 Special District Advisory Committee meeting, those estimates savings figures do not take into consideration the payment of an "exit fee" to the Water Authority; by not including this cost, the estimated savings figures are overstated.

**County Water Authority member agencies' ratepayers will see cost increases.** The conclusion that other Water Authority member agencies' ratepayers will have to pay higher rates (as the result of Fallbrook and Rainbow reorganizations) is correct; however, the impacts are understated when the estimated figures shown in the Hanemann report are adjusted to actual as shown in the table included with the Water Authority's June 9, 2022 letter to LAFCO. Additionally, the Water Authority's pass-through rate increase associated with the proposed reorganization would be in addition to any other rate adjustments made by the Water Authority to address member agency roll-offs, MWD rate increases, etc.

**Approval of the Proposals is reasonable if conditioned on an exit fee.** The conclusion that it would be appropriate to require an exit fee equal to the estimated revenue loss for the Water Authority should Fallbrook and Rainbow detach seems reasonable.

**Five years is an appropriate length for an exit fee.** The prospectus notes that the purpose of the exit fee is to provide the Water Authority and its remaining member agencies a level of financial protection in the short run while they adjust to the changed financial situation associated with the Fallbrook and Rainbow detachments. The tentative conclusion by LAFCO staff that five years is appropriate standard to apply an annual exit fee is not supported. The Hanemann reports notes that in the water industry 10 years would typically be considered to be the short term for planning purposes so 10 years would be the shortest standard to apply. However, even 10 years is too short under the circumstances given the substantial investments/obligations that have been incurred by the Water Authority in order to supply water to its member agencies, including Rainbow and Fallbrook. The appropriate length of time for the exit fee should be tied to longer term financial commitments made to secure water supplies (Imperial Irrigation District transfer water and desalinated seawater) or to construct infrastructure.

**Offsetting the exit fee to reflect ancillary Water Authority savings is reasonable.** The prospectus states that the Water Authority would save money should Fallbrook and Rainbow detach that would otherwise be expended on proceeding with the Emergency Storage Project (ESP) North County Pump Station. In its August 31, 2022 letter to LAFCO, the Water Authority states that only “de minimus amounts” have been spent on initial planning for this project, no debt has been issued for this project and no project costs have been included in its rates and charges or budget. Given those statements, a firm commitment to fund and construct the project has not been made by the Water Authority; therefore, there is no savings to be realized and the offset would be zero.

**Loss of voting rights at MWD is a valid concern with a possible solution.** LAFCO staff is correct that voting rights at MWD are valuable, especially when voting on important decisions that have a lasting impact on San Diego region ratepayers; the loss of any voting rights is of the upmost concern. However, LAFCO staff’s proposed solution relating to the Water Authority retaining their voting apportionment associated with Fallbrook and Rainbow for five years after detachment appears to violate California law, more specifically the Metropolitan Water District Act.

**Class 20 California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) exemptions are appropriate.** The Fallbrook and Rainbow reorganizations will change the geographical areas in which the Water Authority exercises its powers; therefore, it appears that the Class 20 exemption does not apply and further environmental review of the reorganization, including its potential to increase reliance on imported water from the Bay-Delta, is warranted.

**Other terms and/or measures raised by others appear problematic.** The Water Authority has requested that LAFCO condition approval of the reorganization proposals on expanding the “affected territory” for the purposes of calling an election to include all registered voters within its member agencies’ boundaries. LAFCO legal counsel does not believe this option is available to the LAFCO Commission, but an analysis was not provided. Given the financial impact that the reorganizations would have on the Water Authority and its member agencies, the Water Authority’s request seems reasonable and warrants further exploration by LAFCO’s legal counsel.

LAFCO staff anticipates scheduling a public hearing for the LAFCO Commission to begin its deliberations on the Fallbrook and Rainbow proposed reorganizations as part of a combined item in February 2023. Notice will be provided to affected agencies no less than 21 days in advance. LAFCO staff stated that written comments received by Wednesday, November 30, 2022 will be incorporated into preparing a draft document to be presented to the LAFCO Commission at a future meeting, tentatively scheduled for February 6, 2023.

**ATTACHMENTS:**

- Proposed Reorganizations Fallbrook Public Utility District and Rainbow Municipal Water District Prospectus, October 2022
- Report to San Diego LAFCO on Fallbrook Public Utility District and Rainbow Municipal Water District Wholesaler Reorganization by Professor Michael Hanemann
- Advisory Committee on Rainbow-Fallbrook Reorg Workgroup Summary
- Water Authority letters to LAFCO dated August 10, 2022 and June 9, 2022





# Proposed Reorganizations

FALLBROOK PUD +  
RAINBOW MWD

PROSPECTUS

REPORT SUMMARY | October 2022



## OVERVIEW

This prospectus covers San Diego LAFCO's current administrative review of two related proposals filed by Fallbrook Public Utility District (PUD) and Rainbow Municipal Water District (MWD) that have been administratively combined by the Executive Officer. The combined proposal affects – directly or indirectly – a sizable portion of San Diego County residents and is expected to be presented to the Commission for formal deliberations as early as February 2023. This prospectus summarizes key policy issues underlying the proposals to date and tentative conclusions reached by LAFCO staff. The role of the prospectus is to help communicate these policy issues and facilitate early input from all interested parties – public or private – before LAFCO staff completes the administrative reviews.

### **PROPOSAL FILINGS: What Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD are Asking to Do...**

Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD via separate filings in March 2020 are requesting LAFCO approval to transfer wholesale water service responsibilities within their combined 124 square mile jurisdictional boundaries from the San Diego County Water Authority to Eastern MWD in Riverside County. The requested transfer necessitates multiple jurisdictional changes and related approvals by LAFCO and headlined by concurrently (a) detaching the affected territory from the County Water Authority and (b) annexing into Eastern MWD. The stated purpose of the proposals is to achieve cost-savings with Fallbrook and Rainbow estimating the per acre-foot wholesale charge would decrease by (25%) from \$1,608 with the County Water Authority to \$1,195 with Eastern MWD with the latter secured by a MOU.

[ [sdlafco.org](http://sdlafco.org) ]



## PROPOSAL FILINGS: What the County Water Authority is Asking in Response...

The County Water Authority is on record via resolution stating they will oppose the proposals unless:

- Rainbow and Fallbrook guarantee all obligations as promised to their own ratepayers are met.
- Detachments will not increase reliance on the Bay-Delta
- Detachments will not adversely affect other County Water Authority member agencies and San Diego County as a region financially or environmentally.
- Detachments will not diminish the County Water Authority's voting power at MET.

### Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD

#### Fallbrook PUD

General Manager **Jack Bebee**

Formed in 1922

Estimated Population is 33,986

Avg Annual Water Demand is 9,161 AF

6% of Customers are Ag

38% of Water Demand is Ag



#### Rainbow MWD

General Manager **Tom Kennedy**


Formed in 1953

Estimated Population is 22,130

Avg Annual Water Demand is 16,976 AF

29% of Customers are Ag

67% of Water Demand is Ag





## ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW What's Been Done to Date...

### Approval of MOU with Riverside LAFCO

In response to the proposal filings, San Diego and Riverside LAFCOs have entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish tasks and responsibilities. The MOU designates San Diego as lead in preparing all related analysis and this includes completing a municipal service review on Eastern MWD to inform a conforming sphere of influence action to accommodate any annexation approvals. The MOU specifies San Diego shall actively consult with Riverside in processing the reorganizations and related studies. All approvals are delegated to San Diego.

### Approval of Alternative Conducting Authority Proceedings

As allowed under statute, San Diego LAFCO has approved a request from the County Water Authority to apply alternative conducting authority proceedings should the Commission approve Fallbrook PUD and/or Rainbow MWD's proposals. This means – markedly – any proposal approval will bypass standard protest proceedings and directly proceed to a confirmation election of registered voters.

### Establishment of an Advisory Committee & Technical Expertise from Dr. Michael Hanemann

Given the complexities and associated jurisdictional disputes underlying the proposals, San Diego LAFCO has created a 10-member Ad Hoc Committee to advise the Executive Officer through the administrative review process. The Ad Hoc includes representatives from all four subject agencies plus at-large members. The Ad Hoc has held 12 meetings to date with the majority focusing on three specific topics involving water supply reliability, ratepayer impacts, and possible true-up costs (exit fees) with technical analysis provided by Dr. Michael Hanemann with Arizona State University. The work of the Ad Hoc is expected to conclude shortly.

### Property Tax Exchange Process

As required for all proposed jurisdictional changes, a property tax exchange analysis has been prepared for the Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD proposals through the County of San Diego. This analysis concludes an existing tax exchange resolution previously adopted by the Board of Supervisors applies to the proposals and means if approved all property tax revenues (AB8 and unitary) currently allocated to the County Water Authority would transfer to Eastern MWD – which totals \$388,216 in 2022-2023. The analysis also concludes that the County Water Authority's existing fixed charges collected on the tax roll within Fallbrook and Rainbow – which presently totals \$723,604 – would be eliminated. The property tax exchange is considered complete, though it can be revisited if needed.



Solar panels facilitate well pumping in Fallbrook, California.





## » Administrative Review

### Fallbrook Region Municipal Service Review (MSR)

As a prerequisite to considering the proposed jurisdictional changes, San Diego LAFCO has prepared and completed a municipal service review on the Fallbrook region and the local agencies operating therein subject to the Commission's oversight – including Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD. The final report outlines nine central conclusions relative to LAFCO's growth management tasks and interests based on data collected and analyzed between 2016 and 2020. This includes concluding Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD have experienced clear and measurable financial stresses during the report period and reflected in substantive declines in their liquidity, capital, and margin levels.

### Addendum to MSR on Eastern MWD

As a separate prerequisite to considering the proposed jurisdictional changes, San Diego LAFCO is preparing an addendum to Riverside LAFCO's most recent MSR on Eastern MWD. The addendum provides gap analysis in bringing data current with respect to Eastern MWD's potable water functions (wholesale and retail) and finances. The addendum is presently under administrative review by Riverside LAFCO and will be forwarded to the Commission in step with presenting both proposals.



## TENTATIVE LAFCO STAFF CONCLUSIONS Where Staff's Analysis to Date is Going...

The following conclusions are purposefully premised as “tentative” and directly informed by analysis performed to date with the key qualifier, the administrative review remains active. Some tentative conclusions, nonetheless, are more firm than others. LAFCO staff welcomes the public’s review and comment on these tentative conclusions.

### **LAFCO Statute Governs**

LAFCO statute – and not the County Water Authority Act – governs consideration of the proposals. Among other pertinent outcomes this means LAFCO has broad authority to condition any proposal approvals using the Commission’s quasi-legislative powers.

### **Eastern MWD’s Supplies are Reliable**

Although the County Water Authority’s potable supply portfolio is superior given its diversification, Eastern MWD’s own supply via MET is adequate and can reasonably accommodate demands now and going forward for both Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD.

### **Eastern MWD’s Finances are Healthy**

Standard measurements used to assess the Eastern MWD’s financial standing shows it trended positively over the last five fiscal years with respect to liquidity, capital, and margin levels. The latter is highlighted by Eastern MWD finishing with positive total margins in four of the five years with an overall average of 4.5%

### **Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD’s Ratepayers Will See Cost-Savings**

LAFCO estimates the average monthly household impact for Fallbrook and Rainbow ratepayers is \$20.21 and \$26.79, respectively assuming full pass-through to ratepayers.

### **County Water Authority Member Agencies’ Ratepayers Will See Cost-Increases**

LAFCO estimates through the help of an Ad Hoc Working Group the average monthly household impact for the remaining members agencies of the County Water Authority is \$2.20 assuming full pass-through to ratepayers. The City of San Diego impact (largest CWA customer) is estimated at \$1.05 per month/per household.

### **Approval of the Proposals is Reasonable if Conditioned on an Exit Fee**

It would be appropriate to condition approval to require an annual true-up – or exit fee – equal to the estimated revenue loss (water sales, property taxes, available fees) for the County Water Authority should both Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD detach. The purpose of the exit fee is to provide the County Water Authority a period of adjustment. This annual amount has been estimated by Dr. Hanemann in the short run at \$12.6 million.



### **Five Years is an Appropriate Length for an Exit Fee**

As referenced, the purpose of an exit fee is to provide the County Water Authority and its remaining member agencies a level of financial protection in the short run while they adjust to the changed financial situation associated with Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD detaching. Five years appears to be an appropriate standard to apply an annual exit fee.

### **Offsetting the Exit Fee to Reflect Ancillary County Water Authority Savings is Reasonable**

The County Water Authority would save money should Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD detach that would otherwise be expended on proceeding with the previously planned construction of the ESP North County Pump Station. The value of the associated savings – however – remains a topic of ongoing analysis.





## » TENTATIVE LAFCO STAFF CONCLUSIONS

### Loss of Voting Rights at MET is a Valid Concern with a Possible Solution

Should Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD detach from the County Water Authority and annex into Eastern MWD a proportional change in voting rights at MET would follow. The estimated value of voting rights – though relatively small – is substantive given it falls within the margin of a recent key vote at MET involving the selection of their new general manager. One possible and otherwise merited solution would involve applying a separate condition to require a MOU between Eastern MWD and County Water Authority to retain the voting apportionment associated with Fallbrook and Rainbow for at least the first five years.

### Class 20 CEQA Exemptions Are Appropriate

Consistent with the findings made by Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD in their resolutions of application, Class 20 exemptions appropriately apply to both proposals. These exemptions appropriately apply given the underlying action involves the transfer of existing municipal service functions within the same area with no additional powers or expansions.

### Other Terms and/or Measures May Also Be Appropriate Based on Commission Preferences

#### Possible examples:

- A LAFCO prescribed “roll-out” requiring Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD to remain member agencies with County Water Authority for a specified period of time before allowing the detachments to formally proceed.
- Requiring the completion of a municipal service review on the County Water Authority.

### Other Terms and/or Measures Raised by Others Appear Problematic

#### Example:

- The County Water Authority is on record requesting San Diego LAFCO condition any proposal approvals on expanding the “affected territory” for purposes of calling an election to include all registered voters within its member agencies’ boundaries. Commission Counsel does not believe this option is available to the Commission.



## ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW What Remains to be Done...

### Complete Staff Report & Address all Statutory and Local Policy Factors

San Diego LAFCO staff is currently preparing a report on the Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD proposals with recommendations that includes addressing all review factors required under State law as well as local policy. The former is headlined by considering all of the factors required under Government Code Section 56668 and ranges in scope from addressing the proposals' conformance growth and development objectives to relationship to environmental justice. The latter is marked by L-107 and consideration of options in addressing known jurisdictional disputes.

### Scheduling a Public Hearing

San Diego LAFCO staff anticipates scheduling a public hearing for the Commission to begin its deliberations on the Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD proposal as part of a combined item in February 2023. Notice will be provided to all subject and affected agencies and published in the UT no less than 21 days in advance.

### Additional Information

Additional information on the combined proposals is available online. This includes pertinent documents, including but not limited to, applications submitted by both Fallbrook PUD and Rainbow MWD, agenda materials for all Ad-Hoc Committee meetings, as well as all correspondence received to-date.

### Receive Written Comments

The public is invited to provide comments on this prospectus and the combined proposal as part of the administrative review process.

Written comments received by Wednesday, November 30, 2022, will be incorporated into preparing a draft document to be presented at a future meeting and tentatively scheduled for February 6, 2023. Comments and questions should be directed to Priscilla Mumpower, Analyst II by e-mail at [priscilla.mumpower@sdcounty.ca.gov](mailto:priscilla.mumpower@sdcounty.ca.gov) or by telephone at **619.321.3380**.

Separate public review and comment period will be noticed and ahead of presenting a final staff report to the Commission.

**REPORT TO SAN DIEGO LAFCO  
FALLBROOK PUD AND RAINBOW MWD WHOLESALER  
REORGANIZATION**

**Submitted by  
Professor Michael Hanemann**

**December 31, 2021**



## INTRODUCTION

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I was engaged by the San Diego County Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) to perform three tasks, as follows:

### **Topic One (Water Rate Impacts)**

The Consultant shall prepare a written memorandum analyzing the potential water rate impacts to the San Diego County Water Authority, the Fallbrook Public Utility District, and the Rainbow Municipal Water District under three distinct scenarios: (i) Commission approval of both proposals; (ii) Commission approval of only the proposal filed by Fallbrook Public Utilities District; and (iii) Commission approval of only the Rainbow Municipal Water District. If the information on file and/or as augmented by the Commission Agreement Administrator is deemed insufficient, the memorandum should succinctly identify the missing, incomplete, incorrect, or otherwise unsubstantiated information needed to appropriately address this topic.

### **Topic Two (Water Supply Reliability)**

The Consultant shall prepare a written memorandum analyzing whether any substantive differences exist with respect to the overall water supply reliability between the San Diego County Water Authority and Eastern Municipal Water District. The Consultant shall use their professional expertise in quantifying and/or qualifying "substantive" relative to addressing water supply reliability. If the information on file and/or as augmented by the Commission Agreement Administrator is deemed insufficient, the memorandum should succinctly identify the missing, incomplete, incorrect, or otherwise unsubstantiated information needed to address this topic.

### **Topic Three (Potential Departure Fees)**

The Consultant shall prepare a written memorandum quantifying what - if any - departure fees (also referred to as exit charges) should be made conditions of approval if the Commission approves either or both proposals. This includes - and among other considerations the Consultant believes to be pertinent - addressing potential rate impacts to the Water Authority addressed in Topic One. If the information on file and/or as augmented by the Commission Agreement Administrator is deemed insufficient, the memorandum should succinctly identify the missing, incomplete, incorrect, or otherwise unsubstantiated information needed to address this topic.

I have discharged those tasks in this report.



I was engaged to address these topics as an economist. I was not engaged to conduct legal analysis or offer legal advice on the issues I addressed, and I do not offer any legal opinions.

The report is organized largely in a question-answer format. I chose this format because experience has shown that it is often the most effective way to convey detailed analysis to an audience. I selected and formulated the questions myself. No one assigned the questions for me to answer. Some questions occurred to me after hearing statements being made at meetings of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee.

I wish to thank the members of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee and, most especially, to Jack Bebee and his staff at Fallbrook Public Utility District, Tom Kennedy and his staff at Rainbow Municipal Water District, Sandy Kerl and Kelley Gage and their staff at the San Diego County Water Authority, and Nick Kanetis and his staff at Eastern Municipal Water District. Jack, Tom, Sandy, Kelley and Nick were exceptionally helpful and generous with their time in answering all manner of questions. I am extremely grateful to them. I also greatly appreciate the assistance provided to me throughout this project by Adam Wilson.

This report contains my opinions based on the information presently available to me. Any opinion that I may have stated previously but that is not repeated here is no longer my view. I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed here. Any errors remaining are my responsibility.

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## CHAPTER ONE | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### NO. 1 | HOW THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY SERVICE AREA GETS ITS WATER

The San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) service area has limited local supplies of surface water and groundwater, which are controlled by the SDCWA member agencies. Most of the water used in the SDCWA service area is provided by SDCWA to member agencies. From its formation in 1947 until 2003, SDCWA's sole source of water was water purchased from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), of which SDCWA is now the largest member agency – I refer to this water as *M-water*.

MWD was created in 1928 to import water to the Greater Los Angeles area from the Colorado River. In 1960 it contracted to receive water from the new California State Water Project (SWP). The SWP was originally planned to deliver 4.2 million acre-feet (MAF) a year to member agencies, and MWD was the single largest contractor with a 48% share of the supply. However, the SWP was not expanded as planned and it has a delivery capacity of only about 2.4 MAF. MWD's 48% share of contract entitlements allow it to receive 1.2 MAF of average year supplies and about 0.6 MAF or less in a dry year.

Until 1963, MWD had a firm allocation of 1.2 MAF a year of Colorado River water. Following the US Supreme Court's ruling in *Arizona v California* in 1963, this was reduced to 550,000 AF. MWD was still able to divert more than this amount until the Colorado River Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) took effect in October 2003. Including water purchased from Imperial Irrigation District (IID) in 1988, MWD now has a firm allocation of about 600,000 AF from the Colorado River.

The antecedent of the current issue is the severe drought in 1990 and 1991. For the first time ever, MWD mandated member agencies to reduce their water use culminating in March 1991 when it cut deliveries for Municipal and Industrial (M&I) use by 30% and for agricultural use by 90%. At the time, SDCWA depended on MWD for 95% of water used in its service area. That experience led SDCWA to seek to become less dependent on MWD for its water supply. In 1998 it signed an agreement with IID to purchase water that IID diverted under a senior water right from the Colorado River. That purchase agreement took effect in October 2003 as part of the larger QSA, which also includes Colorado River water obtained by SDCWA after paying to line the All-American and Coachella Canals.

SDCWA uses MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA) to move its QSA water to its service area under an Exchange Agreement negotiated with MWD. Under that agreement, MWD receives SDCWA's QSA water and is obligated to deliver a like amount of water to SDCWA. SDCWA pays a volumetric rate for the conveyance of this water. I refer to QSA water delivered by MWD to SDCWA as exchanged water or *E-water*. The delivery of E-water commenced in 2003 and ramped

up to the full amount of 277,700 AF in 2021. E-water has accounted for almost 64% of the water delivered by MWD to SDCWA in the last five years, and 80% in the last two years.

In addition, in 2016, SDCWA started to receive desalinated seawater from the Carlsbad Desalination Facility.

It has been suggested that, if Fallbrook Public Utility District (FPUD) and Rainbow Municipal Water District (RMWD) detach from SDCWA and instead become wholesale customers of Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD), they will be receiving the same MWD water as before. That is incorrect. They will be receiving 100% M-water from EMWD rather than a mix of 80% E-water and 20% M-water from SDCWA. Regardless of whether molecules of E- and M-water are physically indistinguishable, they are legally different with regard to their underlying water right and reliability.

FPUD and RMWD are different from many other SDCWA member agencies in still having a high level of agricultural use. They are also the only member agencies located sufficiently far north in San Diego County that they receive some of their water from pipeline turnouts owned by MWD rather than SDCWA. This does not change ownership of the water – it is still owned by SDCWA – but it lowers the delivery charge levied by SDCWA.

## NO. 2 | HOW EXPENSIVE IS SDCWA WATER, AND WHY?

Two conceptual economic distinctions come into play in answering these questions, that between *variable* versus *fixed costs* (and revenues); and that between *average* versus *marginal costs* (and revenues).

Variable costs *vary directly with the quantity of water delivered* and variable revenues vary directly with the quantity of water sold. Fixed costs *do not vary directly with the quantity of water delivered* (fixed revenue is revenue that does not vary with the quantity of water sold).

The average cost of water is defined as the total amount paid divided by the volume of water received; it is the cost per unit of water delivered. The marginal cost is defined as the change in total cost paid per unit change in the amount of water delivered. It measures the *incremental* cost per *incremental* unit of water.

Discussion on how much SDCWA charges focuses on the average cost of SDCWA water.

SDCWA imposes both variable and fixed charges for the delivery of its water, with separate variable charges for treated versus untreated water. The fixed costs can be converted to an equivalent volumetric charge by dividing them by the quantity of water delivered. The volumetric equivalent of the fixed costs counts towards the calculation of average cost. SDCWA's overall average cost of treated water in CY 2021, known as its *all-in cost*, was \$1,769/AF, while its all-in cost for untreated water was \$1,474/AF. Table ES1 compares these rates with MWD's all-in water rates. In CY 2021, SDCWA's rate for treated water is \$367/AF higher (26% higher) than MWD's


rate. SDCWA also offers a special rate for agricultural use that is \$107/AF lower (7% lower) than MWD’s standard rate; in exchange for this special rate, agricultural rate water users are subject to higher cutbacks in the event of supply shortage.

**TABLE ES1 | All-In Water Rates Compared**

	<b>SDCWA</b>	<b>MWD</b>
All-in untreated water rate	\$1,474	\$1,075
All-in treated water rate	\$1,769	\$1,402
Agricultural treated water rate (PSAWR)	\$1,295	NA

It is not surprising that SDCWA charges more than MWD as a wholesale supplier of water since SDCWA buys water from MWD (both E-water and M-water) at a point near the northern boundary of San Diego County and then has the cost of maintaining and operating a separate water distribution system within the County. More significant, however, is that the differential between SDCWA’s water rate and MWD’s water rate widened starting around 2010. Figure ES1 depicts the growth in the rate differential, albeit somewhat inaccurately.<sup>1</sup>

**FIGURE ES1 | Comparison of SDCWA All-In rates and MWD Full-Service Rate for Treated Water<sup>2</sup>**



Sources: San Diego County Water Authority; Metropolitan Water District of Southern California  
Karthika Namboothiri / The San Diego-Union Tribune

It has been suggested that this occurred because QSA E-water is more expensive for SDCWA than M-water from MWD. My analysis suggests otherwise. If QSA water was sometimes more

<sup>1</sup> This compares SDCWA’s all-in rate, combining its fixed and variable charges, with MWD’s variable charge alone, omitting MWD’s fixed charges that amount to around \$300/AF in 2020-2022. The graph thus overstates the rate differential.

<sup>2</sup> Joshua Smith “What Fallbrook and Rainbow’s revolt says about San Diego’s skyrocketing water rates” San Diego Union-Tribune December 18, 2021, retrieved on 12-28-2021 from <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/environment/story/2021-12-18/fallbrook-rainbow-revolt-water-rates>

expensive for SDCWA than M-water, that difference would not have been large, and it no longer exists. E-water costs SDCWA no more than M-water, or less, as shown in Table ES2, which describes SDCWA’s supply sources in CY 2021 and their cost to SDCWA.

**TABLE ES2 | SDCWA's Untreated Water Supply Cost**

<b>WATER SOURCE</b>	<b>Supply Share</b>	<b>Unit Cost (\$/AF)</b>		
QSA (E-water)	75.4%	\$1,049		
Desal (Carlsbad)	13.0%	\$2,725		
MWD (M-water)	11.6%	\$1,075		
<b>WEIGHTED AVERAGE</b>		<b>\$1,271</b>		

If SDCWA had not used any Carlsbad Desal water in CY 2021 and, instead, delivered a 75-25 mix of E- and M-water, its water cost would have been \$1,056/AF instead of \$1,271/AF, a savings of \$215/AF. However, Carlsbad Desal water is more reliable than E- or M-water because it is not derived from streamflow that is being affected by climate change.

SDCWA only started using Carlsbad Desal water in 2016, so that does not explain why the SDCWA-MWD rate differential started to widen around 2010. Moreover, the \$215/AF cost differential between Carlsbad and E/M-water accounts for only part of the \$399/AF differential between SDCWA’s and MWD’s rates for untreated water. So, something else is at work. I believe that two other factors contributed to the rate differential:

1. SDCWA invested in some major water supply infrastructure projects just before and after 2010, a period when MWD was not making any unusually large investments. That would have caused the rate differential to widen.
2. Between 2010 and now, SDCWA experienced a 40% reduction in member agencies’ demand for its water while MWD experienced only a 20% reduction. That difference would have caused the rate differential to widen, given that both agencies have very high fixed costs.

Contrary to what has sometimes been suggested, I have seen no evidence that SDCWA has charged member agencies unfairly, or that FPUD and/or RMWD were paying an excessively large share of the fixed charges levied by SDCWA, leading them to subsidize other member agencies.



### NO. 3 | THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF DETACHMENT

In the event of detachment by FPUD and/or RMWD, SDCWA would lose a variety of revenues including fixed and variable charges for water and also some charges borne by properties in the FPUD/RMWD service areas. It would also experience a reduction in its cost of operation. However, because almost 90% of SDCWA annual expenditures are fixed costs, the reduction in expenditures would fall far short of the reduction in revenues. Table ES3 below shows the impact on SDCWA’s annual net operating revenue calculated for CY 2022.

**TABLE ES3 | SDCWA Net Revenue Impact CY 2022**

<b>Item</b>	<b>FPUD</b>	<b>RMWD</b>	<b>FPUD + RMWD</b>
<b>REDUCTION IN REVENUE</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$8,590,141	\$24,329,127	\$32,919,268
With property tax loss	\$8,750,141	\$24,519,127	\$33,269,268
<b>REDUCTION IN EXPENDITURE</b>			
Short-run	\$4,686,300	\$16,002,000	\$20,688,300
Long-run	\$5,047,100	\$17,234,000	\$22,281,100
<b>CHANGE IN NET REVENUE</b>			
<b>SHORT-RUN</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$3,903,841	\$8,327,127	\$12,230,968
With property tax loss	\$4,063,841	\$8,517,127	\$12,580,968
<b>LONG-RUN</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$3,543,041	\$7,095,127	\$10,638,168
With property tax loss	\$3,703,041	\$7,285,127	\$10,988,168

The exact reduction in revenue depends on whether SDCWA would continue to receive all, some, or none of the property tax revenue from the FPUD and RMWD service areas in the event of detachment, about which there seems to be some disagreement. Also, the reduction in expenditure will be different in the short run versus the long run. In the short run immediately after detachment, SDCWA will experience little reduction in the amount assessed against it by MWD for the Readiness to Serve (RTS) charge. Ten years later, MWD’s RTS will be lowered based on the full reduction in M-water needed by SDCWA due to detachment.

The loss of annual net revenue is not a one-time event. It will occur for as long as SDCWA is paying the financial commitments that it has incurred to date. The exact amount of the annual impact will vary from year to year, depending on SDCWA’s annual finances and rates.

The future financial impact will be lessened to the extent that SDCWA may find another buyer for the water that it would have delivered to FPUD and RMWD. But that will not fully offset the financial loss for two reasons: (1) The payment from the sale may not cover all the payments made annually to SDCWA by FPUD/RMWD as member agencies. (2) The water not delivered to FPUD/RMWD does not belong to FPUD and RMWD individually. Any financial benefit to SDCWA in the event that it sells the water that would have been delivered to FPUD/RMWD to some other party belongs collectively to SDCWA member agencies, and not to FPUD and RMWD individually.

Table ES4 presents my estimate of the cost-savings to FPUD and RMWD in CY 2022 if they switch from being served by SDCWA to being served by EMWD. Their financial gain would be somewhat smaller than SDCWA's financial loss.

**TABLE ES4 | Savings In Water Cost When FPUD & RMWD Switch From SDCWA to EMWD**

		EMWD			
		Unit Rate	FPUD	RMWD	FPUD + RMWD
Source	Item	FPUD/RMWD	Expenditure		
		(\$/AF)	(\$)	(\$)	(\$)
a	WATER DELIVERY (AF)		4,100	14,000	
b	Table 16, row m	SDCWA WHOLESALE WATER COST (\$)	\$8,229,108	\$23,034,412	\$31,263,520
		EMWD WHOLESALE SUPPLIER			
c		MWD Full service Tier 1 treated	\$1,143		
d	Estimated	MWD RTS charge	\$122		
e	Estimated	MWD Capacity charge	\$28		
f		EMWD Wholesaler "markup"	\$11		
g	= c + d + e + f	EMWD all-in treated rate	\$1,304		
h	= a * g	EMWD WHOLESALE WATER COST (\$)	\$5,346,400	\$18,256,000	\$23,602,400
i	= b - h	COST SAVINGS (\$)	\$2,882,708	\$4,778,412	\$7,661,120

#### NO. 4 | A DEPARTURE FEE

As I understand their positions, SDCWA argues that, if they detach, FPUD and RMWD should be liable for covering their shares of SDCWA's bonded and other indebtedness, which totals about \$21 billion. Their share could amount to around \$1 billion. In contrast, FPUD and RMWD argue that they should be able to detach without any further financial liability. In my judgment, as an economist experienced in the economics of water, neither position – a liability of about \$1 billion nor a liability of zero – is reasonable.

However, the decision maker here is San Diego LAFCO, not me. The question confronting LAFCO is whether two SDCWA member agencies with a distinctive set of needs and situated at a distinctive location should be allowed to walk away scot-free, entirely unencumbered by any of the financial commitments that SDCWA has assumed on behalf of its member agencies.

The purpose of a departure fee is to assist SDCWA in covering its financial obligations that are fixed, ongoing and unavoidable for a limited period while it adjusts to the changed financial situation. It is not intended as payment for water being received; it is payment for obligations incurred when receiving water in the past, given that water supply is highly capital-intensive, requires long-term commitments, and is not operated on a PayGo basis.

If San Diego LAFCO were inclined to require a departure fee as a condition for approving detachment by FPUD or RMWD, it would need to decide what is the appropriate share to assign to FPUD or RMWD, of which SDCWA ongoing financial obligations, and for what length of time.

SDCWA is committed to making annual payments that run through 2047 (for IID Transfer water) and 2112 (for canal lining water). This year (CY 2021), the annual payments for QSA water amount to almost \$285 million. LAFCO might use that amount as a starting point for thinking about what a fair and reasonable departure fee could be.

Table ES5 illustrates what an annual departure fee might be if it is framed as FPUD/RMWD's share of SDCWA's annual QSA payment commitment in CY 2021 (\$284,524,900), using their three-year average share of either all deliveries or deliveries for M&I (non-PSAWR) use.

**TABLE ES5 | Calculation of a Departure Fee**

	Share	Annual payment
<b>USING THE SHARE OF M&amp;I DELIVERIES</b>		
FPUD	1.9%	\$5,295,156
RMWD	2.7%	\$7,710,209
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>\$13,005,365</b>
<b>USING THE SHARE OF ALL DELIVERIES</b>		
FPUD	2.3%	\$6,402,041
RMWD	4.3%	\$12,107,975
<b>Total</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>\$18,510,016</b>

This calculation could be adjusted in many different ways and as LAFCO sees fit.

**NO. 5 | WATER SUPPLY RELIABILITY**

EMWD has both retail and wholesale customers. While about half of EMWD’s supply is local supplies, it does not share those with its wholesale customers. Under the present arrangement, if FPUD and RMWD become members of EMWD this will not bring them access to any of EMWD’s local supply. Through EMWD they will receive only M-water from MWD. With the Santa Margarita Conjunctive Use Project online, about half of FPUD’s total consumption is now local supply, but RMWD has almost no local supply and will be essentially as dependent on MWD as SDCWA was in 1991. In contrast, SDCWA is now largely independent of M-water: that accounted for 24% of SDCWA’s supply in CY 2020, about 12% in CY 2021, and is projected to decline even further over the next decade. The bulk of SDCWA’s supply portfolio is: (i) QSA water from the Colorado River which comes under a higher priority water right than most of MWD’s Colorado River M-water, and (ii) water from the Carlsbad Desal facility, which is fully protected against streamflow uncertainty.

The superior reliability of SDCWA’s supply has benefitted FPUD and RMWD in the past. In the drought of 2009, SDCWA faced a 13% cut-back in the delivery of M-water. However, because of its access to QSA water, SDCWA was able to reduce deliveries to its member agencies by only 8%. In the 2015-2016 drought, the supply from the Carlsbad Desalination Facility was certified as drought-resilient, which lowered FPUD and RMWD’s mandated water use reduction from 36% to 28%. In May 2016, the conservation mandate was replaced with a localized “stress test” under which a wholesale water agency could document its ability to meet demands for 2017-2019 should dry conditions continue. Based on the availability of SDCWA’s drought resilient supply, the conservation requirement for FPUD, RMWD and other member agencies was reduced to 0%.

Both of MWD’s sources of M-water – SWP water and Colorado River water -- have supply reliability issues.

There are supply reliability issues for SWP water with regard to: (i) the amount of water available for it to take from its source, the Feather River in the Sacramento Valley, and (ii) the ability to convey that water through the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta to SWP member agencies south of the Delta.

- With regard to the availability of Feather River water, long-standing issues are that droughts are a fact of life in California and that SWP has relatively little carryover storage. A new factor is climate change and the growing recognition that droughts will become more frequent and more severe. Before 2013, there were only two years since SWP deliveries began in 1972 when it delivered a very low supply relative to its Table A commitment; but six of the nine years since then have seen a very low SWP supply. In addition, with soils becoming drier, with climate warming, northern California streamflow is becoming harder to predict using the standard hydrological models, rendering water supply less predictable.
- With regard to conveyance through the Delta, there are two issues: (i) environmental restrictions on releases have increased since the 2000s and (ii) there is a general recognition that the levee system used to convey SWP water is unreliable and will have to be replaced. The first proposal, launched in 2015 and known as WaterFix, involved two tunnels under the Delta, at an estimated cost of about \$17 billion in 2017 dollars. MWD planned to acquire a 64.6% share in the supply at a projected cost of \$10.8 billion. The proposal was withdrawn by Governor Newsom in 2019, and a one-tunnel project is being developed, known as the Delta Conveyance Project, with a preliminary cost estimate of \$15.9 billion (in 2020 dollars). Exactly when the project will be completed, and at what cost, is unknown. It might not come into full operation for another 10 or 15 years. Without it, the ability to convey SWP (and CVP) water to users south of the Delta remains at risk.

The Colorado River was MWD's original source of water and remained its larger source until the QSA took effect in 2003, reducing MWD's firm supply of Colorado River water. Starting in 2003, SWP made up the majority of MWD's water. The recent difficulties with SWP deliveries are causing a return to Colorado River water. However, there has been a twenty-year drought on the Colorado River, and the impacts are now beginning to be felt. Lake Mead and Lake Powell, the country's two largest reservoirs, are now at their lowest levels ever. In September, for the first time in history, a Tier 1 shortage was declared on the river. Tier 1 reduces diversions by Arizona and Nevada but not California. California loses about 5% of its diversion under Tier 2b, and about 8% under Tier 3. Current projections are that there is a 25% chance of a Tier 3 declaration in 2023, a 44% chance in 2024, and a 59% chance in 2025. In the event of a California reduction, the brunt would be borne by MWD, not SDCWA, because of the seniority of the water right to which SDCWA has access. Looking to the future, Tier 3 will not be enough to manage the Colorado River under the "new normal" conditions now being anticipated; sharper cutbacks will probably be required for all three lower basin states.

In anticipation of possible shortage, MWD has built up substantial dry-year reserves stored in groundwater banks in the San Joaquin Valley and Coachella Valley and in Lake Mead. This will enable it to withstand two or three critical shortage years in a row. However, projected climate change scenarios indicate the possibility of significantly longer droughts in the future. It is not clear that MWD yet has the practical capacity to sustain more severe and prolonged drought, especially on the Colorado River.

In switching from being wholesale customers of SDCWA to EMWD, FPUd and especially RMWD may face some challenges. Riverside County is the fastest growing county in California. While EMWD has significant local supplies, it does not share those with its wholesale customers – it provides only MWD water to them. Most of EMWD's wholesale customers themselves have substantial local supplies. The City of Perris and RMWD will be the only EMWD wholesale customers who are solely dependent on MWD water.

EMWD presented an analysis showing that it would be able in a drought to withstand a 30% reduction in MWD deliveries, sparing any wholesale customer (including FPUd and RMWD) from being short of supply. However, that analysis rests on certain assumptions which I find unrealistic.

In summary, while I believe that FPUd and RMWD are taking something of a gamble on supply reliability if they switch from SDCWA to EMWD, the gamble ultimately is not one of running out of water but, rather, paying a higher price than they had anticipated to get by in a drought.

## **NO. 6 | WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?**

The problem generally is not that SDCWA is using water that is too expensive. My analysis indicates that QSA water is not more expensive than M-water from MWD. Desal water from Carlsbad is expensive, but it also has real economic value as insurance against disruption of supplies derived from streamflow, and it proved its value during the 2015-2016 drought. It would be even more valuable if this reliability could be shared across a wider set of Southern California water users.

Increased use of recycled water is also not a solution to the high cost of water supply. While recycling brings important environmental benefits and also has a significant economic benefit as the solution to overcapacity in wastewater collection, treatment and disposal systems, it is generally an expensive source of water supply.

The larger problems underlying the present detachment issues are problems with SDCWA's fiscal model and, to some degree, its governance model.

There is a severe structural imbalance in SDCWA's finances, arising from a mismatch between the share of its revenues that are variable versus fixed and the share of its expenditures that are variable versus fixed. That creates significant financial vulnerability when the volume of water

delivered to member agencies declines. When it delivers less water, while it saves on some expenditure, its revenue declines even more, causing a net loss. This vulnerability is not unique to SDCWA – it is shared with MWD and many other water agencies. Table ES6 below shows the mismatch between its variable revenue share and its variable expenditure share for SDCWA in comparison with MWD.

**TABLE ES6 | Financial Exposure to Variation in Water Sales**

	<b>SDCWA</b>	<b>MWD</b>
<b>PERCENT OF EXPENDITURE THAT VARIES WITH AF DELIVERED</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>16%</b>
<b>PERCENT OF REVENUE THAT VARIES WITH AF DELIVERED</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>88%</b>

These figures are based on SDCWA’s current rate structure and could change if the rates changed. They also indicate that MWD is even more vulnerable to a reduction in deliveries than SDCWA. Still, SDCWA’s situation is quite serious. As a rough example, I estimate that for every 1,000 AF less that SDCWA delivers to member agencies, on average its annual *net* revenue falls by almost \$1M. This is a significant concern given that, over the coming decade, SDCWA is projected to experience a 60,000 AF reduction in deliveries as member agencies substitute increased use of local recycled water for SDCWA water.

The problem with SDCWA’s governance is also shared with many other water agencies, including MWD. The problem is that the Board of Directors makes major investment decisions without any upfront commitment by member agencies to take and pay for the water that will be generated. This strategy commits current resources without guaranteeing the future revenues to pay for new investments. This is a problem that was noted for MWD in a Blue Ribbon Task Force Report to which I contributed in 1993-1994, and it still has not been fixed by MWD.

Member agencies need flexibility to change their supply portfolio in the future without being tied down by long-term purchase commitments. But water supply infrastructure is massively capital intensive and very long-lived. It cannot be funded on a PayGo basis; it needs a long-term financial commitment. The problem was less severe in the past when property tax revenues provided the main repayment source for water infrastructure investments. That source of revenue stability is now lacking.

It has been suggested elsewhere that water transfers and exchanges can contribute to solving the financial dilemmas of urban water supply. Whether that is true depends, in part, on the nature and form of the transfer activity. Up to now, SDCWA and MWD have been the principal actors in water transfers in Southern California, initiating and implementing transfers through the networks that they control. However, the need for transfers now arises increasingly at the local level of individual member agencies with varying needs for reliability in water and varying willingness to pay for water. To take advantage of the variety in individual member needs and to

overcome the financial challenges confronting Southern California's water at a time of climate change, it will be important that local member agencies step up, take more responsibility for the water they obtain through regional wholesalers, commit financially on a long- rather than short-term basis, and become leading actors in shaping their individual supply portfolios through water transfers and exchanges as needed. In that scenario, SDCWA and MWD will to some degree become facilitators and providers of assistance rather than the principals. For this to work, it will also be essential to have a strong degree of cooperation and collaboration between SDCWA and MWD as Southern California's two premier water supply agencies.



## CHAPTER TWO | REPORT ANALYSIS

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### 2.1 HOW THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY SERVICE AREA GETS ITS WATER

**Q. If I am served by a member agency of the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA), where does my water come from?**

**A.** Your water comes from one of two sources: (1) *local supplies* -- water your member agency obtains from local sources that it controls, and (2) water supplied to your member agency by SDCWA.

**Q. What are local supplies?**

**A.** Historically, local sources were groundwater and surface water within the local area of the urban water agency. Before 1947, the San Diego region relied entirely on local surface water runoff and groundwater pumped from local aquifers.

Over time, local sources have expanded to include the use of treated wastewater from local wastewater plants, the use of desalinated local groundwater and, also, desalinated seawater (some of the seawater at the Carlsbad Facility is contracted for by SDCWA member agencies Carlsbad MWD and Vallecitos WD and counts as part of their local supplies).

However, as the region's population and economy grew, local supplies became insufficient to meet the region's water needs.

**Q. How did San Diego County's local supplies come to be augmented?**

**A.** In 1928, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) was formed to develop, store and distribute supplemental water in Southern California, with the specific intention of importing water to the region from the Colorado River. MWD built the Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA) during the 1930s to convey this water, with the aqueduct coming into operation in 1941. The founding members were Los Angeles and its neighboring cities in Los Angeles County.

World War II caused a great increase in water consumption in San Diego and threatened to deplete the region's available local water supply. The solution was to connect the region to the Los Angeles area CRA and import Colorado River water from MWD. In 1943, engineering studies were completed for an aqueduct that would connect with the CRA at what is now called Lake Mathews and convey water south across Riverside County and into San Diego County. The San Diego County Water Authority was organized with nine original members in June 1944 under an enabling act of the California State Legislature known as the County Water Act.<sup>3</sup> The primary purpose was to contract with MWD as a member agency and supply imported MWD water to

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<sup>3</sup> SDCWA now has 24 member agencies.


the region. The San Diego Aqueduct was completed and placed in operation in December 1947. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, SDCWA constructed four additional aqueducts that are all connected to MWD’s distribution system and import water to the County.

SDCWA supplies from 75% to 95% of the region’s water consumption, depending on hydrologic conditions and yield from local supplies.

**Q. Where does SDCWA get its water from?**

**A.** For almost sixty years, from 1947 to 2003, MWD was the sole provider of imported water to SDCWA. This changed in 2003; starting that year, SDCWA began to receive water purchased in a transfer agreement with Imperial Irrigation District (IID). In 2007, SDCWA started to receive an amount of water from projects that lined portions of the All-American Canal (AAC) and the Coachella Canal (CC) in order to conserve water that infiltrated into the ground before the canals were lined. The ramp-up in the delivery of this water from the Colorado River is depicted in the graph below:<sup>4</sup>

**FIGURE 1 | Build-up of QSA Water Delivery to SDCWA**



I will refer to the water obtained by SDCWA from IID and from the canal lining as *QSA water*. It is conveyed from the Colorado River to the SDCWA service area by MWD using the CRA under a 2003 agreement known as the Exchange Agreement.

<sup>4</sup> Source: Presentation to SDCWA Board, 1-25-2018, slide 65.

In addition, in 2016, SDCWA started to receive desalinated seawater from the Carlsbad Desalination Facility.

**Q. Why did SDCWA decide to broaden its source of water beyond water from MWD?**

A. SDCWA decided it needed to expand the sources from which it received water in the light of its experience with MWD during the drought in 1991.

**Q. What happened to SDCWA during the drought in 1991?**

A. The period from 1987 to 1992 saw one of the major droughts in California's history.

This was by no means California's first drought. There had been multi-year droughts in California in 1918-1920, 1928-1934, 1947-1950, 1976-1977 and, subsequently, there were droughts in 2007-2009 and 2012-2016. But, the droughts prior to 1976-1977 occurred when California's population was much smaller and before major reservoirs had been constructed.

What made the droughts of 1976-1977, 1987-1992, 2007-2009 and 2012-2016 so significant was the combination of very low precipitation, low runoff, and severely depleted reservoir storage.

1976-1977 was the single most severe drought in terms of precipitation and runoff, but it was just a two-year drought, and the water supply impact was not as severe as in the subsequent longer droughts starting with 1987-1992.

The drought of 1987-1992 came as a major shock to Southern California's water system. In April 1990, MWD's Board had approved a first-ever drought management plan, calling on agricultural and municipal water users within its service area to voluntarily reduce their usage of water. Adopting a tougher approach, in December 1990 MWD mandated cutbacks in water use by agricultural and municipal users. In January 1991 it mandated sharper cutbacks. It increased the mandated cutbacks in February 1991 and again in March 1991, when it ended up cutting deliveries of water for agricultural use by 90% and deliveries for municipal use by 30%. MWD came within a few weeks of an even more severe cutback – it had given notice of an upcoming cutback of 50% in the County's water supply. This was avoided when heavy rains fell during the March Miracle of 1991.

The 30/90% cutbacks that were implemented were still devastating to SDCWA. SDCWA was almost entirely dependent on delivered water from MWD – MWD deliveries accounted for 95% of the water supply in its service area that year, with local supplies making up only 5%. By contrast, the City of Los Angeles relied on MWD for about 60% of its water, having its own supplies for the remainder. A 30% cut back on 60% of Los Angeles' municipal water supply equated to an 18% cut overall, while a 30% cut back on 95% of San Diego County's water supply equated to a 28.5% cut overall. MWD's cutback of deliveries for agricultural users was even more draconian since, in 1991, SDCWA accounted for 63% of MWD's total agricultural water sales.

The SDCWA Board decided to meld MWD's water supply cutbacks and impose a uniform 31% cut on all member agencies, regardless of whether those were agricultural or municipal uses of water.

**Q. What were the consequences of the 1991 drought experience?**

**A.** The experience during the drought in 1991 had important consequences both for SDCWA and for MWD.

For SDCWA, the consequence was a desire for less dependence on MWD and "a unified regional resolve to use visionary planning and smart investments to ensure San Diego's water supplies would be more resilient to shortage."<sup>5</sup> This led to the 1998 agreement between SDCWA and IID under which SDCWA would purchase water from IID, and also to the negotiations between SDCWA and Poseidon Resources, initiated in 2002 and finally consummated in 2012, for the construction of the Carlsbad Desalination Facility.

For MWD, too, the consequence was a desire for greater resilience in its water supply, including more water marketing transactions and the acquisition of more water storage capacity outside MWD's service area.<sup>6</sup>

**Q. Where does MWD get its water from?**

**A.** MWD has two core sources of water. The first source, as noted above, was water from the Colorado River, for which MWD was established in 1928, and which it started to deliver in 1941. The second is water from the State Water Project (SWP), which is owned by the State of California.

The SWP stretches more than 600 miles from Lake Oroville on the Feather River in Butte County down to Lake Perris in Riverside County. MWD contracted with California's Department of Water Resources (CDWR) in 1960 when the project was planned. MWD is one of 29 water agencies that have long-term contracts with the SWP. SWP was initially planned to deliver about 4.2 million acre-feet (MAF) of water, and MWD contracted for about 2 MAF, or about 48% of the total. MWD received its first deliveries of SWP water in 1972.

An important feature of the SWP contracts is that the full amount of water was not anticipated to be needed for at least the first 20-30 years. Facilities needed to transport the full 4.2 MAF were expected to be constructed over time as demands on the system increased. However, in a famous ballot in 1982, California voters rejected what was known as the Peripheral Canal Act that would have authorized building a canal around the periphery of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta to move additional SWP water down to Central and Southern California. That left the SWP

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<sup>5</sup> Pete Wilson, Foreword on *To Quench a Thirst: A Brief History of Water in the San Diego Region* as quoted in SDCWA Combined Response, 9-18-2020, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> MWD's planning for the Eastside Reservoir (Diamond Valley Lake) had begun in 1987, and so predated the 1991 drought.

delivery capacity at about 2.7 MAF on average, and only about 1.2 MAF in a dry year. The most recent estimate of average SWP Table A deliveries is 2.4 MAF.<sup>7</sup> Following amendments to the SWP contracts under the 1994 Monterey Agreement, all SWP supplies are allocated to contractors in proportion to their original contractual entitlements. Thus, MWD's 48% share of total SWP contract entitlements allows it to receive about 1.2 MAF of average year SWP supplies, and about 0.6 MAF or less in a dry year depending on the severity of the drought.

In addition to a reduced supply of SWP water, MWD has also had to deal with a reduced supply of Colorado River water. Until 1963, MWD had a firm allocation of 1.2 MAF of Colorado River water through contracts with the U.S. department of Interior, which was enough to keep the CRA full. However, as the result of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1963 ruling in *Arizona v. California*, California's supply of Colorado River water was reduced to a total of 4.4 MAF and MWD's supply was reduced to 550,000 AF.

That ruling had little effect at first because Arizona and Nevada did not make use of the full apportionment of Colorado River water awarded to them by the U.S. Supreme court. In the interim, California water users, including MWD, took advantage of the situation to divert more Colorado River water than their allocation.

By the 1990s, the situation was different. By then, Las Vegas had grown into a large metropolitan area, and the Central Arizona Project, authorized by Congress in 1968 to deliver Arizona's apportionment of Colorado River water, had been completed. Arizona and Nevada were ready to take their full allocation of Colorado River water (2.8 MAF and 0.3 MAF, respectively). However, California water agencies, notably IID and MWD continued their high rates of diversion. On average during the 1990s, MWD was able to fill the CRA and California overall took 5.1 MAF of Colorado River water.<sup>8</sup> At this point the Secretary of the Interior stepped into the situation and moved to enforce the limits on California's use of Colorado River water.

The new arrangement on the Colorado River took effect when the Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) was signed in October 2003. This enforced the limits on California's use of Colorado River water, including MWD's limit of 550,000 AF.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to its contractual rights to SWP water and Colorado River water, MWD has augmented its water supply through water leasing and transfer arrangements with other parties outside its service area, including other holders of Colorado River water rights, other SWP contractors and other California water agencies. To store this water, MWD developed additional storage, both the Eastside Reservoir (which was completed in 2000) and additional storage outside its service

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<sup>7</sup> California DWR, *The Final State Water Project Delivery Capability Report 2019*, August 2020, Figure 5.2.


<sup>8</sup> The years 1996-2000 were relatively wet in the Colorado River watershed and the Secretary of the Interior was able to declare that surplus water was available, which benefited California's water users and gave them some time to prepare for the coming change.

<sup>9</sup> In addition, MWD had completed a water transfer agreement with IID in 1988 to obtain about 106,000 AF out of IID's right to Colorado River water. Under certain conditions, however, MWD must provide 50,000 AF to the Coachella Valley Water District. Therefore, MWD's firm supply from the Colorado River is about 600,000 AF.

area, including storage in groundwater banks and storage in Lake Meade through the Colorado River 's Intentionally Created Surplus program.

Figure 2 summarizes MWD's changing mix of supply sources over time.<sup>10</sup> After MWD first received SWP water in 1972, it reduced the amount of water it took from the Colorado River (labelled CRA water in the figure). The chart depicts the steep reduction in delivery of SWP water delivery in the 1991 drought; the reduction in MWD diversions of Colorado River water following MWD's loss of surplus supplies (662,000 AF) in 2003; the initiation of MWD's program to build up out-of-district storage supplies starting in 2004; the reduction in SWP deliveries following increasing environmental restrictions on Delta export pumping; and the severe drought emergency in 2014 leading to a drastic reduction in SWP deliveries which continued into 2015.

**FIGURE 2 | MWD's Changing Reliance on Sources of Supply**



**Q. Where does Fallbrook Public Utility District (FPUD) get its water from?**

**A.** FPUD obtains its water from (i) some small local supplies and (ii) mainly from SDCWA.

Local supplies: according to FPUD's 2020 Urban water Management Plan, in Calendar Year (CY) 2020 FPUD obtained 100 AF from local groundwater and 517 AF of recycled water from its Fallbrook Water Reclamation Plant, for a total local supply of 617 AF.

SDCWA: In addition, FPUD obtained 8,303 AF from SDCWA in CY 2020.

<sup>10</sup> Taken from Presentation to SDCWA Board on 6-26-2014, slide 146.

**Q. Will FPUD's local supplies increase in the future?**

**A.** Yes: there are three projects that will increase FPUD's local supplies.

FPUD recently completed a rehabilitation of its Fallbrook Water Reclamation Plant which will allow it to increase the use of recycled water from 517 AF to 830 AF.

FPUD has been developing a major new local supply project, the Santa Margarita Conjunctive-Use Project, in collaboration with Camp Pendleton. The project involves capturing high surface water flows along the Santa Margarita, a short intermittent river that runs through Camp Pendleton, and storing the surplus flow in an aquifer on Camp Pendleton. Facilities to pump raw water from the aquifer near the Pendleton/FPUD boundary have been completed, and FPUD is currently constructing an advanced water treatment plant to desalinate the brackish groundwater extracted from the aquifer. The project came online during 2021. The amount of water yielded is expected to vary with hydrological conditions; it has been assessed conservatively at an average annual yield of 4,200 AF.

FPUD is also working on a project to obtain 300 AF of surface water by relocating a water right it held to the Santa Margarita but could not utilize to a diversion point on a tributary of the river outside its service area, upstream of Lake Skinner in Riverside County. Lake Skinner is MWD's reservoir that feeds MWD's Skinner Drinking Water Treatment Plant which provides drinking water to MWD's member agencies in Riverside and San Diego Counties. FPUD will store the water it diverts from the tributary in Lake Skinner, and MWD will wheel (convey) the water to FPUD via the SDCWA pipeline that connects SDCWA and MWD in return for a treatment charge plus a wheeling charge to be levied by MWD. When this comes into operation, it is conservatively expected to provide a yield of 300 AF for FPUD.

**Q. Where does Rainbow Municipal Water District (RMWD) get its water from?**

**A.** RMWD, like FPUD, is a member agency of SDCWA. It currently has no local supply and relies on SDCWA for the entirety of its water supply, which amounted to 14,297 AF in CY 2020.

**Q. Will RMWD develop some local supply in the future?**

**A.** RMWD is investigating the feasibility of developing local San Luis Rey River basin groundwater resources as a local supply of water. This would require the construction of a desalting plant or some other appropriate form of treatment facility for the groundwater extracted. In its 2020 Urban Water Management Plan, RMWD anticipates that this groundwater project might provide a local supply of 2,000 AF by 2030.

**Q. Is FPUD served by MWD as its wholesaler?**

**A. No.**

So far in its history, PFUD has had no supply relationship with MWD. FPUD is not a member agency of MWD, and MWD does not sell water to non-member agencies. FPUD is a member agency of SDCWA, and SDCWA is its sole wholesale supplier.

If FPUD starts to receive a surface water diversion from upstream of Lake Skinner, wheeled to it by MWD, then it will have a relationship with MWD. But MWD will then be serving in the roles of a treater of the water and a (partial) conveyor of the water, not as a supplier of that water.

MWD's water distribution line that comes down from Riverside County and connects to SDCWA's distribution system is owned by MWD for some of its length and by SDCA for the rest.<sup>11</sup> Although the county line demarcates the boundary of SDCWA's service area, the county line did not serve as the demarcation point between the portion of the pipeline controlled by MWD and the portion controlled by SDCWA. Instead, the control demarcation points for Aqueducts 1, 2, 3 and 4 are located at varying distances into San Diego County.

In consequence, FPUD and RMWD are each served by some turnouts owned by MWD and some owned by SDCWA. The details are presented in the following table:<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> This was motivated by how the pipeline's construction cost was split between MWD and SDCWA.

<sup>12</sup> Provided to me by SDCWA in an email dated 8-31-2021.



**TABLE 1 | Metered Deliveries to FPUD and RMWD (AF)**

(FY 2017 - FY 2021)							
Meter Description	Pipeline Turnout Structure Owner	Flow Control Facility (FCF) Owner	Meter Deliveries (AF)				
			FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021
<b>Fallbrook Public Utility District</b>							
DeLuz 1 FCF	MWD	MWD	2,180	2,264	1,541	1,426	1,579
Fallbrook 3 FCF	MWD	SDCWA	1,739	1,485	1,340	2,393	2,635
Fallbrook 4 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	1,132	1,499	1,197	292	0
Fallbrook 5 FCF	MWD	SDCWA	Not in Service				
Fallbrook 6 FCF	MWD	MWD	3,667	5,102	3,808	3,763	4,799
		<b>Total</b>	<b>8,718</b>	<b>10,350</b>	<b>7,886</b>	<b>7,874</b>	<b>9,013</b>
<b>Rainbow Municipal Water District</b>							
Rainbow 1 FCF	MWD	SDCWA	2,151	2,892	2,584	2,940	3,149
Rainbow 3 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	3,560	4,335	3,534	2,293	3,564
Rainbow 4 FCF	MWD	SDCWA	Not in Service				
Rainbow 5 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	Not in Service				
Rainbow 6 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	2,403	2,393	1,962	1,866	2,799
Rainbow 7 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	3,110	3,119	2,601	1,191	383
Rainbow 8 FCF	MWD	MWD	2,238	2,647	1,425	3,585	3,747
Rainbow 9 FCF	MWD	MWD	1,617	1,842	1,496	1,197	1,456
Rainbow 10 FCF	MWD	SDCWA	955	1,060	548	462	634
Rainbow 11 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	1,167	922	506	946	1,239
Rainbow 12 FCF	SDCWA	SDCWA	Not in Service				
		<b>Total</b>	<b>17,202</b>	<b>19,211</b>	<b>14,654</b>	<b>14,479</b>	<b>16,972</b>
<sup>1</sup> Represents water delivered to FPUD and RMWD. No adjustment for small volumes of interagency exchanges.							

As shown, FPUD was served by three pipeline turnouts owned by MWD and one owned by SDCWA. FPUD took delivery of water from the turnout owned by SDCWA for the last time in November 2019 (within FY 2020).

RMWD is currently being served by four pipeline turnouts owned by MWD and by four owned by SDCWA.

**Q. Are there any other SDCWA member agencies that have turnouts on a portion of the pipeline from Lake Skinner owned by MWD?**

**A.** No. FPUD and RMWD are the only SDCWA member agencies located sufficiently far north in San Diego County that they receive water from turnouts owned by MWD rather than SDCWA.

**Q. Does the fact that MWD owns a turnout from which FPUD or RMWD receives water make MWD a wholesale supplier to FPUD or RMWD?**

**A.** No. The fact that MWD owns a turnout from which a SDCWA member agency receives water does not make that member agency a wholesale customer – or any other form of customer – of MWD. The member agency is solely a customer of SDCWA.

This is so for several reasons:

SDCWA is the entity that acquired the water from MWD.

SDCWA is the entity billed by MWD for the water.

SDCWA owns the water it obtains from MWD.

**Q. Does the fact that SDCWA waives its Transportation Charge for water received by FPUD and RMWD from a turnout owned by MWD make that not SDCWA water?**

**A.** No. The fact that SDCWA has decided to waive its Transportation Charge for water received by FPUD and RMWD does not make this something other than SDCWA water, for the reasons stated above.

**Q. Is it the case that, if FPUD and RMWD exit from SDCWA, they still would end up receiving the same MWD water from the same turnouts on the same pipes? Nothing would really change?**

**A.** No – that is not the case.

FPUD and RMWD would not receive water from turnouts owned by SDCWA.

More importantly, FPUD and RMWD would NOT be receiving the same water as they receive as member agencies of SDCWA.

**Q. Why will it not be the same water?**

**A.** It will be water belonging to MWD and supplied by MWD, rather than water belonging to SDCWA and supplied to FPUD and RMWD by SDCWA.

**Q. How is water supplied by MWD different from water supplied by SDCWA?**

**A.** It is different in source, it is different in supply reliability, and it is different in pricing.

**Q. How is MWD water physically delivered by MWD to FPUD and RMWD different in source from SDCWA water physically delivered by MWD to FPUD and RMWD?**

**A.** SDCWA, as an MWD member agency, purchases water from MWD. But this is supplemental water. SDCWA's base water supply – water that it owns directly – consists of QSA water from the Colorado River (canal lining water and IID Transfer water) and desalinated water from the Carlsbad Facility.

MWD base supply – water that it owns directly – consists of water obtained under its right to Colorado River and water purchased from IID, totaling approximately 600,000 AF, plus water obtained by MWD through its 48% share of the SWP supply.

**Q. Isn't it true that MWD currently delivers to SDCWA some water from the SWP?**

**A.** It is more complicated than that. MWD delivers molecules of SWP water to SDCWA in *two distinct capacities*.

MWD delivers SWP water to SDCWA as a *supplier* of water. MWD also delivers water as a conveyor of water through an exchange agreement with SDCWA.

**Q. What is the difference between MWD's role as a supplier of water versus its role as a conveyor of water under an exchange agreement with SDCWA?**

**A.** As a supplier of water, MWD is both selling the water and transporting the water to SDCWA. MWD owns the water supplied and it owns the conveyance facility. It charges for both the water supplied and for the conveyance.

Under the exchange agreement with SDCWA, MWD is providing water to SDCWA in exchange for water owned by SDCWA and received by it from SDCWA – it is charging just for conveyance of the exchanged water.

**Q. Is MWD's exchange agreement the same as wheeling water?**

**A.** No.

A dictionary definition of wheeling water is the following:

“The conveying of water through the unused capacity in a pipeline or aqueduct by someone other than the owner.”

There is an important distinction between wheeling water and what MWD does for SDCWA under the 2003 Exchange Agreement between those two parties. Typically, wheeling occurs only if there is available capacity in the pipeline.

Under the exchange agreement, however, MWD is obligated to making capacity available. SDCWA pays MWD a volumetric rate to cover MWD's expenses in exchange for the conveyance of water. “Unlike the wheeling context, the Exchange Agreement does not literally call for the conveyance of water but instead for the *exchange* of water.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Karnow, August 28, 2015, p.27.

**Q. Is MWD selling the water it delivers to SDCWA under the Exchange Agreement?**

**A.** This question was resolved in the course of rate litigation between SDCWA and MWD.

MWD had argued that the Exchange Agreement involved a purchase of water by SDCWA because, under the agreement, SDCWA gives money and water to MWD (namely, QSA water) and obtains from MWD different water – some blend of Colorado River water and SWP water.

The trial judge in San Francisco Superior court ruled against MWD and in favor of SDCWA. He held that “San Diego is not purchasing water from Met. San Diego is exchanging water with Met to make use of its own independent supplies. The parties agreed to exchange an equal amount of water; the only water quality requirement was for Met to provide San Diego with water of at least the same quality as the water Met received from San Diego. These facts underscore that the Exchange Agreement was not an agreement pursuant to which San Diego obtained water from Met, but instead an agreement pursuant to which Met in effect conveyed water on behalf of San Diego. That the Exchange Agreement differs in some respects from a wheeling contract does not mean that the Exchange Agreement was not in substance an agreement to convey, rather than purchase water.”<sup>14</sup>

The trial judge’s ruling was relitigated before the California Court of Appeals in 2017. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on this point. It stated:

“The trial court found ‘the Exchange Agreement was not an agreement pursuant to which [the Water Authority] obtained water from [Metropolitan], but instead an agreement pursuant to which [Metropolitan] in effect conveyed water on behalf of [the Water Authority].’ ... We agree with this conclusion.”<sup>15</sup>

The Appeals Court further stated: “The purpose, structure and terms of the [exchange] contract make it clear that the Water Authority is not purchasing water from Metropolitan but from Imperial. As the trial court rightly discerned, the Water Authority is exchanging water with Metropolitan ‘to make use of its own independent supplies.’ ... In agreeing to pay rates equal to the Metropolitan-supplied water rates, the Water Authority did not agree it was purchasing Metropolitan water. There was no purchase of Metropolitan water...”<sup>16</sup>

**Q. Is water delivered by MWD to SDCWA as a member agency the “same water” as water provided by MWD to SDCWA under the exchange agreement?**

**A.** No.

The molecules of water may be the physically and chemically indistinguishable, but they are different legally, with regard to both their underlying water right and their reliability.

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<sup>14</sup> Karnow, August 28, 2015, pp. 28-29.

<sup>15</sup> Court of Appeals, June 21, 2017, 372.

<sup>16</sup> Op cit., 373.

With what I will call *M-water*, water that MWD delivers to SDCWA in its capacity as a MWD member agency, this is water owned by MWD under its right to Colorado River water or under its contract with the SWP.

With what I will call *E-water*, water supplied to QSA under the 2003 Exchange Contract, this is water that MWD is exchanging with SDCWA in return for water that is owned by SDCWA under SDCWA's agreements with IID for QSA water, which in turn reflect IID's right to Colorado River water.

As explained further below, IID's right to Colorado River water is senior to MWD's right to Colorado River water and is therefore more reliable.

MWD's obligation to deliver E-water to SDCWA is different from its obligation to deliver M-water to SDCWA.

MWD has the same obligation to deliver M-water to SDCWA as it has to deliver that water to other MWD member agencies. MWD's obligation to deliver E-water to SDCWA is unique to SDCWA.

If MWD experiences a shortfall in its supply of water from the SWP or in its diversion of water from the Colorado River, it can declare a reduced allocation to MWD member agencies, including SDCWA in its capacity as a member agency. Regardless of that, if SDCWA delivers to MWD the volume of water specified under the Exchange Agreement, my understanding is that MWD is not free to deliver a reduced amount of water to SDCWA under that agreement: it is obligated to deliver the amount specified in the Exchange Agreement.<sup>17</sup>

**Q. Is most of the water delivered by MWD to SDCWA M-water?**

**A.** That used to be true, but it is no longer true— see Table 2 below.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The terms of the exchange are that (1) SDCWA makes the water that it purchases from IID and that it obtains from the lining of canals available to MWD at Lake Havasu, and (2) MWD delivers a like amount of water from any source to SDCWA in equal 1/12th monthly deliveries, regardless of when in the year SDCWA makes the IID and canal lining water available to MWD (SDCWA Exhibit 28, p. 6).

<sup>18</sup> This uses data provided to me by SDCWA in an email dated 9-2-2021.

**TABLE 2 | Breakdown of Water Delivered by MWD to SDCWA**

Fiscal Year	QSA Water	MWD Water	Total	QSA Share
2012	156,604	282,948	439,552	35.6%
2013	183,500	296,472	479,971	38.2%
2014	180,256	325,729	505,985	35.6%
2015	180,123	305,039	485,162	37.1%
2016	179,347	187,057	366,404	48.9%
2017	178,278	189,919	368,197	48.4%
2018	194,326	163,639	357,965	54.3%
2019	192,241	132,831	325,072	59.1%
2020	230,430	82,843	313,273	73.6%
2021	274,702	42,322	317,024	86.7%
2012-2021	1,949,807	2,008,798	3,958,604	49.3%
2012-2013	340,104	579,420	919,523	37.0%
2017-2021	1,069,977	611,554	1,681,531	63.6%
2020-2021	505,132	125,165	630,297	80.1%

As Table 2 shows, in the past decade overall, the water delivered by MWD to SDCWA broke down almost evenly between M-water and E-water, but the share of E-water has grown steadily from 37% in 2012 and 2013 to almost 64% in the last five years, to 80% in the most recent two years.

A clear implication is that the bulk of the water received by FPUD and RMWD, whether through turnouts owned by MWD or by SDCWA, is now E-water, not M-water.

**Q. Are FPUD and RMWD different from other SDCWA member agencies?**

**A.** Two features stand out as points of some difference between FPUD and RMWD versus other SDCWA member agencies.

First, as noted above, FPUD and RMWD are the only member agencies located sufficiently far north in San Diego County that they receive water from turnouts owned by MWD rather than by SDCWA.

Second, FPUD and RMWD are heavily agricultural users of water. Agricultural water uses in SDCWA’s service area overall amounted to about 37,050 AF, or 8% of total water use in the service area in 2020.<sup>19</sup> However, in RMWD agricultural use amounted to 8,876 AF out of a total use of 14,297 AF in 2020, or 62%.<sup>20</sup> FPUD had about 2,676 AF of agricultural use, or about 30% of total water use.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> SDCWA 2020 Urban Water Management Plan p. ES-1.

<sup>20</sup> RMWD 2020 Urban Water Management Plan, Table 4-1, p. 4-1.

<sup>21</sup> FPUD 2020 Urban Water Management Plan p. 12.

Other SDCWA member agencies with significant levels of agricultural use include Valley Center MWD, Ramona MWD, Yuima MWD and the City of Escondido, all located in the northern parts of the County.

The primary crops grown by SDCWA's agricultural water users include avocado, citrus, cut-flowers, vegetables, vine crops and nursery products. These are generally high value agricultural crops. Nevertheless, a high price for water is an issue for many agricultural producers, even of high value crops. As shown below, SDCWA's charges for water have risen significantly since 2000. The consequent rise in the retail price of water has been a factor in the reduction of crop production and agricultural water use in the FPUD and RMWD service areas since 2000. In the case of RMWD, its total annual water use has declined by about 50% from around 30,000 AF in 2000 to 14,297 AF in 2020.



## 2.2 HOW EXPENSIVE IS SDCWA WATER, AND WHY?

### Q. What does SDCWA charge for water?

A. SDCWA obtains revenue from its member agencies as their wholesale supplier through a mix of charges. The charges for CY 2021 and CY 2022 are itemized in Table 3, below.

**TABLE 3 | SDCWA Rates and Charges**

		ITEM	CY 2021	CY 2022
<b>CHARGED TO MEMBER AGENCIES</b>				
a		M&I water supply rate (\$ /AF)	\$940	\$1,009
b		Agricultural water supply (\$/AF)	\$777	\$799
c		Transportation rate (\$/AF)	\$150	\$173
d		Treatment rate (\$/AF)	\$295	\$310
e		Customer Service charge - Total, all member agencies (\$)	\$25.6M	\$25.6M
f		Storage Charge - Total, all member agencies (\$)	\$60.0M	\$60.0M
g		Supply Reliability charge - Total, all member agencies	\$38.84M	\$39.3M
h		Infrastructure Access charge (\$/meter equivalent)	\$4.24	\$4.24
i	e + f + g + h	Fixed charges equivalent (\$/AF)	\$384	\$341
j	a + c + i	All-in Untreated (\$/AF)	\$1,474	\$1,523
k	d + j	All-in Treated (\$/AF)	\$1,769	\$1,833
<b>CHARGED TO PROPERTIES IN SERVICE AREA</b>				
l		Water Availability Standby charge (per property)	\$10	\$10
m		Ad valorem Property Tax	VARIES	VARIES
n		System Capacity Charge per new meter less than 1" (\$)*	\$5,312	\$5,328
o		Treatment Capacity Charge per new meter less than 1" (\$)*	\$147	\$149
		* varies by meter size		

Some of the items are charged to member agencies (items a-h), and others are charged to properties in the SDCWA service area (l-o).

Depending on the item, charges to member agencies vary by acre-feet of water supplied each month (items a-d), or by the individual agency's proportional share of a three-year or five-year rolling average of the total quantity supplied to all member agencies, or by the number of individual meter equivalents served by the agency in the previous year (h).<sup>22</sup>

Items a-d are volumetric charges. Economists classify these as *variable costs* for member agencies since they vary directly with the quantity of water delivered that year to the member agency. The other charges listed in Table 3 are fixed charges; these are what economists call *fixed costs* for member agencies because they do not vary directly with the quantity of water delivered that year to the member agency.<sup>23</sup> Items e-f-g do vary *indirectly* with the quantity of water delivered, in that they apportion to each member agency a portion of a quantum of fixed cost (\$25.6M, in the case of item e) based on the member agency's share of the total quantity delivered to all member agencies over a span of three or five years. A change in the quantity of water delivered to a member agency in 2021, say, will have the potential to change the agency's allotted share of a cost item e, f, or g three or five years hence.

SDCWA offers a separate rate for water delivered to member agencies for agricultural use known as the Permanent Special Agricultural Water Rate (PSAWR). The PSAWR rate applies item b in place of a.<sup>24</sup> It includes the transportation rate, c, the treatment rate, d, and the customer service charge, e, but it excludes the storage charge, f, and the supply reliability charge, g. In exchange for this special agricultural rate water users are subject to higher cutbacks compared to M&I users in the event of a supply limit imposed by MWD ("an allocation") or other water shortages faced by SDCWA.<sup>25</sup> PSAWR users do not receive the benefit from the supply reliability or storage programs since they do not pay the charges for those programs.<sup>26</sup>

For planning purposes, a common practice is to convert the fixed charges e-f-g-h into equivalent volumetric charges (\$/AF) by dividing them with the total (projected) quantity of water delivered to member agencies. For CY 2021, SDCWA estimates that its *all-in untreated water cost*<sup>27</sup> amounts to \$1,474/AF, while its *all-in treated water rate* amounts to \$1,769/AF.<sup>28</sup>

These all-in rates are averages across all SDCWA member agencies. For any individual member agency, its actual all-in rate for SDCWA water will vary with the quantity of water it buys that year from SDCWA, as well as with its mix of M&I water versus PSAWR water. The member agency allocations of fixed charges are based on the agencies' past shares of total water deliveries and

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<sup>22</sup> Customer service charge is applied to a three-year rolling average of all SDCWA deliveries; Storage charge is applied to a three-year rolling average of M&I (non-PSAWR deliveries); and Supply reliability charge applies to a five-year rolling average of M&I (non-PSAWR) deliveries.

<sup>23</sup> This does not imply that fixed charges cannot be lowered: it means that they cannot be lowered *just by delivering less water*.

<sup>24</sup> By design, SDCWA's agricultural water supply rate, item b, is kept the same as MWD's full volumetric rate for its Tier 1 water supply (items a plus c plus d in Table 4).

<sup>25</sup> If MWD imposed a reduction in its delivery of M-water (as opposed to E-water), deliveries to PSAWR users would be cut in the proportion used by MWD regardless of the availability of QSA water or Carlsbad water.

<sup>26</sup> Less than half of FPUD and RMWD's agricultural customers avail themselves of the PSAWR rate.

<sup>27</sup> The all-in cost is the unit cost or average cost of water.


<sup>28</sup> The all-in treated water agricultural water rate amounts to \$1,295/AF in CY 2021 and \$1,355 in CY 2022.

total M&I deliveries; if an agency takes less SDCWA water this year than it had in the past (which is especially true of FPUD in 2021 and 2022), it will raise its all-in SDCWA water rate.

**Q. How has the cost of SDCWA water changed over time?**

A. Figure 3, plots SDCWA’s all-in treated water rate over the period FY 1999 through FY 2019.<sup>29</sup>

**Figure 3 | SDCWA All-In Treated Water Rate 1998-1999 to 2018-2019**



The all-in treated water rate was \$516/AF in FY 1999, and it stayed around that level through FY 2003. It started to rise in FY 2004, and it grew at a faster rate after FY 2009. FPUD and RMWD have cited the increasing trend in SDCWA’s all-in treated water rate as their reason for wanting to depart from SDCWA.

<sup>29</sup> This figure was prepared by RMWD and presented to the RMWD Board of Directors on December 3, 2019. See Memorandum Subject: Consider Adoption of a Resolution of Application Authorizing the General Manager to Prepare and Submit an Application to the San Diego LAFCO to detach from SDCWA and Annex to EMWD.” Page 46 of 238.

## Q. What does MWD charge for water?

Table 4 below shows how MWD currently charges its member agencies for water this year.<sup>30</sup>

MWD's Tier 1 water supply rate applies to a member agency's water purchases that are within the agency's set Tier 1 maximum. In addition, MWD applies its System Access rate and its System Power rate to cover MWD's cost of transporting water delivered to member agencies. Up to CY 2020, MWD also applied its Water Stewardship Rate. Thus, the MWD Full-Service Tier 1 untreated rate, the sum of items a, c, d and f, amounted to \$755/AF for CY 2020, \$777/AF for CY 2021, and \$799/AF for CY 2022.

The Full-Service Tier 1 treated water rate (row k) adds in the treatment surcharge (item e), for a total of \$1,078/AF in CY 2020, \$1,104/AF in CY 2021, and \$1,143/AF in CY 2022.

Items a-f are all variable (volumetric) charges in the sense defined above. Items g and i are fixed charges, although they vary indirectly with the quantity of water delivered by MWD. Item g (the Readiness to Serve Charge, RTS) allocates to each member agency a portion of a fixed quantum (\$130M, in CY 2021) identified by MWD as recovering the cost of providing capacity, including emergency storage capacity, to meet outages and hydrologic variability. This cost is allocated to member agencies based on each agency's proportional share of a ten-year rolling average of all M-water deliveries.<sup>31</sup> It is a fixed charge in the short run; it is a variable charge in the long-run as the ten-year rolling average adjusts.

Item i (the Capacity Charge) is charged on each member agency's individual peak (maximum) summer day delivery of water from MWD measured, in cfs, over a three-calendar year period. This varies, therefore, with changes in peak daily delivery, but not with total annual delivery.

For planning purposes, SDCWA converts g and i into equivalent volumetric charges (\$/AF) by dividing them by the quantity of water it expects to purchase from MWD as a member agency (i.e., the quantity of M-water).<sup>32</sup> The table includes those equivalent per-acre foot charges (rows h and j) for CY 2020, 2021 and 2022, as presented to the SDCWA Board on 2-25-2021. What SDCWA refers to as MWD's all-in rate adds the per-acre foot equivalent MWD RTS and Capacity charges (rows h and j) to MWD's other charges (rows a+c+d+e+f) shown in Table 4.

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<sup>30</sup> The charge structure was different in the past. MWD used to have a special agricultural rate which was discontinued.

<sup>31</sup> Member agencies may choose to have a portion of their total RTS obligation offset by standby charge collections levied by MWD on their behalf, and SDCWA chooses to do this.

<sup>32</sup> This is a delicate calculation. In the case of row g, the per-acre-foot estimate varies depending on whether one uses the average annual delivery over the previous ten years, on which the RTS is based, the projected delivery to SCWA this year (used by SDCWA here), or the actual realized CY delivery.

TABLE 4 | MWD Water Rates and Charges

	ITEM	CY 2020	CY 2021	CY 2022
	<b>CHARGED TO MEMBER AGENCIES</b>			
a	Tier 1 Water supply rate (\$/AF)	\$208	\$243	\$243
b	Tier 2 Water supply rate (\$/AF)	\$295	\$285	\$285
c	System Access rate (\$/AF)	\$346	\$373	\$389
d	System Power rate (\$/AF)	\$136	\$161	\$167
e	Treatment surcharge (\$/AF)	\$323	\$327	\$344
f	Water Stewardship rate (\$/AF)	\$65	-	-
g	Readiness to Serve (RTS) charge (\$M)	\$136	\$130	\$140
h	Readiness to Serve charge (\$/AF)*	\$179	\$161	\$174
i	Capacity charge (\$/cfs)	\$8,800	\$10,700	\$12,200
j	Capacity charge (\$/AF)*	\$103	\$137	\$156
k	Full-service Tier 1 treated (\$/AF)	\$1,078	\$1,104	\$1,143
l = h+j+k	All-in Tier 1 treated charge (\$/AF)	\$1,360	\$1,402	\$1,473
	<b>CHARGED TO PROPERTIES IN SERVICE AREA</b>			
m	Ad Valorem Property Tax	VARIABLES	VARIABLES	VARIABLES
n	Standby charge per parcel	VARIABLES	VARIABLES	VARIABLES
	*Equivalent charge per acre foot for SDCWA.			

**Q. How does what SDCWA charges for water compare with what MWD charges?**

**A.** Comparisons of what MWD charges for water versus what SDCWA charges are typically framed in terms of the all-in rates for water discussed above.<sup>33</sup> Table 5 presents the comparison of SDCWA versus MWD all-in water rates in CY 2021.

**TABLE 5 | All-in Rates Compared (\$/AF) CY 2021**

	<b>SDCWA</b>	<b>MWD</b>
All-in untreated water rate	\$1,474	\$1,075
All-in treated water rate	\$1,769	\$1,402
Agricultural treated water rate (PSAWR)	\$1,295	NA

The all-in SDCWA treated water rate is about 26% higher than the all-in MWD treated water rate (\$1,769 vs \$1,402). This is due primarily to the difference in the charge for untreated water, where the SDCWA rate is about \$400/AF higher than the MWD rate, which amounts to a price differential of 37% (\$1,474 vs \$1,075). SDCWA’s treatment cost is about 10% lower than MWD’s treatment cost (\$295 vs \$327).<sup>34</sup>

**Q. Is it surprising that SDCWA charges more for water than MWD?**

**A.** No.

In addition to having its own source of water (E-water), SDCWA obtains water from an outside wholesale supplier, namely M-water from MWD. Every water agency that is supplied with water by an outside wholesaler supplies water to its own customers at a higher cost than what its wholesale supplier charges. This is because the water agency is both paying towards the costs of the wholesale supplier’s infrastructure and also covering the cost of its own supply infrastructure for its own service area.

Thus, there definitely should be a difference between what MWD charges and what SDCWA charges. SDCWA obtains water through the MWD pipeline at the north end of San Diego County and then maintains, operates and manages a distribution system serving the entire western portion of the county. It is obvious that there has to be some mark-up over MWD’s wholesale rate to cover the cost of maintaining, operating and managing water distribution in the county.

<sup>33</sup> I expand on that cost analysis below.

<sup>34</sup> Some commentaries have compared the MWD all-in untreated rate of \$1,075/AF with the SDCWA all-in treated rate of \$1,769/AF, but that is comparing apples with oranges. Others have compared SDCWA’s all-in treated water rate with MWD’s Full-service Tier 1 treated rate, rather than MWD’s all-in treated rate – see Figure 4 below.


It also should be noted that, just as SDCWA’s wholesale water rate has increased substantially over the past two decades, so has MWD’s wholesale rate.

I do not have the data to consistently compare SDCWA’s and MWD’s water rates over time. What I have is shown in Figure 4. This compares SDCWA’s *all-in* treated water rate not with MWD’s all-in rate (Table 4, row l) but, rather, with MWD’s *Full-service* Tier 1 treated water rate (row k). This omits the Readiness to Serve and Capacity charges imposed by MWD – rows h, j -- which amount to \$282/AF in CY 2020, \$298/AF in CY 2021, and \$330/AF in CY 2022. Figure 4 thus has the effect of overstating the rate differential between SDCWA and MWD. Nevertheless, it is probably correct in pinpointing when the differential began to widen.

From 2000 to 2005, the differential between SDCWA’s rate and MWD’s rate as depicted in Figure 4 was around \$100/AF; from 2006 to 2009, it was around \$150/AF. In 2010 it rose to about \$220/AF, in 2011 it became about \$300/AF, and it continued to rise thereafter. Thus 2010 seems to have been the turning point when SDCWA’s wholesale water rate began to rise significantly faster than MWD’s rate.

**FIGURE 4 | Comparison of SDCWA All-In Rates and MWD Full-Service Rate for Treated Water** <sup>35</sup>

*In dollars per acre foot*



Sources: San Diego County Water Authority; Metropolitan Water District of Southern California  
Karthika Namboothiri / The San Diego-Union Tribune

**Q. Is it significant that the differential between SDCWA rates and MWD rates widened starting around 2010?**

**A. Yes.**

<sup>35</sup>Joshua Smith “What Fallbrook and Rainbow’s revolt says about San Diego’s skyrocketing water rates” San Diego Union-Tribune December 18, 2021, retrieved on 12-28-2021 from <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/environment/story/2021-12-18/fallbrook-rainbow-revolt-water-rates>



That widening differential between SDCWA rates and MWD rates has been an important factor underlying FPU and RMWD's wish to detach from SDCWA.

**Q. Why did the differential between SDCWA rates and MWD rates widen starting around 2010?**

A. Below, I investigate four possible explanations:

- (1) QSA water (E-water) is more expensive for SDCWA than M-water from MWD.
- (2) The Carlsbad desalination water is more expensive for SDCWA than M-water from MWD.
- (3) SDCWA made major infrastructure investments soon before and after 2010; this was a time when MWD happened not to be making major infrastructure investments.
- (4) SDCWA was hit harder than MWD by a sharp reduction in demand for its water from its member agencies.

**Q. Is QSA water (E-water) more expensive for SDCWA than M-water from MWD?**

A. It depends on what is being referred to: more expensive in terms *average cost* or *marginal cost*? Also, more expensive in terms of *short-run* marginal cost or *long-run* marginal cost?

I compare here the average cost of QSA water for SDCWA versus the average cost of M-water, and also the marginal cost of E-water versus the long- and short-run marginal costs of M-water.

The average cost of water is defined as the total amount paid divided by the volume of water received; it is the cost per unit of water delivered (E-water or M-water). If this cost per unit is multiplied by the number of units of water delivered, this yields the total amount paid that year, inclusive of all charges, for E-water or M-water.

The marginal cost is defined as the change in total cost paid per unit change in the amount of water delivered. It measures the *incremental cost per incremental* unit of water.

The marginal cost is relevant when contemplating changes in the amount of water delivered. If a change in the amount of water delivered to SDCWA is contemplated, multiplying the marginal cost by the change in the delivered amount yields the change in total cost paid by SDCWA. Using the short-run marginal cost yields the savings in cost paid if this is a one-time reduction in water delivery that year. Using the long-run marginal cost yields savings in cost paid if the reduction in quantity delivered is sustained over a multi-year period.

While both variable and fixed costs count towards the calculation of average cost, only variable costs (volumetric charges) count towards the calculation of marginal cost. Thus, the all-in costs reported in the text preceding Table 5, and in Table 5 itself, are average costs, not marginal costs. Table 6A and 6B assess the cost of QSA water to SDCWA versus the cost of M-water in FY 2021 (as opposed to CY 2021), breaking cost down into its components and separately identifying average cost versus short-run marginal cost versus long-run marginal cost.

**TABLE 6a | AVERAGE/MARGINAL COST QSA E-WATER**

	ITEM	FORMULA	CY 2021		
			Rate (\$/AF)	Supply (AF)	Cost (\$M)
			(a)	(b)	(c)
1	IID transfer	$1(c) = 1(a)*1(b)$	\$688	200,000	\$137.6
2	IID early transfer	$2(c) = 2(a)*2(b)$	\$214	5,000	\$1.1
3	IID Socioeconomic reimbursement	$3(a) = 3(c)/3(b)$	(\$2)	205,000	(\$0.3)
4	Canal Lining OM&R	$4(c) = 4(a)*4(b)$	\$17	77,700	\$1.3
5	Canal Lining Debt Service	$5(a) = 5(c)/5(b)$	\$76	77,700	\$6.0
6	Total QSA charge (fixed cost)	$6(c) = 1(c) + \dots + 5(c)$			\$145.7
7	Melded QSA Supply rate (average cost)	$7(a) = 6(c)/7(b)$	\$515	282,700	
8	MWD System Access rate (marginal/average cost)	From Table 4	\$373		
9	MWD System Power rate (marginal/average cost)	From Table 4	\$161		
10	MWD Exchange rate (marginal/average cost)	$12(a) = 8(a) + 9(a)$	\$534		
11	Combined cost QSA supply (average cost)	$11(a) = 7(a) + 10(a)$	\$1,049		
12	Combined cost QSA supply (marginal cost)	$12(a) = 10(a)$	\$534		

Table 6A deals with the QSA water, which came to SDCWA in FY 2021 in three separate varieties: (i) regular transfer water whose amount had built up on a schedule specified in the 2003 Revised Fourth Amendment Transfer Agreement between SDCWA and IID; (ii) early transfer water which provided for the additional transfer of small quantities of IID water to SDCWA in 2020, 2021 and 2022 at a special, low price; and (iii) canal lining water which became available to SDCWA from the Coachella Canal in 2007 and from the All-American Canal between 2008 and 2010. IID transfer water came with a specified schedule of annual prices that grew over time. The price rose by roughly 10% a year between 2007 and 2015; from 2016 through 2034 it follows a price index which, so far, has been rising at less than 2% a year. For canal lining water, there is no charge for the water per se, but SDCWA pays an annual debt service on its financing of the canal lining, amounting to roughly \$76/AF per year, plus a small annual amount to cover the cost of operations, maintenance and replacement, which amounted to \$17/AF in 2021. In summary, of the two main supply items, canal lining water provides SDCWA with 77,700 AF/year at a current unit cost of \$93/AF which will increase by only a couple of dollars a year, and IID transfer water provides 200,000 AF/year at a purchase cost in FY 2021 of \$688, which, currently, is rising at less than 2% per year. The weighted average of the costs of these two forms of QSA water amounted, in FY 2021, to \$515/AF.

The key feature of these QSA costs is that, in economic terms, they are all fixed costs, stemming from commitments that SDCWA has made. SDCWA has committed to pay for the specified annual amounts of IID transfer water at the specified annual prices, and it borrowed money to co-fund the lining of the canals. Therefore, SDCWA's QSA expenditure would not be reduced if, for whatever reason, it decided to take less than 200,000AF/year from IID, or less than

77,700AF/year from the canal lining. These are long term commitments: the canal lining contract runs through 2113; the IID transfer contract runs through 2047 and can be extended to 2077 upon mutual consent.

To transport the QSA water from the Colorado River to the San Diego County service area, SDCWA signed the Exchange Agreement with MWD, which runs through 2047. Under this agreement, MWD charges a rate per acre-foot exchanged. In CY 2021, the exchange rate amounted to \$534/AF (row 10).

Prior to CY 2021, MWD's Exchange Rate for QSA water had also included the Water Stewardship charge levied by MWD (amounting to \$65/AF in CY 2020). In June 2010, SDCWA sued MWD challenging the Exchange Rate which MWD had adopted for CY 2011 and 2012 on the grounds that (i) MWD was misallocating certain SWP costs included in the System Access charge and System Power rate and wrongfully applying them towards the QSA water Exchange Rate, and (ii) the Stewardship rate was really a cost of MWD water supply and should not be included in the Exchange Rate.<sup>36</sup> The San Francisco Superior Court issued a ruling in April in 2015, which was then appealed. The California Court of Appeal issued its ruling in June 2017. My understanding is that the Superior Court essentially upheld both of SDCWA's claims, (i) and (ii); the Appeals Court reversed this judgment on (i) while upholding it on (ii). There is still ongoing litigation on these and other issues related to the Exchange Rate in more recent years.<sup>37</sup> However, MWD's Board of Directors decided to suspend the Stewardship rate for CY 2021 and 2022, thus removing it from both M-water and E-water.

If, for whatever reason, SDCWA had decided to take less than the contracted amounts of QSA water in CY 2021, it would have avoided paying the MWD Exchange Rate cost (\$534/AF) per acre-foot not taken, but it would still have had to pay the contracted total of \$145.7M shown in row 6 of Table 6A. Thus, the average (unit) cost of QSA water for SDCWA in CY 2021 was \$1,049/AF (= \$515 + 534), while the marginal cost saved by taking a smaller amount of QSA water than was contracted for would have been \$534/AF.

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<sup>36</sup> MWD used the Stewardship rate to fund member agency investments in local resources including recycled water, conservation and demand management.

<sup>37</sup> According to a press release issued by SDCWA on 10-28-2021, the two parties are now seeking to resolve the remaining issues outside of court. Also, MWD recently refunded to SDCWA some excess payment of the Stewardship rate plus interest.

**TABLE 6b | Average/Marginal Cost of MWD M-Water**

	ITEM	FORMULA	CY 2021 Rate (\$/AF)
1	MWD Tier 1 untreated rate (marginal/average cost)	From Table 4	\$243
2	MWD System Access rate (marginal/average cost)	From Table 4	\$373
3	MWD System Power rate (marginal/average cost)	From Table 4	\$161
4	Tier 1 full service untreated	4 = 1 + 2 + 3	\$777
5	Treatment surcharge		\$327
6	Tier 1 full service treated	6 = 4 + 5	\$1,104
7	Readiness to Serve (long-run marginal cost)	Total amount of RTS/Projected total MWD delivery	\$88
8	Readiness to Serve (average cost)	= SDCWA RTS/actual SDCWA delivery	\$161
9	Capacity Charge (average cost)	= SDCWA Capacity charge/actual SDCWA delivery	\$137
10	All-in MWD Tier 1 untreated (average cost)	10 = 4 + 8 + 9	\$1,075
11	All-in MWD Tier 1 treated (average cost)	11 = 6 + 8 + 9	\$1,402
12	All-in MWD Tier 1 untreated (long-run marginal cost)	12 = 4 + 7	\$865
13	All-in MWD Tier 1 untreated (short-run marginal cost)	13 = 4	\$777

Table 6B shows the costs to SDCWA of M-water from MWD. As with QSA water, there are two main charges: a cost for the water itself and a cost to transport it through MWD’s system to the SDCWA service area. In addition, there are some other MWD charges that do not vary directly with the quantity of M-water supplied that year.

The cost for the water itself is the Tier 1 untreated rate (row 1), which in CY 2021 amounted to \$243/AF. The variable costs are the MWD System Access charge and the System Power Rate (rows 2, 3), which together total \$534/AF.

The other charges for untreated M-water are the Capacity charge and the Readiness to Serve (RTS) charge (rows 8, 9). The Capacity charge depends on the peak (maximum) daily delivery of water by MWD to a member agency. If the annual delivery of water to a member agency changes but the peak daily delivery does *not* change, then the Capacity charge would be effectively a fixed cost, not a variable cost, and it would not count towards the marginal cost of M-water.<sup>38</sup> The RTS charge does count towards the marginal cost of M-water, but it counts differently in the long-run and the short-run.

Converting these charges to a per-acre-foot equivalent is non-trivial, and it produces varying estimates depending on whether the quantity of water being divided into these charges is the projected water use looking forward over the coming year or the historical water use that actually materialized, looking backward. Also, in the case of the RTS, it makes a difference whether one uses an agency’s proportional share of a ten-year rolling average of total M-water deliveries or

<sup>38</sup> The flow of M-water to SDCWA drives the capacity charge paid to MWD by SDCWA. Since E-water is delivered in equal monthly instalments under the Exchange Agreement, it should not impact the peak daily flow received by SDCWA from MWD.

its actual delivery that year. In the case of the per-acre-foot equivalents of the RTS and the Capacity charge reported by SDCWA and used in Table 4 (rows j and l) and Table 6B (rows 8 and 9), I believe SDCWA was using the projected water delivery that calendar year. The difference between the amounts reported in row 7 versus row 8 of Table 6B is as follows. The amount in row 7 (\$88/AF) is the MWD-wide RTS charge per acre foot, obtained by taking the target amount to be raised through this charge (\$130M in CY 2021) and dividing it by the past ten-year rolling average total delivery of M-water to all MWD member agencies (1,475,544 AF). However, the amount of M-water taken by SDCWA has been declining over the past 10 years (see Tables 8 and 9 below), so that amount of M-water projected to be taken by SDCWA in CY 2021 is below its proportionate share of that ten-year average. Dividing SDCWA’s proportional share of the \$130M RTS charge by the lower amount of its projected delivery of M-water in CY 2021 raises SDCWA’s average per acre-foot RTS charge from the systemwide average of \$88/AF to \$161/AF (row 8).

Table 7 summarizes the results of this analysis. It shows SDCWA’s average supply costs of QSA water and M-Water in FY 2021, broken down into three components: cost per unit for water supply, cost per unit for conveyance, and cost per unit for fixed charges. It also shows the marginal supply cost of QSA water and the long- and short-run marginal supply costs of M-water. In FY 2021, the average cost of M-water from MWD was a little higher than the average cost of QSA water, \$ 1,075/AF versus \$1,049/AF, and the short- and long-run marginal costs of M-water were also higher than those of E-water.

**TABLE 7 | SDCWA’s Supply Cost for Untreated E-Water vs. M-Water**

ITEM	CY 2021	
	E-WATER	M-WATER
<b>Average cost (\$/AF)</b>		
Water supply	\$515	\$243
Conveyance	\$534	\$534
Fixed charges		\$298
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,049</b>	<b>\$1,075</b>
<b>Long-run Marginal cost (\$/AF)</b>	<b>\$501</b>	<b>\$865</b>
<b>Short-run Marginal cost (\$/AF)</b>	<b>\$501</b>	<b>\$777</b>

Table 8 extends the analysis back in time to 2003 when delivery of QSA started, on a CY basis. Following the methodology employed in Tables 6A,B and 7, the cost reported in column (C) of Table 8 represents the average cost of QSA water for SDCWA, while the cost reported in column (B) is the marginal cost of QSA water. The cost reported in column (G) is the long-run marginal cost of M-water for SDCWA.<sup>39</sup> I do not have the data needed to calculate SDCWA’s average cost

<sup>39</sup> The sum of columns (D) and (E) constitutes the short-run marginal cost of MWD water.

of MWD water over the period 2003-2020. I don't know the per-acre-foot equivalent of the short-run MWD RTS charge (SDCWA's actual annual payment by divided by the amount of M-water actually delivered that year), but it is probably larger than the amount recorded in column F in the same way that row 8 in Table 6B is larger than row 7. I also do not know the per-acre-foot equivalent of the annual MWD Capacity charge, corresponding to row 9 in Table 6B. Those two missing items should be added to the number in column (G) to calculate the average cost of M-water. This would significantly reduce the cost difference between QSA water and M-water, shown in column (I), and reverse it in some years.

Two conclusions emerge from this analysis:

- (1) While the annual average cost of QSA water for SDCWA may have been higher than that of M-water from MWD in some individual years, that difference would not have been large. Quite often the costs would have been about the same. Sometimes, including recently, the average cost of QSA water was lower than that of M-water.
- (2) It is unlikely that the importation of QSA water starting in 2003 had a significant role in the widening of the gap between the all-in SDCWA rate and the all-in MWD rate starting around 2010, as depicted in Figure 5.

**TABLE 8 | SDCWA's Supply Cost for Untreated E-Water vs. M-Water**

CY	QSA (E-WATER)			MWD M-WATER					RATIO QSA/MWD (C)/(G)	QSA WATER SHARE *
	QSA OVERALL	MWD EXCHANGE	QSA TOTAL	TIER 1 UNTRD	ACCESS + POWER	READINESS	TIER 1 UNTRD			
	RATE	RATE	COST	RATE	+ STEWARDSHIP	TO SERVE	TOTAL COST			
	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)			
(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)		
2003	258	253	\$511	\$73	\$253	\$52	\$378	135.1%	1.5%	
2004	267	253	\$520	\$73	\$253	\$52	\$378	137.4%	3.0%	
2005	276	258	\$534	\$73	\$258	\$50	\$381	140.0%	5.5%	
2006	286	258	\$544	\$73	\$258	\$49	\$380	143.1%	6.8%	
2007	225	258	\$483	\$73	\$258	\$48	\$379	127.4%	10.5%	
2008	214	278	\$492	\$73	\$278	\$49	\$400	123.0%	14.4%	
2009	191	314	\$505	\$107	\$314	\$53	\$474	106.6%	26.2%	
2010	226	314	\$540	\$101	\$314	\$60	\$475	113.6%	33.9%	
2011	238	372	\$610	\$103	\$372	\$60	\$535	114.0%	35.2%	
2012	312	396	\$708	\$104	\$396	\$78	\$578	122.6%	41.1%	
2013	332	453	\$785	\$106	\$453	\$78	\$637	123.3%	36.6%	
2014	363	445	\$808	\$140	\$445	\$94	\$679	118.9%	31.5%	
2015	381	424	\$805	\$148	\$424	\$91	\$663	121.4%	35.9%	
2016	383	438	\$821	\$156	\$438	\$89	\$683	120.2%	40.9%	
2017	385	465	\$850	\$201	\$465	\$100	\$766	110.9%	50.1%	
2018	429	486	\$915	\$209	\$486	\$83	\$778	117.6%	55.6%	
2019	464	522	\$986	\$209	\$522	\$82	\$813	121.3%	74.7%	
2020	494	547	\$1,041	\$208	\$547	\$87	\$842	123.5%	87.6%	
* QSA share of combined QSA + MWD supply										

**Q. Tables 7 and 8 show that SDCWA pays a higher unit cost for water supply for QSA water compared to MWD M-water, but exactly the same unit cost for conveyance. Is this surprising?**

**A.** The fact that the water supply cost per unit of QSA water is higher than that for M-water is not a surprise. The fact that the conveyance cost per unit of QSA water is the same as that of M-water *is* something of a surprise.

**Q. Why is it not a surprise that the water supply cost per unit of QSA water is higher than that for M-water?**

**A.** Three factors explain why the supply cost of MWD M-water is relatively low.

1) There is no water supply cost per se for the water that MWD obtains from the Colorado River under its own water right of 550,000 AF.

2) MWD does pay for the 108,000 AF of Colorado River water that it contracted to obtain from IID in 1988; that price was represented by IID as \$128/AF.

In the negotiation with IID, MWD required that the price of this water “not exceed -- indeed, remain below – the cost for State Water Project deliveries south of the Tehachapi’s (at the time \$249/AF inclusive of power charges to get the water over the mountains).”<sup>40</sup> IID had wanted to receive a higher price which MWD rejected. The outcome was that IID did not sell an additional 200,000 AF to MWD which had been on the table. This is the supply that SDCWA contracted for with IID in 1998, at an initial cost (in 2003) of \$253/AF, roughly twice what MWD had been willing to pay in 1988.

3) The supply cost component of water projects – whether the SWP or the lining of the Coachella and All-American canals – are typically based on the historical construction cost of the project, not the future replacement cost. With inflation over time, the supply cost of water from an older project is lower than that of a more recently constructed project: older water is cheaper. The SWP, the major NON-Colorado River source of MWD water, was constructed in the 1960s and is older water.

**Q. Why is it something of a surprise that the conveyance cost of QSA water is exactly the same as that of M-water?**

**A.** The Exchange Rate set by MWD is based on its cost of transporting all of its water, not just water from the Colorado River but also SWP water from Northern California. The setting of this rate was beset by contention from the very beginning – there was what has been called a “wheeling-rate war” between SDCWA and MWD in which their other past feuds became

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<sup>40</sup> Norris Hundley, *The Great Thirst*, University of California Press, Revised edition, 2001, p. 474.



entangled.<sup>41</sup> The wheeling rate that emerged reflected MWD’s desire “that SDCWA continue paying its full share of MWD expenses”<sup>42</sup> rather than being a fine-grained calculation of the economic cost to MWD of transporting and exchanging QSA water.

SDCWA has stated that the real point-to-point cost to MWD for performing the exchange of QSA water is less than half the Exchange Rate charged by MWD.<sup>43</sup> However, I am not in a position to make my own assessment of that statement.

SDCWA first sued MWD with regard to the proposed Exchange Rate in 1997. The litigation continued on and off since then, picking up in 2010, and continuing in some form to the present day. The Court of Appeal ruled in 2017 that the Exchange Rate is not illegal. That does not make it actually fair or reasonable. The Court held that: “[s]ubstantial deference must be given to [Metropolitan’s] determination of its rate design. Rates established by the lawful rate-fixing body are presumed reasonable, fair and lawful.”<sup>44</sup>

**Q. Could the sharp increase in SDCWA’s all-in water rate be due to the desalinated seawater from the Carlsbad Facility?**

**A.** At a CY 2021-unit cost of \$2,752/AF,<sup>45</sup> water from the Carlsbad Facility is significantly more expensive for SDCWA than purchased MWD water with an all-in rate of \$1,075/AF. But this is unlikely to explain much of the escalation in the SDCWA’s all-in water rate for two reasons.

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<sup>41</sup> Hundley, *op. cit.*, pp 483-501.

<sup>42</sup> Hundley, *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> For example, Dan Denham presentation to SDCWA Imported Water Committee, January 26, 2017.

<sup>44</sup> 2017 Ruling, p. 29, citing a 2004 ruling in SDCWA’s earlier litigation against MWD.

<sup>45</sup> Presentation by Jeremy Crutchfield to SDCWA Board of Directors, October 22, 2020.

**TABLE 9 | Total Water Use in SDCWA Service Area, Broken Down By Source**

Fiscal Year	Water Authority Supplies				Total Water Used	Total Supplied by SDCWA
	Local Supplies	Seawater Desalination	QSA	From MWD		
1999	150,173	-	-	454,436	604,609	454,436
2012	111,914	-	156,604	282,948	551,466	439,552
2013	104,081	-	183,500	296,472	584,052	479,971
2014	97,185	-	180,256	325,729	603,170	505,985
2015	53,668	-	180,123	305,039	538,830	485,162
2016	62,875	25,599	179,347	187,057	454,877	392,003
2017	74,910	34,421	178,278	189,919	477,528	402,618
2018	125,699	34,907	194,326	163,639	518,570	392,871
2019	98,526	40,036	192,241	132,831	463,634	365,108
2020	116,706	33,157	230,430	82,843	463,137	346,431
2021	138,171	47,530	274,702	42,322	502,725	364,554
<b>BREAKDOWN OF ALL SOURCES BY SHARE</b>						
Fiscal Year	Local Supplies	Seawater Desalination	QSA	From MWD		
1999	24.8%	-	-	75.2%		
2012	20.3%	-	28.4%	51.3%		
2013	17.8%	-	31.4%	50.8%		
2014	16.1%	-	29.9%	54.0%		
2015	10.0%	-	33.4%	56.6%		
2016	13.8%	5.6%	39.4%	41.1%		
2017	15.7%	7.2%	37.3%	39.8%		
2018	24.2%	6.7%	37.5%	31.6%		
2019	21.3%	8.6%	41.5%	28.6%		
2020	25.2%	7.2%	49.8%	17.9%		
2021	27.5%	9.5%	54.6%	8.4%		
<b>BREAKDOWN OF SDCWA SUPPLY BY SOURCE</b>						
Fiscal Year	Seawater Desalination	QSA	From MWD			
1999	-	-	100.0%			
2012	-	35.6%	64.4%			
2013	-	38.2%	61.8%			
2014	-	35.6%	64.4%			
2015	-	37.1%	62.9%			
2016	6.5%	45.8%	47.7%			
2017	8.5%	44.3%	47.2%			
2018	8.9%	49.5%	41.7%			
2019	11.0%	52.7%	36.4%			
2020	9.6%	66.5%	23.9%			
2021	13.0%	75.4%	11.6%			

First, the sharp increase in SDCWA’s all-in rate began around 2010, but SDCWA did not start receiving Carlsbad water until 2016.

Second, since 2016 Carlsbad water has accounted for only a small fraction of the water delivered by SDCWA -- see Table 9.

Table 10 compares the unit cost (average cost) of the three sources of water used by SDCWA: QSA (E-water); desalinated water from the Carlsbad facility; and M-water from MWD.

**TABLE 10 | SDCWA's Untreated Water Supply Cost**

	<b>WATER SOURCE</b>	<b>Supply Share</b>	<b>Unit Cost (\$/AF)</b>		
a	QSA (E-water)	75.4%	\$1,049		
	Desal (Carlsbad)	13.0%	\$2,725		
b	MWD (M-water)	11.6%	\$1,075		
	<b>WEIGHTED AVERAGE</b>		<b>\$1,271</b>		
a = Melded QSA (\$515) + MWD Exchange rate (\$534)					
b = Full service Tier 1 untrd (\$777) + RTS (\$161) + Capacity (\$137)					

If SDCWA had not used any Carlsbad Desal water and, instead, delivered a 75-25 mix of E- and M-water in CY 2021, its water cost would have been \$1,056/AF instead of \$1,271/AF, a savings of \$215/AF. However, Carlsbad Desal water is more reliable than E- or M-water because it is not derived from streamflow that is being affected by climate change. Moreover, the \$215/AF cost differential between Carlsbad and E/M-water accounts for only part of the \$399/AF differential between SDCWA's and MWD's rates for untreated water (Table 5). So, something else is at work. I believe that two other factors contributed to the rate differential: (1) SDCWA invested in some major water supply infrastructure just before and after 2010, a period when MWD happened not to be making any unusually large investments. (2) Between 2010 and now, SDCWA experienced twice as large a reduction in member agency demand as MWD and that would have caused the rate differential to widen, given that both agencies have very high fixed costs.

**Q. Could the fact that SDCWA made some major infrastructure investments soon before and after 2010 help explain the widening of the gap between the all-in SDCWA rate and the all-in MWD rate starting around 2010?**

**A.** Yes. In those years, SDCWA made some major investments in water supply infrastructure projects, including the following:<sup>46</sup>

Olivenhain Dam (2003)	\$198M
Coachella Canal Lining (2006)	\$129M
Twin Oaks Treatment Plant (2007)	\$179M
All-American Canal Lining (2009)	\$149M

<sup>46</sup> Amounts and dates taken from presentation to SDCWA Board, 6-9-2015.

San Vicente Pipeline (2011)	\$300M
Lake Hodges Pumped Storage (2012)	\$208M
San Vicente Dam Raise (2014)	\$825M
Carlsbad Desal Facility (2015)	\$1,000M

Figures 5A and 5B together chart SDCWA annual capital improvement program expenditures between FY1991 and FY 2021. Annual CAPEX expenditures from 2006 through 2010 reached levels above \$250M, roughly double the amount in the years before or since then. These were substantial financial commitments for SDCWA.


To illustrate the scale of this financial commitment by SDCWA, it is useful to make the comparison with MWD’s capital improvement expenditures (Figure 6). In the recent period, MWD had CIP expenditures exceeding \$300M only in FY 2007-2008-2009, and its annual CIP expenditure in those peak years was about \$500M, less than twice SDCWA’s peak annual expenditure, while MWD delivers three to four times more water than SDCWA.

It is not that MWD has never undertaken capital investments on the scale experienced by SDCWA around 2010. MWD had made comparably scaled financial commitments at the time of the construction of the State Water Project.


CIP investments tends to occur in cycles, and the period around 2010 found SDCWA and MWD at different phases of their investment cycles.

Figures 7A and 7B show that SDCWA took on significant debt to finance these investments, but this large debt burden will be extinguished by 2039.

**FIGURE 5a | SDCWA CIP Spending FY 1991-2014<sup>47</sup>**



**FIGURE 5b | SDCWA CIP Spending FY 2000-2021<sup>48</sup>**



<sup>47</sup> Presentation to SDCWA Board, 6-28-2012.

<sup>48</sup> Presentation to SDCWA Board, 1-28-2021.

FIGURE 6 | MWD CIP Expenditures FY 1996-FY 2025<sup>49</sup>






FIGURE 7a | Paying for Major Infrastructure: Debt Serviced Through 2050<sup>50</sup>



<sup>49</sup> Figure 5-2 in MWD 2020 Annual Report.

<sup>50</sup> Presentation to SDCWA Board, 6-28-2012.

**FIGURE 7b | SDCWA Debt Service<sup>51</sup>**



**Q. Was SDCWA hit harder than MWD by a reduction in the revenue-earning supply of water to member agencies?**

**A. Yes.**


Figure 3 above depicts something else that changed for RMWD besides the price of SDCWA water. The amount of water purchased by RMWD from SDCWA fell dramatically from around 30,000 AF through about 2006 to around 14,297 AF in 2020. The reduction in water demand may have been especially pronounced in RMWD because of the large component of agricultural water use, which is likely to be more price-sensitive than urban use generally. However, a striking reduction in water demanded by member agencies was occurring at this time throughout SDCWA’s service area. The phenomenon was not limited to RMWD. It was driven by two things: a very substantial reduction in per capita water use in SDCWA’s service area combined with increased development of member agency local supplies.

Figure 8 documents the very substantial decline in per capita water use in SDCWA’s service area. Per capita use declined by 19% between 1990 and 2005 and by even more between 2005 and 2017 -- 35%.

<sup>51</sup> Presentation to SDCWA Board, 1-26-2017.




**FIGURE 8 | Decline in Per Capita Potable Water Use in SDCWA Service Area<sup>52</sup>**



The reduction in water sales by SDCWA to its member agencies was even larger than the reduction in per capita water use, as shown in Figure 9.

**FIGURE 9 | SDCWA Supply to Member Agencies<sup>53</sup>**



<sup>52</sup> Presentation by Tim Bombadier to SDCWA Board, February 22, 2018.


<sup>53</sup> Presentation to SDCWA Board of Directors, January 28, 2021.

Sales to member agencies declined from over 600,000 AF in 2008 to about 365,000 AF in 2020, a reduction of almost 40%.

The fact that sales to member agencies declined by more than the reduction in per capita use signifies the effect of increased development of member agency local supply.

MWD also experienced a reduction in the volume of water purchased from it by its member agencies. MWD's sales to member agencies are shown in Figure 11. Note that MWD includes in this data the QSA water that it supplies to SDCWA under the Exchange Agreement. However, as noted above, it earns significant revenue from this water. Between 2008 and 2020, there was a 20% reduction in MWD's sales of revenue-earning water. This is about half the magnitude of the reduction in SDCWA's sales of revenue-earning water shown in Figure 10.

**FIGURE 10 | MWD Supply to Member Agencies (Fiscal Years)<sup>54</sup>**



<sup>54</sup> Figure 3-8 in MWD 2020 Annual Report.

**Q. Could SDCWA’s larger reduction in the supply of revenue-earning water help explain the widening of the gap between the all-in SDCWA rate and the all-in MWD rate starting around 2010?**

**A. Yes, assuming that, for both SDCWA and MWD, a large share of operating costs is fixed costs.**

**Q. Is it the case that, for both SDCWA and MWD, a large share of their operating costs is fixed costs?**

**A. Yes. Table 11 presents a breakdown of SDCWA operating expenditures in FY 2020. Table 12 similarly presents a breakdown of MWD’s operating expenditures for FY 2021.**

**TABLE 11 | SDCWA Expenditures FY 2020**

		ITEM	\$ Thousands	Percent	Cost Type
		Water Supply			
a		Colorado River Water			
b		MWD Wheeling Cost	\$119,184	15.1%	Fixed
c		All other Colorado River water costs	\$124,414	15.8%	Fixed
d		Water Purchased from MWD	\$82,967	10.5%	Variable
e		Carlsbad Desal Plant	\$97,934	12.4%	Fixed
f		All Other Water Supply Expenses	\$61,639	7.8%	Fixed
g	= a + ... + f	Subtotal - water supply	\$486,138	61.7%	
h		Operating Departments*	\$54,252	6.9%	Fixed
i	= g + h	<b>COST OF WATER OPERATIONS</b>	\$540,390	68.5%	
j		Debt Service*	\$148,716	18.9%	Fixed
k		CIP Expenditures*	\$81,111	10.3%	Fixed
l		Equipment Replacements*	\$3,012	0.4%	Fixed
m		Grant Expenditures*	\$13,162	1.7%	Fixed
n		Other Expenditures*	\$1,944	0.2%	Fixed
	= i + ... + n	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$788,335</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	
* NOTE: "Variable" means that this revenue varies directly with the quantity of water delivered that year by SDCWA to its member agencies. "Fixed" means that the revenue does not vary directly with the quantity of water delivered that year.					
* FY20 obtained by halving FY20 & 21 amount in Table 1.					
SOURCE: SDCWA Adopted Budget FY 2021 & 2022, Table 1, p.26.					

For SDCWA, I estimate that only about 15% (= row d/row i) of its cost of operation in FY 2020 was variable cost, namely the portion associated with its purchase of M-water.<sup>55</sup> Back in 2010, however, M-water constituted a larger component of SDCWA's supply than now. Instead of being about 24% of SDCWA's supply in 2020 (Table 9), M-water was about two-thirds of SDCWA's supply in 2010, QSA water being the rest. As a rough estimate, I assume that the purchase of M-water – SDCWA's only variable cost component – might have accounted for about 30% of SDCWA's cost of operation in 2010.

For MWD, I estimate that only about 12% (= rows a + c) of its cost of operation in FY 2021 is variable cost. I assume that the proportion was roughly the same back in 2010.

**TABLE 12 | MWD Planned Expenditures FY 2021**

	ITEM	\$ Thousands	Percent	Cost Type
	<b>State Water Project</b>			
a	Variable Transportation & OAC*	\$166,984	9.2%	Variable
b	All other SWP costs	\$473,784	26.0%	Fixed
c	Colorado River Power Costs	\$52,237	2.9%	Variable
d	Supply Programs	\$68,683	3.8%	Fixed
e	Demand Management	\$48,532	2.7%	Fixed
f	Operating Departments*	\$529,254	29.1%	Fixed
g	Recycled Water Program Planning Costs	\$15,000	0.8%	Fixed
h	Other Operating costs	\$14,878	0.8%	Fixed
i	<b>Subtotal - cost of water operations</b>	<b>\$1,369,352</b>	<b>75.2%</b>	
j	Capital Financing	\$408,690	22.5%	Fixed
k	Increase/(Decrease) in Required Reserves	\$42,400	2.3%	Fixed
<b>l = i + j + k</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$1,820,442</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	
NOTE: "Variable" means that this expenditure varies directly with the quantity of water delivered that year by MWD its member agencies. "Fixed" means that the expenditure does not vary directly with the quantity of water delivered that year.				
* Estimate				

<sup>55</sup> The cost associated with the MWD Exchange Agreement would become a variable cost if SDCWA decided to take less than its committed quantity of IID Transfer water or canal lining water, but I see that as highly unlikely at present.

**Q. How could SDCWA’s larger reduction in the supply of revenue-earning water help explain the widening of the gap between the all-in SDCWA rate and the all-in MWD rate starting around 2010?**

In the case of SDCWA in 2010, under my assumptions 70% of its total operating cost was fixed cost and would not change if it sold less water; 30% of its total operating cost was variable costs and this *would* fall if it sold less water. If it sold 40% less water, its total variable cost would go down by 40%. Its total operating cost – fixed plus variable -- would go down by only 12%: 70% of that cost would not change, while the other 30% would fall by 40%.

Its total operating cost would fall by 12%, but this cost would now have to be raised from the sale of 40% less water. SDCWA would be financing 88% of the previous cost while selling only 60% of the previous quantity of water. This would raise the unit cost per acre-foot sold by 47%.

Turning to MWD in 2010, under my assumptions 88% of its total operating cost was fixed costs and would not change if it sold less water. 12% of its total operating cost was variable costs and this *would* fall if MWD sold less water. If it sold 20% less water, its total variable cost would go down by 20%. Its total operating cost – fixed plus variable -- would go down by only 2.4%: 88% of that cost would not change, while the other 12% would fall by 20%.

MWD’s total operating cost would fall by 2.4%, but this cost would now have to be raised from the sale of 20% less water. MWD would be financing 97.6% of the previous cost while selling only 80% of the previous quantity of water. This would raise the unit cost per acre-foot sold by about 22%, or just under half SDCWA’s increase in unit cost. Table 13 summarizes these calculations.

**TABLE 13 | Impact of Sales Reduction on Unit Cost**

<b>SDCWA</b>	<b>MWD</b>
Total cost drops by 12% (= 0.4*0.3)	Total cost drops by 2.4% (= 0.2*0.12)
AF sold drops by 40%	AF sold drops by 20%
Cost (\$/AF) <i>rises</i> by 47% (= 0.88/0.6)	Cost (\$/AF) <i>rises</i> by 22% (= 0.976/0.8)

Two conclusions result from this analysis:

- 1) When the cost of water supply contains a large, fixed cost component, a reduction in the quantity of water supplied raises the unit cost to provide water, and this puts upwards pressure on rates charged for the water.
- 2) Since SDCWA experienced about twice as large a sales reduction starting in 2010 as that experienced by MWD, this would have caused the rate differential between SDCWA’s water rate and MWD’s water rate to widen after 2010.

**Q. In summary, what caused the differential between SDCWA's all-in water rate and MWD's all-in water rate to widen starting around 2020?**

**A.** Here are my conclusions:

- 1) Given the way that QSA water was priced under the Exchange Agreement with MWD, the importation of QSA water did not have a significant role in the widening of the rate differential that started around 2010.
- 2) Using water from the Carlsbad Desalination Facility contributes in some degree to the rate differential but only since 2016: it was not a factor in 2010 -2015.
- 3) SDCWA's investment in some major water supply infrastructure projects just before and after 2010, a period when MWD happened generally not to be making major infrastructure investments, caused the rate differential to widen starting around 2010.
- 4) The fact that SDCWA experienced a 40% reduction in member agencies' demand for its water between 2010 and now, while MWD experienced only a 20% reduction, also would have caused the rate differential to widen.

**Q. Was the reduction in member agency demand for SDCWA water starting around 2010 caused by the increase in SDCWA's all-in water rate?**

**A.** On the whole, I believe the answer is no.

I believe the reduction in member agency demand starting around 2010 was driven by two longer-run trends that were set in motion before the differential in SDCWA and MWD all-in rates started to widen in 2010. Those trends were

- 1) Increased conservation which accelerated following the experience of the 2007-2009 drought in California and motivated Governor Schwarzenegger's 2009 initiative requiring that urban water demand be reduced by 20% by the year 2020.
- 2) increased development of local supplies, including expanded use of treated groundwater and treated wastewater.

Higher water rates at the retail level will have complemented these trends,<sup>56</sup> but I do not believe that higher retail water rates were generally the prime mover.

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<sup>56</sup> There is some evidence that urban water agencies with increasing block rates that sharpened those rate structures during the 2014-2016 drought had more success in meeting Governor Brown's conservation mandate than other urban water agencies.

**Q. Did the increase in SDCWA’s water rates cause agricultural water use to decline in SDCWA’s service area?**

**A.** Table 14 presents data on the trends in total water use and agricultural water use within SDWCA’s service area and within RMWD, using data from their respective Urban Water Management Reports.

In both cases, there was a substantial drop in both total water use and agricultural water use between 2005 and 2010, and between 2015 and 2020. By comparison, the changes in water use between 2010 and 2015 were smaller. The drop in water use between 2005 and 2010 came about in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 drought; the drop between 2015 and 2020 was in the aftermath of the 2014-2016 drought.

It looks as though the drought experiences may have had more impact on water use than the increase in SDCWA water rates following 2010.

**TABLE 14 | Trends in Water Use, SDCWA and RMWD**

	SDCWA*		RMWD**	
YEAR	AGRICULTURAL USE (AF)	TOTAL USE (AF)	AGRICULTURAL USE (AF)	TOTAL USE (AF)
2005	83,480	642,152	19,298	24,154
2010	43,515	566,443	11,854	18,158
2015	41,055	539,361	12,312	20,062
2020	37,100	463,128	8,876	14,297
* Fiscal year				
** Calendar year				

**Q. Will the differential between SDCWA water rates and MWD water rates stay this wide in future, or widen, or become smaller?**

**A.** I don’t know.

The recent trend has been for the average cost of M-water to SDCWA to grow faster than the that of QSA water. That would tend to narrow the differential between SDCWA’s all-in rate and MWD’s all-in rate.

**Q. Are the rates that SDCWA has charged its member agencies unfair?**

**A.** I will note two facts.

- 1) So far, I have not been presented with any evidence that would support a claim of unfairness by SDCWA.

- 2) Whether or not one agrees with this, it is worth quoting what the California Court of Appeal has stated: "Rates established by the lawful rate-fixing body [of a water agency] are presumed reasonable, fair and lawful."

**Q. Has FPUD and/or RMWD paid an unfairly high share of SDCWA's fixed charges?**

**A. No.**

The report by London Moeder Advisors, *Rainbow MWD and Fallbrook PUD Cost-Benefit Analysis of SDCWA Membership* dated 9-15-2020 asserts that, in the years from 2009 to 2019, FPUD and RMNWD paid an excessively large share of the fixed charges collected by SDCWA and, over that period, subsidized the other member agencies by \$49.5 M. It also asserts that, over this period, FPUD and RMWD achieved a benefit-to-cost ration of 0.12 from the payment of fixed charges, while the remaining SDCWA member agencies benefited from this imbalance, representing a benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.04.

I have analyzed those assertions – see Appendix A – and find that they lack foundation.



## 2.3 THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF DETACHMENT

This section analyzes both the financial impact on the other member agencies of SDCWA if FPUD and/or RMWD detach from SDCWA and also the financial impact on FPUD and RMWD.

I start with the financial impact on SDCWA member agencies. Then I discuss the financial impact on FPUD and RMWD.

The detachment of a member agency reduces the revenues received by SDCWA. It also to some degree reduces the expenses incurred by SDCWA in operating in its water supply and distribution system. The key question is the *net* impact: will SDCWA's revenues be reduced by as much or more than its operating expenses?

### Q. How large are FPUD and RMWD in relation to the other SDCWA member agencies?

A. FPUD and RMWD accounted for 1.7%<sup>57</sup> of the population served by SDCWA in FY 2020 and 8.1%<sup>58</sup> of the acreage in SDCWA's service area.<sup>59</sup> Tables 15 shows the breakdown of SDCWA deliveries over the period FY 2017 – FY 2021 to FPUD and RMWD versus other member agencies.<sup>60</sup> Over this period, FPUD accounted for an average of 2.3% of all SDCWA deliveries to member agencies, and RMWD accounted for 4.4%. which represents a higher rate of usage per capita, but not per acre, than the average across all member agencies.

Going forward, FPUD's share of water delivered to SDCWA member agencies will fall as the Santa Margarita Conjunctive-Use Project comes on-line.

About 42% of the water received by FPUD and RMWD has come under the SDCWA's Permanent Special Agricultural Water Rate (PSAWR) program for agricultural water users in the SDCWA service area.

**TABLE 15 | SDCWA Deliveries to FPUD & RMWD FY 2017-2021**

	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	5 - YEAR AVERAGE
ALL MEMBERS (AF)	405,400	392,871	365,083	346,431	376,465	377,250
FPUD (AF)	9,101	10,007	7,766	7,893	8,822	8,717
RMWD (AF)	16,983	19,240	14,831	14,386	17,082	16,504
FPUD (%)	2.2%	2.5%	2.1%	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%
RMWD (%)	4.2%	4.9%	4.1%	4.2%	4.5%	4.4%

Source: SDCWA Annual Reports

(TABLE CONTINUED...)

<sup>57</sup> = 54,944/323,060.6.

<sup>58</sup> = 75,658/934,777.5.

<sup>59</sup> These and the following statistics are taken from the SDCWA Annual Report FY 2020, consulted online at [sdcwa.org/annualreport/2020/diversification-and-operation/water-sources-and-uses.php](http://sdcwa.org/annualreport/2020/diversification-and-operation/water-sources-and-uses.php) on 6/11/2021.

<sup>60</sup> Data supplied to me by SDCWA in an email on 10-7-2021.

## Acre Feet Deliveries - Includes certified and non-certified ag water

	FY'17	FY '18	FY '19	FY'20	FY'21
Carlsbad	12,149	13,780	12,095	11,719	12,501
Del Mar	939	1,078	961	954	1,046
Escondido	14,886	9,526	12,435	7,416	12,286
<b>Fallbrook</b>	<b>9,101</b>	<b>10,007</b>	<b>7,766</b>	<b>7,893</b>	<b>8,822</b>
Helix	24,960	25,713	24,480	21,035	24,756
Lakeside	2,604	2,839	2,643	2,879	3,223
National City	2,978	246	495	526.9	296
Oceanside	21,249	22,510	19,902	19,844	22,240
Olivenhain	17,475	19,432	16,817	17,189	19,548
Otay	27,002	29,638	27,385	28,309	30,126
Padre Dam	9,346	10,321	9,300	9,585	10,244
Camp Pendleton	134	188	201	166	163
Poway	8,635	10,231	8,535	8,837	9,752
<b>Rainbow</b>	<b>16,983</b>	<b>19,240</b>	<b>14,831</b>	<b>14,386</b>	<b>17,082</b>
Ramona	4,406	4,872	4,291	4,075	4,510
Rincon del Diablo	4,981	5,468	4,738	4,839	5,271
San Diego	153,496	152,193	143,551	140,505	137,049
San Dieguito	3,984	2,660	3,382	3,127	3,820
Santa Fe	7,450	5,819	6,435	5,642	6,911
South Bay	10,691	1,709	3,531	1,929	2,897
Vallecitos	10,910	12,634	10,724	10,877	12,053
Valley Center	20,220	22,526	16,500	16,684	18,846
Vista	16,332	4,156	9,340	3,361	7,401
Yuima	4,494	6,088	4,747	4,653	5,624
<b>Total</b>	<b>405,400</b>	<b>392,871</b>	<b>365,083</b>	<b>346,431</b>	<b>376,465</b>

**Q. If FPUD and/or RMWD leave SDCWA's service area, which of SDCWA's revenue sources shown in Table 3 would be affected?**

**A.** If FPUD and/or RMWD leave SDCWA's service area, SDCWA's revenue from every row in Table 3 would be affected. The revenue items fall into four groups:

- A. Volumetric charges on deliveries to member agencies
- B. Fixed service charges applied to member agencies
- C. Annual charges borne by properties in the SDCWA service area
- D. Charges paid by new meters for properties within the SDCWA service area

All of these revenue items will be reduced if FPUD and RMWD leave SDCWA's service.

So far, at least four estimates have been presented of the financial impact on SDCWA and its remaining member agencies if FPUD and RMWD depart:

- (i) SDCWA presented its estimate of the financial impact on pages 54-62 of its Combined Response dated 9-18-2020. This contained estimates of the financial impact both in a single year and in a ten-year sequence. SDCWA staff provided backup for that analysis in a zoom call on 6-23-2021 and then in a spreadsheet and memo emailed to me on 7-2-2021.
- (ii) I provided an estimate of the financial impact at the Advisory Committee meeting on June 14, and I corrected an error in my presentation and my report on June 18.
- (iii) My October Draft Report contains an analysis of the financial impact combining what I had presented in June and what SDCWA had presented in their 2020 Combined Response.
- (iv) In comments on my Draft Report date 10-25-2021, FPUD and RMWD submitted their own analysis of the financial impact, replicating the decadal analysis submitted by SDCQA in 2020 but with differences.

Below, I present a new analysis which replaces the one contained in my October Draft Report.

*I will not present a multi-year analysis. I feel that there is now too much uncertainty about future water supply, future water demand, and future rate schedules to justify making a projection of the annual financial impact over the coming decade. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to an estimate of the financial impact in CY 2022.*

A key variable is how much water FPUD and RMWD would purchase from SDCWA as their wholesale supplier if they stayed within the SDCWA service area.

I based my June analysis on the FY 2020 delivery levels for FPUD and RMWD as reported in SDCWA's 2020 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, namely 7,822 AF for FPUD and 14,479 AF for RMWD.<sup>61</sup> Since then, FPUD's Santa Margarita Conjunctive-Use Project has come online, replacing up to about 4,000 AF formerly received by FPUD from SDCWA. In recognition of this, SDCWA had projected FPUD's FY 2022 water use as 4,130 AF. FPUD's projection, consistent with the 2020 Urban Water Management Plan, is 4,045 AF. I will use 4,100 AF as a rough estimate of FPUD water use in CY 2022. SDCWA had projected RMWD's FY 2022 water use as 13,924 AF; RMWD projects it as 13,750. I will use 14,000 AF as a rough estimate of RMWD water use in 2022.<sup>62</sup> In line with FPUD and RMWD estimates, I assume that 1,600 AF of the FPUD's 4,100AF, and 6,000 AF of RMWD's 14,000 AF, are received under SDCWA's PSAWR rate. To assess the loss of revenue, I use SDCWA's CY 2022 water rates.

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<sup>61</sup> Those are different from the FY 2020 delivery levels listed in Table 14, which come from an email from SDCWA dated 10-4-2021.

<sup>62</sup> FPUD and RMWD also propose lower bound estimates of their 2022 water use that are 15% lower, on the grounds that Urban Water Management generally overstate future water demand by about 15%. Since the 2020 Urban Water Management Plans were delivered in June 2021, a 15% overstatement for the year beginning six months later seems too high. I will stick with the single projection given above.

Table 16 presents my estimate of the annual revenue loss to SDCWA in CY 2022 if FPUD and/or RMWD detach from the SDCWA service area.

There appears to be some question as to whether SDCWA would continue to receive all, some, or none of the property tax revenue if FPUD and/or RMWD detach. If SDCWA would continue to receive all the property tax revenue, the overall one-year revenue loss for SDCWA amounts to \$32.9 M; if it would receive none of the property tax revenue, the one-year revenue loss is \$33.3 M. To put this in context, Table 17 shows the percentage breakdown of SDCWA's overall revenue in FY 2020. 88.1% of SDCWA revenue came from water sales (row f). If FPUD and RMWD both detach, that revenue would be reduced by \$31.3 M (row m in Table 16). The remaining revenue loss hits Other Revenue items in Table 16.

**TABLE 16 | SDCWA Revenue Reduction CY 2022**

	Item	Unit Rate	FPUD		RMWD		FPUD + RMWD
			Quantity Change (AF)	Revenue Reduction (\$)	Quantity Change (AF)	Revenue Reduction (\$)	Revenue Reduction (\$)
	<b>M&amp;I Water supply</b>						
a	Water Supply	\$1,009	2,500	\$2,522,500	8,000	\$8,072,000	\$10,594,500
b	Transportation*	\$173	0	\$0	2,400	\$415,200	\$415,200
c	Treatment	\$310	2,500	\$775,000	8,000	\$2,480,000	\$3,255,000
	<b>Ag Water supply</b>						
d	Water Supply	\$799	1,600	\$1,278,400	6,000	\$4,794,000	\$6,072,400
e	Transportation	\$173	1,600	\$276,800	6,000	\$1,038,000	\$1,314,800
f	Treatment	\$310	1,600	\$496,000	6,000	\$1,860,000	\$2,356,000
g = a + .. + f	<b>Subtotal - volumetric charges</b>			\$5,348,700		\$18,659,200	\$24,007,900
h	<b>Customer Service Charge</b>			\$561,780		\$1,057,632	\$1,619,412
i	<b>Storage Charge</b>			\$1,052,568		\$1,560,780	\$2,613,348
j	<b>Supply Reliability Charge</b>			\$661,248		\$1,000,512	\$1,661,760
k	<b>Infrastructure Access</b>			\$604,812		\$756,288	\$1,361,100
l = h + .. + k	<b>Subtotal - charges</b>			\$2,880,408		\$4,375,212	\$7,255,620
m = g + l	<b>SUBTOTAL - CHARGES PAID BY MEMBER AGENCY</b>			\$8,229,108		\$23,034,412	\$31,263,520
n	<b>"All-in rate" (\$/AF)</b>		4,100	\$2,007	14,000	\$1,645	
	<b>OTHER REVENUE</b>						
o	<b>Property Taxes**</b>			\$160,000		\$190,000	\$350,000
p	<b>Availability Standby Charge*</b>			\$257,637		\$463,673	\$721,310
q	<b>Capacity Charges*</b>			\$103,396		\$831,042	\$934,438
r = m + p + q	<b>TOTAL WITHOUT PROPERTY TAX</b>			\$8,590,141		\$24,329,127	\$32,919,268
= r + o	<b>TOTAL WITH PROPERTY TAX</b>			\$8,750,141		\$24,519,127	\$33,269,268
	*Taken from FPUD/RMWD spreadsheet submitted 10-25-2021.						
	** Rounded up from values used by SDCWA Combined Response 9-18-2020						

**TABLE 17 | SDCWA Breakdown of Revenues FY 2020**

		ITEM	\$ Thousands	Percent	Revenue Type*
		<b>Water Related Revenue</b>			
a		Water Sales	\$420,165	63.3%	Variable
b		Infrastructure Access Charge	\$36,942	5.6%	Fixed
c		Customer Service Charge	\$25,600	3.9%	Fixed
d		Storage Charge	\$65,000	9.8%	Fixed
e		Supply Reliability Charge	\$37,430	5.6%	Fixed
f	= a + .. + e	SUBTOTAL Operating revenue	\$585,137	88.1%	
		<b>Other Revenue</b>			
g		Property Tax	\$15,526	2.3%	Fixed
h		Standby Availability Charge	\$11,164	1.7%	Fixed
i		Capacity Charges	\$17,983	2.7%	Fixed
j	= g + h + i	SUBTOTAL Property related	\$44,673	6.7%	Fixed
		<b>Other Income</b>			
k		CIP	\$2,726	0.4%	Fixed
l		Hydroelectric Revenue	\$3,192	0.5%	Fixed
m		Investment Income	\$6,789	1.0%	Fixed
n		Other Revenue	\$21,542	3.2%	Fixed
o	= k + ..+ n	SUBTOTAL Other Income	\$34,248	5.2%	Fixed
	= f + j + o	<b>TOTAL REVENUE</b>	<b>\$664,058</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	
* NOTE: "Variable" means that this revenue varies directly with the quantity of water delivered that year by SDCWA to its member agencies. "Fixed" means that the revenue does not vary directly with the quantity of water delivered that year.					

As for the reduction in SDCWA’s expenditure if FPUD and/or RMWD detach from SDCWA’s service area, Table 11 above showed how SDCWA’s expenditures broke down in FY 2020. Because the short-run marginal cost of M-water to SDCWA is larger than that of E-water, if SDCWA faced a reduction in its deliveries to member agencies, it generally would be better financially for SDCWA to take less M-water rather than less E-water.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, for present purposes, M-water is the only variable input for SDCWA, and the cost of M-water is the only variable cost in SDCWA’s budget; all the other cost items represent fixed costs. As Table 11 showed, only about 15% of SDCWA’s cost of water operations is a variable cost (row d/row f), while 85% represents a fixed cost.

Table 18 presents my estimate of the reduction in SDCWA’s annual expenditure in CY 2022 if FPUD or RMWD or both detach from the SDCWA service area. I assume that detachment leads

<sup>63</sup> There are some logistical constraints on SDCWA’s logistical ability to do this: it receives E-water in equal monthly amounts, which may limit the extent to which it can reduce M-water in peak delivery months.

SDCWA to purchase less treated M-water from MWD and I apply MWD’s CY 2022 full-service Tier 1 treated rate. In the first year of detachment, that will have no impact on the amount of the Readiness to Serve charge paid by SDCWA to MWD (see short-run expenditure reduction), but over ten years it will build up to the amount shown as the long-run expenditure reduction. To account for the future long-run RTS impact, I apply MWD’s CY 2022 RTS charge calculated as a per-acre-foot charge based on system-wide usage.

I do not know whether detachment would affect SDCWA’s maximum daily delivery from MWD. It would have no effect in the first year (CY 2022) but if It did reduce maximum daily deliveries then, after three years, this would lower the Capacity charge paid by SDCWA to MWD. In the absence of other information, however, I assume no impact on the Capacity charge paid by SDCWA to MWD.

The short-run reduction in SDCWA annual expenditure is \$20.7M. In the long run, when the full impact on the RTS charge paid by SDCWA takes effect, the expenditure reduction is \$22.3M.

**TABLE 18 | SDCWA Expenditures Reduction CY 2022**

Item	Unit Rate	FPUD		RMWD		FPUD + RMWD
		Quantity Change (AF)	Expenditure Reduction (\$)	Quantity Change (AF)	Expenditure Reduction (\$)	Expenditure Reduction (\$)
M-water, full service, Tier 1 trd	\$1,143	4,100	\$4,686,300	14,000	\$16,002,000	
MWD RTS charge - short run	0	4,100	\$0	14,000	\$0	
MWD RTS charge - long run	\$88	4,100	\$360,800	14,000	\$1,232,000	
<b>TOTAL REDUCTION - short-run</b>	<b>\$1,143</b>	<b>4,100</b>	<b>\$4,686,300</b>	<b>14,000</b>	<b>\$16,002,000</b>	<b>\$20,688,300</b>
<b>TOTAL REDUCTION - long-run</b>	<b>\$1,231</b>	<b>4,100</b>	<b>\$5,047,100</b>	<b>14,000</b>	<b>\$17,234,000</b>	<b>\$22,281,100</b>

Table 19 presents my resulting estimate of the reduction in SDCWA net revenue in CY 2022 if FPUD and/or RMWD detach from SDCWA’s service area. The short-run (immediate) reduction in annual net revenue is \$12.2M or \$12.6M, depending on whether SDCWA retains or loses the property tax revenue from FPUD and RMWD. The long-run reduction in annual net revenue after a decade is \$10.6M or \$11M.

**TABLE 19 | SDCWA Net Revenue Impact CY 2022**

Item	FPUD	RMWD	FPUD + RMWD
<b>REDUCTION IN REVENUE</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$8,590,141	\$24,329,127	\$32,919,268
With property tax loss	\$8,750,141	\$24,519,127	\$33,269,268
<b>REDUCTION IN EXPENDITURE</b>			
Short-run	\$4,686,300	\$16,002,000	\$20,688,300
Long-run	\$5,047,100	\$17,234,000	\$22,281,100
<b>CHANGE IN NET REVENUE</b>			
<b>SHORT-RUN</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$3,903,841	\$8,327,127	\$12,230,968
With property tax loss	\$4,063,841	\$8,517,127	\$12,580,968
<b>LONG-RUN</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$3,543,041	\$7,095,127	\$10,638,168
With property tax loss	\$3,703,041	\$7,285,127	\$10,988,168

This differs from my previous estimate in my Draft Report and from the estimates submitted by SDCWA and by FPUD/RMWD. The year is different, the assumed annual amounts of water are different, the water rates are different and some of the other cost items accounted for are different.

Two important differences are the following:

- 1) In its analysis of the financial impact of a detachment, SDCWA included an accounting for the use of reserves. In my Draft Report, I deferred to SDCWA’s assessment of this item, which I understand was based on the financial model they use to manage their various reserve accounts. I exclude that item here, for two reasons. I myself am not an expert in debt finance and municipal accounting, so that I cannot form my own assessment of SDCWA’s reserve accounts and their funding.<sup>64</sup> But, as I now understand SDCWA’s rationale for including the item, I do not believe it is appropriate.

As I understand it, SDCWA was making the following argument. It argued that its water rates in CY 2022 were unduly low because it was drawing down reserves on a temporary basis to cover certain cost items that would normally be covered through the rate schedule. Had rates been set in the usual manner, the rates would have been higher,

<sup>64</sup> In my previous experience as an expert witness in water rate litigation, a colleague with expertise in municipal bond finance was the one who testified on the funding of reserve accounts.



making the amount of revenue foregone by SDCWA if the delivery of water to FPUD and RMWD were discontinued larger by approximately \$3.6 M.<sup>65</sup>

I believe that it is more appropriate for me to make my assessment based on SDCWA's water rates as they are, and not as they might have been.

However, I do acknowledge that the following is a valid assertion. If the CY 2022 water rates that I use in Table 16 to calculate the reduction in SDCWA net revenue are unduly low because of a temporary and unusual reliance on funds obtained by drawing down reserves, my estimate will understate the revenue lost due to FPUD/RMWD detachment when SDCWA cannot draw down reserves in the same manner.

- 2) The FPUD/RMWD analysis reduced its estimate of the financial impact of detachment on SDCWA by the cost of the North County ESP Pumping Station that will not be needed in the event of detachment. The Pumping Station project is said to cost \$35 million, and this is divided into 10 annual amounts of \$3.5 million which are subtracted from FPUD/RMWD's estimate of the annual financial impact of detachment over the ten-year period FY 2022 – FY 2031. I do not agree with that adjustment.

For the sake of argument, I assume that the North County ESP Pumping Station would indeed cost \$35M. The adjustment proposed by FPUD/RMWD would have merit if (i) there had been a decision to go ahead and fund construction of the project and this was reflected in the current rates, and (ii) it was being cash funded out of those current rates. As I understand the situation, neither of those conditions holds. According to an email from SDCWA on 12-22-2021, "[T]he final phase of the ESP construction to provide complete service from the south to Rainbow and Fallbrook was scheduled to be done, and the initial construction had been budgeted (not funded)" when Fallbrook and Rainbow announced their intention to seek detachment.

At that point, the North County project was put on hold. Had it continued on schedule, according to an email from SDCWA 12-21-2021, it would have been debt financed over a 30-year period. Thus, the FPUD/RMWD adjustment is based on what SDCWA's rates might have been, rather than what they are.

There seems to be a degree of inconsistency in the position adopted by FPUD/RMWD – past financial commitments incurring ongoing payments and debt service appear not to be relevant when assessing FPUD/RMWD detachment, but future investments that would not be incurred *are* relevant to that assessment.

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<sup>65</sup> This refers to the foregone deliveries assessed by SDCWA in Table 4.7 of the Combined Response of 9-18-2020 and, specifically, the last row of that table.



**Q. Is the amount of \$12.2 – 12.6M short-run impact on SDCWA’s net revenue just a one-year phenomenon?**

**A.** No.

There will be a recurring annual loss of net revenue for SDCWA once the detachment occurs, lasting for as long as SDCWA has to pay for the financial commitments that it has incurred to date. As elaborated below, these financial commitments last for varying periods of time and stretch far into the future.

The exact annual financial impact in the future will vary from year to year, depending on SDCWA’s annual finances and rates.

The future financial impact will be lessened to the extent that SDCWA may find another buyer for the water that it would have delivered to FPUD and RMWD. But that will not fully offset the financial impact of FPUD/RMWD detachment for two reasons:

- (1) The payment from the sale may not cover all the payments made annually to SDCWA by FPUD/RMWD as member agencies.
- (2) The water not delivered to FPUD/RMWD does not belong to FPUD and RMWD individually. Any financial benefit to SDCWA in the event that it sells the water that would have been delivered to FPUD/RMWD to some other party belongs collectively to SDCWA member agencies, and not to FPUD and RMWD individually.

**Q. How large is this net financial impact in relation to SDCWA’s total operating revenue and operating expenses?**

**A.** SDCWA’s actual operating revenues and expenses totaled around \$569 million in FY 2020. My estimate of a CY 2022 net revenue loss of about \$12.2M amounts to 2.1% of the FY 2020 operating revenue and expense.

**Q. What is the financial impact on FPUD and RMWD?**

**A.** To answer this, I use the same assumptions as above. I focus on CY 2022, and I assume that FPUD obtains 4,100 AF from its wholesale supplier, whether SDCWA or EMWD, while RMWD receives 14,000 AF. FPUD and RMWD are planning to switch their wholesale supplier because this will lower the cost of their wholesale supply. Here I calculate the cost saving to FPUD and RMWD in their wholesale supply for CY 2022, recognizing that they may also bear some other expenses relating to their water equipment.

FPUD and RMWD avoid the cost they would have paid to SDCWA for this supply of water. Figure 16 shows that cost. Not every row in Table 16 represents a cost paid by FPUD and RMWD. Some of the revenue items lost by SDCWA in the event of detachment are paid by property owners within the FPUD and RMWD service areas (namely, rows o + p + q in Table 16). Row m in Table

16 totals up the portion of the revenue lost by SDCWA that is a cost paid by FPUD and RMWD to SDCWA. The totals in row m are a mix of variable charges (volumetric payments) and fixed charges. Row n in Table 16 converts the total payment (row m) into an equivalent payment per acre-foot received, i.e., an “all-in” amount, for each agency separately. The all-in cost of SDCWA water to FPUD amounts to \$2,007/AF; that cost to RMWD amounts to \$1,645. This reflects the fact that RMWD receives more than three times the amount that FPUD receives from SDCWA. Thus, when SDCWA’s fixed charges are averaged over the amount of water delivered by SDCWA, the unit cost for RMWD is lower than for FPUD.

Table 20 compares what FPUD and REMWD would have paid SDCWA if they remained member agencies in CY 2022 with what they would pay if they became member agencies of EMWD. Row b in Table 20 is the same as row m in Table 16 and shows what they would pay SDCWA. Row h shows what they would pay if served by EMWD, based on my understanding that they would be asked to pay the MWD Tier 1 treated water rate, plus their shares of MWD’s RTS and Capacity charges to EMWD, plus a markup of \$11/AF to cover EMWD’s cost of collecting MWD’s charges from them. I estimate that the cost savings to FPUD and RMWD combined in CY 2022 amounts to about \$7.7 million. FPUD and RMWD’s net gain is less than SDCWA’s net loss (Table 20).

**TABLE 20 | Savings in Water Cost when FPUD & RMWD Switch from SDCWA to EMWD**

	Item	SDCWA		EMWD		FPUD	RMWD	
		Unit Rate		Unit Rate				Expenditure
		FPUD	FPUD/RMWD	Other members				
	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$/AF)	(\$)	(\$)			
	<b>SDCWA WHOLESALER SUPPLIER</b>							
a	SDCWA average untreated supply cost*	\$1,271						
b	SDCWA treatment charge	\$310						
c = d - a - b	SDCWA Wholesaler "markup"	\$252						
d	<b>SDCWA all-in treated rate</b>	<b>\$1,833</b>						
	<b>MWD WHOLESALER SUPPLIER</b>							
g = a + b	MWD Full service Tier 1 treated		\$1,143	\$1,143				
h	MWD RTS charge		\$122	\$122				
i	MWD Capacity charge*		\$28	\$28				
j	EMWD Wholesaler "markup"		\$11	\$246				
k = c + d + e + h	<b>EMWD all-in treated rate</b>		<b>\$1,304</b>	<b>\$1,539</b>				
l	WATER DELIVERY (AF)				4,100	14,000		
m = i * l	SDCWA WHOLESALER WATER COST (\$)							
n = j * l	EMWD WHOLESALER WATER COST (\$)				\$5,346,400	\$18,256,000		
= m - n	<b>COST SAVINGS (\$)</b>							

## **2.4 A DEPARTURE FEE**

I was asked to address the possibility of a financial obligation to be imposed on FPUD and RMWD if they are permitted to detach from SDCWA, such as a departure fee.

I am aware that there is currently disagreement among the parties with respect to whether LAFCO has the legal authority to prescribe conditions that include a financial obligation such as a departure fee. I am not being asked to opine on that legal question, and I am not offering an opinion on that question. Instead, I am being asked to examine whether there is a sound economic justification for imposing a financial obligation of FPUD and RMWD and, if so, what an appropriate obligation could be. However, the decision maker here is the LAFCO Commission.

There are two basic questions:

- (1) Should some form of financial obligation be placed on FPUD and RMWD as a condition for approving their detachment from SDCWA?
- (2) If the answer is yes, how large a financial obligation, and for what period of time?

Here, I offer some suggestions to LAFCO for answering these questions.

### **Q. Do the parties agree on this?**

**A.** No. They disagree.

As I understand their positions, SDCWA argues that, if they detach, FPUD and RMWD should be liable for covering their shares of about \$21 billion of bonded and other indebtedness. The combined share could amount to about \$1 billion. In contrast, FPUD and RMWD argue that they should be able to detach without any further financial liability.

In my judgment, as an economist experienced in the economics of water, neither position – a liability of about \$1 billion nor a liability of zero – is reasonable.

### **Q. Is there a sound economic justification for imposing some continuing financial obligation?**

**A.** Yes.

Since 2000, SDCWA has made major infrastructure investments and has taken on substantial contractual commitments for a more reliable water supply. The infrastructure investments and the purchase commitments have benefited all member agencies, including both FPUD and RMWD. These commitments are long-term in nature, and they impose a fixed and ongoing financial burden on SDCWA and its member agencies.

Behind this disagreement lies the difficult challenge of financing San Diego County's water supply system and, more generally, Southern California's water supply system, in an era of conservation, growing recycling of wastewater, and increasing water supply uncertainty due to climate change.

Supplying water, as an industry, is exceptionally capital intensive – more so than supplying electricity, natural gas, telecom services, or any other utility industries. The infrastructure involved in water supply is exceptionally long-lived compared to that in other utility industries. The infrastructure is dominated by major economies of scale, which make it uneconomic to expand the infrastructure by small gradual increments. It has to be sized to meet future needs looking quite far into the future. Moreover, once installed, water supply infrastructure has little salvage value in any alternative use – if unneeded, it becomes a classic example of a stranded asset.

Over the past two decades, SDCWA has made major infrastructure investments and has made major long-term commitments to obtain some independent, and highly reliable, sources of water. It will be paying for those commitments for the next 20-25 years or more.

*The question confronting LAFCO is whether SDCWA member agencies with a distinctive set of needs and situated at a distinctive location should be allowed to walk away scot-free, entirely unencumbered by any of the financial commitments that SDCWA has assumed on behalf of its member agencies.*

**Q. If a departure fee were to be imposed, what would be the purpose?**

**A.** The purpose of imposing some financial obligation on FPUD or RMWD if they are permitted to detach from SDCWA is to provide a level of financial protection for SDCWA and the remaining member agencies in the short run while they adjust to the changed financial situation of a detachment.

The purpose is to cover SDCWA's own financial obligations that are fixed, ongoing and unavoidable for the duration of a period of adjustment. These include the following:

- SDCWA is committed to paying for 78,700 AF of canal lining water through 2112.
- It is committed to paying IID for 200,000 AF of conserved water through 2047
- Under the exchange agreement, SDCWA is committed to paying MWD to convey this water for the same period of time as in those underlying supply contracts.

A departure fee is intended to promote flexibility and efficiency in the management of scarce water resources and in the operation of a supply network that is essential to the wellbeing of the regional economy. It is not appropriate that the departure fee afford such protection in perpetuity. It is important that SDCWA and all its member agencies receive an economic signal about the need for efficient network organization and rationalization. Compensation continuing for the long run would work against the objective of promoting the efficient use of the region's water infrastructure assets.

**Q. What portion of SDCWA’s outstanding water-supply related obligations should serve as the basis for determining a departure fee?**

**A.** That is a judgment call for LAFCO.

On the one hand, like every other SDCWA member agency, FPUD and RMWD have benefited from all of the financial obligations incurred by SDCWA because member agencies are bound together by an integrated infrastructure network. Each member agency benefits to some degree from all investments in the infrastructure either directly or indirectly.

A member agency benefits directly from an investment in a particular source of supply or in a particular component of the infrastructure if it is directly served by that particular infrastructure component or it directly receives water from that particular supply source. But, even if a member agency is not served directly by that particular component and does not directly receive water from that particular supply source, the member agency still benefits indirectly through being part of an integrated water distribution network. If *other* member agencies receive water from that particular source or through that particular component, it makes it possible for *this* member agency to receive water from another source within SDCWA’s portfolio, thereby benefiting indirectly.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to recognize that FPUD and RMWD are in a somewhat special situation by virtue of both their particular location at the furthest end of SDCWA’s distribution system and their rural and agricultural local economies.

In the light of these factors, I recommend that a departure fee be limited to the portion of SDCWA’s outstanding obligations that relates specifically to QSA water. QSA water constitutes about 80% of the water FPUD and RMWD have received in the past two years.

**Q. What is the portion of SDCWA’s outstanding obligations that relates to QSA water?**

**A.** In its submission on 9-18-2020, SDCWA presented a table breakdown of its contractual water supply payment obligations as, follows:<sup>66</sup>

**TABLE 21 | SDCWA Contractual Water Supply Payment Obligations**

Desc.	CY 2021 Cost	Remaining Term (as of 1/1/2021) (yrs)	Escalation Factor	Net Present Value (3% Discount)
IID	\$135,000,000	27	2.5%	\$3,401,733,753
MWD Exchange - IID	\$106,800,000	27	4.6%	\$3,642,717,018
Canal	\$1,233,099	93	3.0%	\$114,678,207
MWD Exchange - Canal	\$41,491,800	93	4.6%	\$9,029,224,611
Desal	\$111,846,000	26	3.0%	\$2,907,996,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$396,370,899</b>			<b>\$19,096,349,589</b>

<sup>66</sup> Table 4.3.

The first four rows of this table cover SDCWA's payments relating to QSA water. SDCWA is committed to making annual payments that run through 2047 (for IID Transfer water) and 2112 (for canal lining water). This year (CY 2021), the annual payments for QSA water amount to \$284.525 M. This committed annual payment is projected to grow over time based on price adjustments built into SDCWA's contracts with IID, MWD and other parties. The combined total financial obligation over the lives of these QSA commitments amounts to just under \$16.2 billion.

LAFCO might use SDCWA's current annual payment for QSA water of around \$285 million as a starting point for thinking about what a fair and reasonable departure fee could be.

**Q. What is the underlying logic of the position being adopted by FPUD and RMWD?**

**A.** The position being adopted by FPUD and RMWD – that, once they detach from SDCWA, they should not be liable for any ongoing financial obligation to SDCWA – would be reasonable if SDCWA were supplying water to its member agencies solely on a pay-as-you-go (“PayGo”) basis. If that were the case, a member agency which no longer received water from SDCWA should have no obligation for any further payment to SDCWA. But, SDCWA does not supply water to its member agencies solely on a PayGo basis – nor does MWD, nor does any other wholesale water supply agency that I know of.

A departure fee is intended as a payment for obligations incurred by having received water in the past; it is not a payment for water to be received currently.

**Q. Why does SDCWA not supply water to its member agencies on a PayGo basis?**

**A.** SDCWA does not supply water to member agencies on a PayGo basis because that would be extremely burdensome to them financially. This is so for at least two reasons.

- 1) Much of the infrastructure being financed – dams, aqueducts, treatment plants, etc.<sup>67</sup> – has a useful life of 40 years to over 100 years. Financing this infrastructure on a cash basis at the time of construction would be burdensome, and also unfair, for contemporary water users. Debt finance is generally far more reasonable.
- 2) In the case of IID Transfer, IID would only agree to sell this water to SDCWA on a long-term basis. It was unwilling to sell water to SDCWA (or MWD) on a year-by-year basis. That was the commitment a buyer had to make in order to receive IID water with its senior water right.

**Q. Why don't water agencies rely more on property tax revenues to pay for long-term debt service and water purchase commitments?**

**A.** Public and municipal water agencies used to rely almost entirely on property tax revenue to finance their debt service and other long-term financial commitments. However, they stopped

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
<sup>67</sup> See for example the recent major investments by SDCWA listed on page 18 above.

doing this in the 1960s and 1970, and switched instead to relying on revenue from water sales raised particularly via volumetric water rates.

Figures 11a and 11b illustrate the switch from property tax to water sales as the foundational revenue source for the case of MWD.


The switch – at MWD and elsewhere – was motivated in part by concerns of fairness. In the case of MWD, for example, the City of Los Angeles had the highest property tax base of all member agencies, but it was using relatively little M-water from MWD because it had access to its own water from Mono Lake. Other growing member agencies had small property tax bases but were far more heavily reliant on water from MWD. Charging member agencies based on their usage of water was seen as fairer (and more efficient economically) than charging based on their property values.

**FIGURE 11a | Changing Sources of MWD Revenue Over Time<sup>68</sup>**



<sup>68</sup> Steven P. Erie, *Beyond Chinatown*. Stanford University Press, 2006, Figure 3.1,

FIGURE 11b | MWD Revenue Sources<sup>69</sup>



**Q. What is a fair share of SDCWA’s contractual obligation to pay for QSA water to assign to FPUD and RMWD?**

**A.** This is something for LAFCO to decide.

It could be based on FPUD and RMWD’s shares in either total deliveries to SDCWA member agencies or in deliveries for municipal and industrial use as opposed to deliveries made under SDCWA’s special PSAWR agricultural rate program.

Table 22 provides an example of the calculation of these shares using the data for FY 2021.<sup>70</sup> In FY 2021, FPUD and RMWD together accounted for 6.9% of total water deliveries to all member agencies, and 4.8% of deliveries for M&I (non-PSAWR) use.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Metropolitan Water District, *Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee*, April 12, 2011, Figure 2.6.

<sup>70</sup> Other years could also be used – the share in an earlier year, or the average share over a span of several past years.

<sup>71</sup> In my October Draft report, I had used FPUD and RMWD’s shares in projected FY 2021 deliveries of SDCWA water. Now I am using their shares in the actual, realized FY 2021 deliveries, which turned out to be larger than had been projected.



**TABLE 22 | FPU D/RMWD Share in SDCWA Water Deliveries**

	FY 2012 ACTUAL		FY 2013 ACTUAL		FY 2014 ACTUAL		FY 2015 ACTUAL		FY 2016 ACTUAL	
	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share
<b>PSAWR DELIVERIES</b>										
Fallbrook	3,953	10.3%	4,348	10.0%	4,811	10.0%	3,853	9.4%	3,039	9.6%
Rainbow	8,025	21.0%	9,769	22.4%	11,413	23.8%	9,688	23.6%	7,846	24.8%
Subtotal	11,978	31.3%	14,117	32.4%	16,224	33.8%	13,541	33.0%	10,885	34.3%
All Member Agencies	38,267		43,610		47,941		41,055		31,696	
<b>M&amp;I DELIVERIES</b>										
Fallbrook	8,163	2.0%	8,594	2.0%	8,535	1.9%	7,876	1.8%	6,430	1.8%
Rainbow	12,441	3.1%	12,745	2.9%	11,567	2.5%	10,486	2.4%	9,204	2.6%
Subtotal	20,603	5.1%	21,339	4.9%	20,102	4.4%	18,362	4.1%	15,633	4.3%
All Member Agencies	401,285		436,439		458,044		444,107		360,307	
<b>ALL DELIVERIES</b>										
Fallbrook	12,116	2.8%	12,942	2.7%	13,346	2.6%	11,729	2.4%	9,468	2.4%
Rainbow	20,466	4.7%	22,514	4.7%	22,980	4.5%	20,173	4.2%	17,050	4.3%
Subtotal	32,582	7.4%	35,456	7.4%	36,325	7.2%	31,902	6.6%	26,518	6.8%
All Member Agencies	439,552		480,048		505,985		485,162		392,003	

	FY 2017 ACTUAL		FY 2018 ACTUAL		FY 2019 ACTUAL		FY 2020 ACTUAL		FY 2021 ACTUAL	
	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share
<b>PSAWR DELIVERIES</b>										
Fallbrook	2,602	8.3%	2,971	8.3%	1,843	7.3%	1,830	7.8%	1,998	6.9%
Rainbow	7,937	25.4%	8,807	24.7%	6,002	23.9%	5,654	24.2%	7,256	25.2%
Subtotal	10,538	33.7%	11,778	33.0%	7,845	31.2%	7,484	32.0%	9,255	32.1%
All Member Agencies	31,254		35,696		25,118		23,370		28,831	
<b>M&amp;I DELIVERIES</b>										
Fallbrook	6,499	1.7%	7,035	2.0%	5,922	1.7%	6,063	1.9%	6,823	2.0%
Rainbow	9,046	2.4%	10,433	2.9%	8,830	2.6%	8,732	2.7%	9,826	2.8%
Subtotal	15,545	4.2%	17,469	4.9%	14,752	4.3%	14,795	4.6%	16,649	4.8%
All Member Agencies	374,147		357,175		339,965		323,061		347,634	
<b>ALL DELIVERIES</b>										
Fallbrook	9,101	2.2%	10,007	2.5%	7,766	2.1%	7,893	2.3%	8,822	2.3%
Rainbow	16,983	4.2%	19,240	4.9%	14,831	4.1%	14,386	4.2%	17,082	4.5%
Subtotal	26,083	6.4%	29,247	7.4%	22,597	6.2%	22,279	6.4%	25,904	6.9%
All Member Agencies	405,400		392,871		365,083		346,431		376,465	

	3-YEAR AVERAGE		5-YEAR AVERAGE		10-YEAR AVERAGE	
	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share	Delivered (AF)	Share
<b>PSAWR DELIVERIES</b>						
Fallbrook	1,891	7.3%	2,249	7.8%	3,125	9.0%
Rainbow	6,304	24.5%	7,131	24.7%	8,240	23.8%
Subtotal	8,194	31.8%	9,380	32.5%	11,364	32.8%
All Member Agencies	25,773		28,854		34,684	
<b>M&amp;I DELIVERIES</b>						
Fallbrook	6,270	1.9%	6,469	1.9%	7,194	1.9%
Rainbow	9,129	2.7%	9,373	2.7%	10,331	2.7%
Subtotal	15,399	4.6%	15,842	4.5%	17,525	4.6%
All Member Agencies	336,887		348,396		384,216	
<b>ALL DELIVERIES</b>						
Fallbrook	8,160	2.3%	8,717	2.3%	10,319	2.5%
Rainbow	15,433	4.3%	16,504	4.4%	18,570	4.4%
Subtotal	23,593	6.5%	25,222	6.7%	28,889	6.9%
All Member Agencies	362,660		377,250		418,900	

Source: SDCWA Annual Reports

**Q. What annual payment would be assigned to FPUD and RMWD, based on SDCWA’s QSA-related financial obligations?**

**A.** This is a decision for LAFCO.

The amount of the departure fee depends on (i) what one takes as SDCWA’s annual expenditure commitment for QSA water, and (ii) what one takes as FPUD’s share and RMWD’s share of that annual cost.

Table 23 illustrates what an annual departure fee might be if it is framed as FPUD/RMWD’s share of SDCWA’s annual QSA payment commitment in CY 2021 (\$284,524,900), using their three-year average share of either all deliveries or deliveries for M&I (non-PSAWR) use.

**TABLE 23 | Calculation of a Departure Fee**

	Share	Annual payment
<b>USING THE SHARE OF M&amp;I DELIVERIES</b>		
FPUD	1.9%	\$5,295,156
RMWD	2.7%	\$7,710,209
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>\$13,005,365</b>
<b>USING THE SHARE OF ALL DELIVERIES</b>		
FPUD	2.3%	\$6,402,041
RMWD	4.3%	\$12,107,975
<b>Total</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>\$18,510,016</b>

These calculations could be modified in any manner that LAFCO sees fit.

In particular, the FPUD/RMWD share could be calculated for a different set of years.

There is also the question of for how many years an annual departure fee would be paid – that is also something to be decided by LAFCO. I offer some thoughts below.

**Q. Why should FPUD and/or RMWD be required to make an annual payment to SDCWA if they do not receive any water from SDCWA that year? How is that fair?**

**A.** The logic of a departure fee is that it is not a payment being made in exchange for the delivery of water. Instead, it is a payment being made in exchange for being permitted to detach from financial commitments previously made on behalf of FPUD and RMWD along with the other SDCWA member agencies. It is a payment for obligations incurred by having received water in the past, for the purpose of providing some limited financial relief to SDCWA while it adapts to the change in its financial circumstances.

**Q. If FPUD and RMWD detach from SDCWA, would it possible for SDCWA to sell the water that it otherwise would have delivered to FPUD and RMWD to some other water agency that is *not* a member agency, thereby recouping lost revenue?**

**A.** In theory, one mechanism by which SDCWA might recoup lost revenue is to sell water that otherwise would have been delivered to FPUD and RMWD to a *non-member* water agency. Logical possibilities are to sell water to MWD itself or to individual member agencies served by MWD. The water distribution systems serving MWD and SDCWA are sufficiently interlinked that this ought to be possible in principle, although there could be some operational complications and constraints.

From a purely economic perspective, Southern California as a region would be better served if there could be a more open and collaborative relationship between MWD and SDCWA, its largest single customer.<sup>72</sup>

However, depending on the price SDCWA was able to negotiate for the sale of any unneeded water, the revenue earned might not fully offset the net revenue lost by the detachment of FPUD and RMWD.

**Q. Wouldn't the justification for a departure fee be eliminated if SDCWA could work out an arrangement to resell part of the QSA water?**

**A.** No, the economic justification for a departure fee would not be eliminated, for at least two reasons.

First, it is unlikely that SDCWA could arrange and implement a long-run financial adjustment within a year from when detachment occurs. A&N Technical Services states that almost all California water transfers are negotiated in less than 12 months.<sup>73</sup> Negotiation is not the same as implementation, especially where regulatory approval is required. *Short-run* transfers (leases) in California are often negotiated and consummated within twelve months, but that is because they are exempted from the conventional legal requirements for the transfer of an appropriative water right in California (proof of no injury and proof of the historical right) on condition that the water is being transferred for a period of one year or less. With regard to the proposed new transfer cited by A&N between Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District and Marin Municipal Water District, the newspaper article that they reference actually states the following: "If an agreement is worked out, it would be for a one-time transfer occurring in 2022."

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<sup>72</sup> The agreement announced on December 14 whereby SDCWA will make available to MWD some of the groundwater which it has stored in the Semitropic Water Bank, while a temporary arrangement for 2022, may be a harbinger of a new and more productive relationship between the two agencies.

<sup>73</sup> Email dated 11-8-2021. On 11-5-2021, SDCWA submitted an email disputing this claim by A&N Technical Services.

It is thus likely that it will take SDCWA several years to work out and implement the adjustments needed as a permanent fix for the financial issues raised by detachment.

Second, assuming that SDCWA can replace the net revenue lost by the detachment through the resale of some QSA water to another party, as I noted above, the QSA water no longer delivered to FPUD and RMWD does not belong to them individually. Any financial benefit from resale of that water belongs collectively to SDCWA member agencies.

**Q. In the event of a detachment, would the departure fee be paid annually for a period of several years or in one lump sum?**

**A.** This is something for LAFCO to decide. As noted above, the detachment will cause an ongoing loss of annual net revenue, not a one-time loss.

**Q. Over how long a period should FPUD and RMWD bear an obligation for a departure fee?**

**A.** This is something for LAFCO to decide.

The purpose of the financial obligation is to provide an appropriate level of protection for SDCWA and the remaining member agencies in the short run while they adjust to the changed situation of a departure.

I do not think it likely that the adjustment will be completed quickly.

If the departure fee involves an annual payment, the period during which FPUD and RMWD bear that financial obligation to SDCWA should not exceed 10 years. In the water industry, a period of 10 years would typically count as the short run for planning purposes. The period should not be less than three years, given the time likely to be needed to for SDCWA to arrange a permanent remedy for the financial impact of detachment on its member agencies.

**Q. Could there be a different approach to determine the amount of their financial obligation to SDCWA in the event that FPUD and RMWD detach?**

**A.** Yes, there are other possible approaches besides the one I outlined above, based on assigning to FPUD and RMWD a share of SDCWA's annual payment commitment for QSA water.

For example, FPUD and RMWD could be obligated to make a pre-specified payment to SDCWA based on the contingency that SDCWA fails to earn a pre-specified level of revenue from water sales that year, or on the contingency that SDCWA fails to be able to sell a pre-specified quantity of water, or on some other contingency.

In principle, this is something that could be negotiated between SDCWA, FPUD and RMWD. In the end, however, LAFCO has the final decision on whether to approve the terms of a detachment.

## **2.5 WATER SUPPLY RELIABILITY**

The IID Transfer and canal lining agreements and some of SDCWA's major infrastructure investments listed above were motivated by SDCWA's desire to increase the reliability of its water supply portfolio.

That raises two questions:

- (A) Is SDCWA's wholesale supply of water actually more reliable than the wholesale supply of EMWD, which will become FPUD and RMWD's wholesale supplier if they depart from SDCWA?
- (B) If SDCWA's wholesale supply is more reliable, does that justify the higher cost of water when staying with SDCWA as a wholesale supplier?

In this report, I do not address question (B). That is a policy judgment for FPUD and RMWD Boards of Directors and perhaps LAFCO to make. This section contains my analysis of question (A).

### **Q. What are the threats to the reliability of supply for FPUD and RMWD?**

**A.** There are conceptually two distinct kinds of threat: (1) A situation occurs where the wholesale supply agency – SDCWA, MWD or EMWD – does not itself have access to sufficient water to provide all the water that FPUD and/or RMWD wishes to obtain; the supply provided to them is curtailed or rationed. (2) A physical break or disruption occurs on a major pipeline supplying FPUD and/or RMWD and there is not sufficient connectivity remaining in the wholesale agency's distribution system to deliver the amount of water that FPUD and/or RMWD wishes to receive. In one case, the wholesale agency lacks sufficient water; in the other, it (temporarily) lacks sufficient connectivity.<sup>74</sup>

### **Q. With regard to the possibility of an insufficient water supply, how could that differ as between SDCWA vs EMWD?**

**A.** FPUD and MWD could face differences in the reliability of their water supply when served by EMWD versus SDCWA in two ways: (1) SDCWA and EMWD have supply portfolios with differing degrees of reliability, and (2) the member agency status currently proposed for FPUD and RMWD within EMWD will be different from the status they currently have within SDCWA, and that gives them a different degree of access to their wholesaler's full supply portfolio.

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<sup>74</sup> I do not analyze (2) here because that is beyond my expertise.

**Q. How do EMWD and SDCWA differ in the reliability of their water supply?**

**A.** EMWD relies on M-water from MWD for about half of its supply; the rest is local supplies from local groundwater, recycled water and desalination of brackish local groundwater.<sup>75</sup> However, under their proposed arrangement with EMWD, FPUD and RMWD would not have any access to EMWD’s local supplies; they would be 100% reliant on M-water from MWD.


SDCWA relied on M-water from MWD for 24% of its supply in CY 2020 and about 12% in CY 2021 (Table 9). This is projected to decline even further over the next decade. The rest of SDCWA’s supply portfolio is (i) QSA water from the Colorado River which comes under a higher priority water right than most of MWD’s Colorado River M-water and (ii) water from the Carlsbad Desal facility which is fully protected against streamflow uncertainty.

**Q. Has the distinctive reliability of SDCWA’s supply portfolio actually made any difference?**

**A.** Yes. It would have made a difference if SDCWA had QSA water in the 1991 drought, it did make a difference that SDCWA had QSA water in the 2007-2009 drought, and it made a difference that SDCWA had desal water in the 2015-2016 drought.

Figure 12 is a presentation made to the SDCWA Board on 6-28-2012 showing what difference it would have made if SDCWA had access to QSA water in the 1991 drought: member agency deliveries would have been reduced by 14% instead of 31%.

**FIGURE 12 | What if SDCWA had QSA Transfers in 1991?**



<sup>75</sup> The figure of 50% reliance on MWD comes from an interview with EMWD’s General Manager Mouawad in *Municipal Water Leader* dated December 1, 2021, accessed at <https://municipalwaterleader.com/joe-mouawad-of-eastern-municipal-water-district-diversifying-supply-for-efficiency-minded-customers/>. EMWD’s 2020 Urban Water Management Plan gives the reliance on MWD as 60% in CY 2020.

Due to the drought in 2009, SDCWA faced a 13% cut from MWD in its FY 2010 delivery of M-water. However, because of its access to QSA water, SDCWA was able to reduce deliveries to its member agencies by only 8%.

Under the drought emergency regulation adopted in May 2015, FPUD and RMWD were required to reduce their monthly water use starting in June 2015 through February 2016 by 36% compared to the level in 2013. In February 2016, the emergency regulation was amended to allow for new local drought-resilient supplies developed after 2013. In March 2016, the supply from the Carlsbad Desalination Facility was certified as drought resilient. This lowered FPUD and RMWD's mandated water use reduction from 36% to 28%. In May 2016, the conservation mandate was replaced with a localized "stress test" under which a wholesale water agency could document its ability to meet demands for 2017 - 2019 should dry conditions continue. Based on the availability of SDCWA's drought resilient supply, the conservation requirement for FPUD and RMWD was reduced from 28% to 0%.

**Q. How does MWD water have supply reliability issues?**

**A.** Both of MWD's sources of M-water – SWP water and Colorado River water -- have some supply reliability issues.

**Q. What are the supply reliability issues with SWP water?**

**A.** There are supply reliability issues for SWP water with regard to (i) the amount of water available for it to take from its source, the Feather River in the Sacramento Valley, and (ii) the ability to convey that water through the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta to SWP member agencies south of the Delta.

**Q. What are the supply reliability issues with regard to the amount of water SWP can obtain from the Sacramento Valley?**

**A.** There are two long-standing reliability issues and one newer issue now coming into focus.

The long-standing issues are that (i) droughts are a fact of life in California, and (ii) the SWP has relatively little carryover storage compared, say, to the Colorado River – two consecutive years of drought in Northern California could create a difficult situation for SWP supply.

The new factor now coming more clearly into focus is climate change. For almost twenty years now, scientists have been warning that climate change will make California's droughts worse – both more frequent and more severe.<sup>76</sup> The new feature is a recognition that not only will droughts become more frequent and more severe in California, but they will also become *harder to predict* on a seasonal basis. The higher temperatures currently being experienced in California

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<sup>76</sup> This was a major finding from the State of California's Climate Scenarios Project. I served on the steering committee for this project from 2003 to 2011.

are making seasonal forecasts of streamflow runoff less reliable, with past forecast methods turning out this year to be too optimistic.<sup>77</sup> Snowmelt in the Sacramento River Basin was forecast in early May this year to be about 800,000 AF less than had been predicted in early April based on the past relationship between snowpack and runoff. This was equivalent to 10% less Sacramento River system runoff than had been predicted by California’s Department of Water Resources using its standard models and methods.<sup>78</sup>

**Q. Has the SWP supply to member agencies diminished in recent years?**

**A.** Yes.

One indication is the changing estimates of the average Table A amount that the SWP can deliver from the Delta which have appeared biennially in the SWP Delivery Capability Reports since 2005. The estimated average Table A delivery from the Delta was 2.818 MAF/yr in the 2005 Report and 2.414 MAF/yr in the most recent 2019 Report. This change is due to increased environmental regulation over the last three decades aimed at protecting native species of fish in the Delta.

In addition, however, actual SWP deliveries have decreased since 2006 in a manner indicative of climate change. Through 2012, there were only two years in SWP history where it delivered low supplies relative to the Table A amounts – 1991, where it delivered 20% of Table A, and 2008 where it delivered 35%. Since then, there have been six years of very low SWP supplies amounting to 35% of Table A entitlements in 2013, 5% in 2014, 20% in 2015, 35% in 2018, 20% in 2020 and 5% this year. On December 1 of this year, before the onset of the rains, the SWP set its initial 2022 allocation to M&I and agricultural contractors at 0%.

**Q. What is the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta and how does it affect the conveyance of SWP water?**

**A.** The Delta is a web of channels and reclaimed islands at the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. It originated through sea level rise after the last ice age bringing a steady accumulation of sediment into a large freshwater marsh which commingled with vast quantities of organic matter from the vegetation, forming an area of shallow channels and sloughs amid low islands of peat and tule. Starting around 1850 with the planting of orchards to provide fresh fruit for the gold mining camps, these Delta lands were drained to reclaim them for farming and protected by levees to form a network of islands separated by freshwater channels. By 1900, nearly half of the Delta’s land area had been reclaimed. By the 1920’s reclamation of almost all the farmable land in the Delta had been completed.

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<sup>77</sup> As noted below, the same is turning out to be true for the forecasts of streamflow used for the Colorado River.

<sup>78</sup> Abatzoglou, J. et al. “California’s Missing Forecast Flows in Spring 2021 – Challenges for seasonal flow forecasting,” CaliforniaWaterBlog.com, Posted on July 18, 2021.



When the Central Valley Project (CVP) came into operation in the late 1940s, and then the SWP in the 1960s, the Delta became the hub of the system for transporting water from the Sacramento Valley to the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California. Water stored behind dams in the Sacramento Valley is released into the Sacramento River and flows naturally into the northern end of the Delta. It flows south on the eastern side of the Delta, kept separate by the various islands from brackish water on the far western side of the Delta, which would be harmful for water supply purposes. The water flows in the channels between the Delta islands (“Tracts”) but, instead of following the natural course of streamflow in a westerly direction to exit the San Francisco Estuary at the Golden Gate, it is sucked by powerful pumps at the southern end of the Delta into two major aqueducts that convey the water to CVP and SWP users in the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California.

**Q. What are the supply reliability issues with regard to the ability to convey SWP water through the Sacramento/ San Joaquin Delta to SWP member agencies south of the Delta?**

**A.** The integrity of the levees has long been a concern. The levees were quite often poorly designed and constructed, they were generally poorly maintained, and they are subject to natural erosion. Moreover, the Delta islands are mainly peat soil which is highly erodible with wind action. The land inside the islands is now mostly below sea level. This land subsidence has triggered failures of some levee and flooding of some islands.

It has also long been known that there are several major earthquake faults within the vicinity of the Delta that are capable of generating ground shaking which could likely lead to levee failure, although so far there have been no significant earthquakes in or closely adjacent to the Delta since the late 1800s.

Between 1900 and 1982, there were over 160 levee failures, but significant improvements were then made to the levee system and there was no major levee failure for the next 22 years. On a sunny June day in 2004, with calm seas, the Upper Jones Tract levee failed spontaneously inundating the entire island with more than 150,000 AF. It took three weeks to repair the levee, using special equipment which had to be brought down from Seattle, and an additional five months to de-water the island, which lay 3 meters below sea level, for a total cost of about \$90 million.

Around the same time, new data mapping became available showing that the Delta islands lie further below sea level than previously thought, up to 8 meters in some cases. The implication was that, if a levee was breached, the task of restoring the land would be more arduous than expected because of the great volume of water that would have to be extracted.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Jeffrey Mount and Robert Twiss, “Subsidence, Sea Level Rise and Seismicity in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.” *San Francisco Estuary & Watershed Science*, vol. 3, issue 1 (March 2005).

Sea level rise due to climate change adds a new risk on top of seismicity. The sea level off San Francisco has risen about 10” since 1900 and is projected to rise by a meter or more by 2100. The threat from sea level rise becomes acute during a storm coming at high tide, because that increases the chance of waves overtopping levees and destroying them.

**Q. What is the current assessment of the supply reliability issues with regard to the ability to convey SWP water through the Delta?**

A. Between land subsidence within the Delta Islands, the fragility of the Delta levees, the threat of an earthquake and the anticipated rise in sea level due to climate change, there is a very high likelihood – in fact, a certainty – of significant levee failures in the Delta during this century. Indeed, there is a high likelihood that *multiple* levees might fail at the same time, whether due to an earthquake or a winter storm at high tide, rather than a single levee failing as in June 2004. If several Delta levees were breached simultaneously, the physical resources would probably not be available to repair them all and the islands would be irreversibly flooded.<sup>80</sup> Depending on their location, the flooding of multiple islands would increase the risk of brackish water intruding and comingling with CVP and SWP water being conveyed through the Delta, thereby shutting down those projects’ deliveries.

**Q. If it is certain that the current conveyance of CVP and SWP project through the water will not endure, what is California’s policy response?**

A. California’s policy response, which emerged in the aftermath of the 2009 Delta Reform Act and became known as WaterFix, was to re-route the conveyance of CVP and SWP project water underneath the Delta through two deep tunnels that would provide an alternative to conveyance using the Delta channels thereby eliminating dependence on the integrity of the Delta levees. More detailed engineering and financial analysis for the development of an EIR/EIS was initiated in 2015. In 2017, MWD approved its participation for a 26% share in the project (a 47% share in the SWP’s 55% stake in the project). The estimated cost of WaterFix was about \$17 billion in 2017 dollars, with MWD’s 26% share amounting to \$4.3 billion. MWD’s Board subsequently authorized the acquisition of an unsubscribed share of the project, bringing its total share to 64.6% and its cost to about \$10.8 billion. In 2019, however, incoming Governor Newsom announced that he did not support a two-tunnel Delta project but preferred a smaller one-tunnel project instead. Planning documents are being developed for a one-tunnel project, now named the Delta Conveyance Project. A preliminary cost estimate released in August 2020 was \$15.9 billion (in 2020 dollars) and MWD has not yet determined its participation in the new project.

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<sup>80</sup> “Over the next 50 years there is a two-thirds chance of catastrophic levee failure in the Delta leading to multiple island flooding’s and the intrusion of sea water” PPIC 2007, p. v

**Q. Will the Delta Conveyance Project fix the reliability issues for SWP?**

**A.** If the Delta Conveyance Project is completed, it will eliminate the present risk associated with the ability to convey SWP and CVP water to users south of the Delta. It will maintain the current ability to convey SWP water against the threat of future disruption. It is a means of preserving the status quo.

It will not fix the unreliability associated with declining streamflow in the Sacramento River Basin due to the effects of climate change.

**Q. Will the Delta Conveyance Project raise the cost of SWP water?**

**A.** For sure.

The Delta Conveyance Project does not generate any additional water supply. It prevents future reductions in SWP deliveries to member agencies south of the Delta that would be caused by failures of the levees in the Delta. In effect, SWP member agencies will have to pay more for the same water that they receive at present.

**Q. When will the Delta Conveyance Project be completed?**

**A.** That is not known at present. Once the Project is fully financed and authorized, which could perhaps take another three to five years, construction is expected to ramp up over a period of about ten years – so, perhaps, about 15 years from now.

**Q. How important is MWD’s Colorado River water as a source of supply for MWD compared to its SWP water?**

**A.** As noted earlier, MWD was formed to bring water from the Colorado River to Southern California. The Colorado River constituted MWD’s only source of supply until SWP deliveries started arriving in the 1970s. The Colorado River remained MWD’s dominant source of water until the QSA was implemented in 2003.<sup>81</sup> Between 1982 and 2002, MWD took an average of over 1.1 MAF annually from the Colorado River alongside an average of 860,000 AF annually from the SWP. Over this period, the Colorado River made up 56.8% of MWD’s supply while the SWP made up 43.2%. The access to Colorado River water shielded MWD from the worst effects of drought on SWP supplies in 1977 and 1991.

The situation changed once the QSA came into effect in 2003. MWD’s firm supply of Colorado River water was reduced to about 600,000 AF.<sup>82</sup> In consequence, MWD has come to rely more

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<sup>81</sup> In the fifty years prior to 2003, California overall had exceeded its 4.4 MAF annual apportionment of Colorado River water almost every year, drawing on Arizona’s and Nevada’s unused apportionments. About half of the time California took more than 5 MAF.

<sup>82</sup> See footnote 7 above.

on its SWP supply. Between 2003 and 2020, the Colorado River made up about 37% of MWD's supply, while the SWP made up about 63%.

**Q. Apart from the reduction in MWD's water right once the QSA was implemented, are there any supply reliability issues affecting Colorado River water?**

**A.** Climate change, which has been impacting the availability of streamflow in the Sacramento River Basin, is also affecting streamflow in the Colorado River Basin.

The drought in the Colorado River Basin has actually been more severe and more sustained than that in the Sacramento River Basin.

Lake Mead was last at full capacity (an elevation of 1,221 feet) in 2000. Over the subsequent 22 years, the watershed has experienced 17 dry years. According to Udall and Overpeck (2017): "Between 2000 and 2014, annual Colorado River flows averaged 19% below the 1906–1999 average, the worst 15-year drought on record. Approximately one-third of the flow loss is due to high temperatures now common in the basin, a result of human caused climate change."<sup>83</sup> The drought continued, with dry winters in 2019-2020 and in 2020-2021.

Until now, water users were shielded by the availability of extensive storage in the basin, including in Lake Mead and Lake Powell, the two largest reservoirs in the U.S. However. Those reservoirs have been depleted since 2000 and are now at the lowest levels ever reached since first being filled (Lake Mead around 1935, Lake Powell in 1980). Between January 1 and October 1 of this year, the water level in Lake Mead dropped by 16 feet and it dropped by another 10 feet by the end of December, for a total of 26 feet this calendar year, to a level of 1,066 feet on 12-28-2021. A decline of one foot in the level of Lake Mead corresponds to a reduction of about 85,000 AF held in storage. Lake Mead is now at 35% of its capacity.

**Q. Is the historically low water level in Lake Meade currently an issue for California's water supply from the Colorado River?**

**A.** It is not currently an issue for California.

It is an issue for Arizona and Nevada under the Interim Guidelines for the Colorado River Lower Basin promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior in 2007 in response to then seven years of drought in the Colorado River Basin.

The Secretary of the Interior functions as the master of the river for the Colorado River Lower Basin and must approve all diversions in the Lower Basin. The 2007 Guidelines set limits on diversions by the three Lower Basin states depending on the amount of water in storage at Lake Mead. Those limits are now taking effect.

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<sup>83</sup> Xiao, Udall and Lettenmaier, "On the Causes of Declining Colorado River Streamflows" *Water Resources Research*, August 2018 subsequently modified this analysis to estimate that 50% of the flow reduction from 2000 to 2014 was due to higher temperatures.

The limits are tied to specific water elevations in Lake Mead. Under the Interim Guidelines, as supplemented by the 2019 Drought Contingency Plan for the Lower Basin, Tier Zero applies in a calendar year when the January 1 elevation is projected to fall below 1,090 feet. This has been in effect since January 2020. Under Tier Zero, Arizona forfeits 192,000 AF of its 2.8 MAF annual entitlement to Colorado River water, and Nevada forfeits 8,000 AF of its annual entitlement to 300,000 AF.

Tier One applies when the elevation at Lake Meade on January 1 is projected to fall below 1,075 feet (which happened this May).<sup>84</sup> Under Tier One, Arizona forfeits a total of 512,000 AF of its Colorado River entitlement, and Nevada forfeits 21,000 AF. In August, the Secretary of the Interior announced that the Tier One restrictions will take effect starting January 2022. Those apply to Arizona and Nevada but not California.

On December 15, California, Arizona and Nevada signed a new agreement, called the 500+ Plan, to spend up to \$100 million to add an annual 500,000 AF to storage in Lake Mead in each of 2022 and 2023 to prevent the reservoir level from becoming perilously low.<sup>85</sup> It is not yet clear where the extra 500,000 AF of water will come from. So far, it appears that it may come mainly from reduced agricultural use, with growers in the three states being paid to fallow land.

**Q. Could a historically low water level in Lake Meade become an issue for California’s water supply from the Colorado River?**

**A.** Yes.

California starts to forfeit some of its annual entitlement to Colorado River if the projected January 1 elevation falls below 1,045 feet, which triggers what is known as Tier 2b.<sup>86 87</sup> Under Tier 2b, California forfeits 200,000 AF of its 4.4 MAF entitlement to Colorado River water; Arizona forfeits 640,000 AF; and Nevada forfeits 27,000 AF.

If the projected January 1 elevation of Lake Mead falls below 1,025 feet, this triggers Tier Three for that year.<sup>88</sup> Under Tier Three, California forfeits 350,000 AF, Arizona forfeits 720,000 AF, and Nevada forfeits 30,000 AF.

The Bureau of Reclamation issues five-year projections of future conditions in the Colorado River system in January every year and then updates them in April and September (but known as the August projection). The projections released this September, looking through January 2026, project zero chance that Lake Mead will be below 1,025 feet in January 2022, a 25% chance in

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<sup>84</sup> To put this in perspective, as explained below Lake Mead is holding water to meet a delivery of 9 MAF to the Lower Basin states and to Mexico, plus there is 0.6 MAF of evaporation loss from Lake Mead. At an elevation of 1,075 feet, Lake Meade is storing about 9.6 MAF.

<sup>85</sup> The federal government will also contribute \$100 million. This is expected to raise the reservoir level by about 16 feet.

<sup>86</sup> Tier 2a is triggered if the elevation falls below 1,050 feet. That tier impacts only Arizona (which forfeits 592,000 AF) and Nevada (which forfeits 25,000 AF).

<sup>87</sup> At an elevation of 1,045 feet, Lake Mead is storing about 7.3 MAF.

<sup>88</sup> At an elevation of 1,025 feet, Lake Mead is storing about 6 MAF.

January 2023 (thereby triggering Tier Three), a 44% chance in January 2024, a 59% chance in January 2025, and a 62% chance in January 2026.

The Bureau also projected that, while there is zero chance that Lake Mead will fall below 1,000 feet in January 2022 or 2023, there is a 12% chance that it will fall below 1,000 AF in January 2024, a 19% chance in January 2025, and a 22% chance in January 2026. An elevation below 1,025 feet, such as 1,000 feet, was not anticipated in the 2007 Interim Guidelines and would necessitate more drastic actions by the Lower Basin states.<sup>89</sup>

Obviously, conditions may change between now and January 2023 or January 2025, but as of today there is a real probability that Tier Three may take effect within the next three to five years, thus triggering a reduction in the amount of water that California can obtain from the Colorado River.

**Q. If California did have to reduce the amount of water it takes from the Colorado River water, would that affect MWD and SDCWA equally?**

**A. No.**

Reductions in the diversion of Colorado River water are governed by the seniority of the right to that water within California. Under the 1931 Seven-Party Agreement among California users of Colorado River water, there are four tranches of seniority. The first two seniority tranches take up the full current allocation of 4.4 MAF. The senior allocation is 3.85 MAF for Palo Verde Irrigation District, the Yuma Project, and Imperial Irrigation District. Junior to this is an allocation of 550,000 for MWD.<sup>90</sup>

SDCWA obtains all of its Colorado River water in a transfer or exchange with IID, and this water is covered by IID's seniority.

Some of MWD's Colorado River water comes from a transfer agreement with Palo Verde Irrigation District (about 50,000 AF) and is covered by that seniority. The remainder of MWD's Colorado River water comes from its lower seniority right of 550,000 AF, and this is junior to the QSA water which SDCWA obtains from IID.

Therefore, if California is required to forfeit some of its entitlement to Colorado River water, the reduction would be disproportionately larger for MWD than for SDCWA.

Exactly how the reduction would be apportioned among the California users is something that could be modified in future negotiations, including negotiations among the Lower Basin States,

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<sup>89</sup> The 2019 Drought Contingency plan itself expires at the end of 2026, by which time a new Drought Contingency Plan will have to be negotiated.

<sup>90</sup> Following this is an additional allocation of 662,000 AF to MWD, followed by an allocation of 300,000 to Imperial Irrigation District and Palo Verde Irrigation District. These would come into play in the event of a surplus supply of Colorado River water.

and also between them and the Upper Basin states, to formulate a post-2026 Drought Contingency Plan. Those negotiations are likely to be brutal.<sup>91</sup>

**Q. Will the water supply situation in the Colorado River get better in the long run?**

**A. No.**

In addition to climate change, there is a second calamitous threat to the Colorado River Basin states' entitlements to Colorado River water. Even without climate change, the fact is that the river was over-allocated when the Colorado River Compact was negotiated among the states in 1922. The seven basin states divided up among themselves water that did not actually exist.

The negotiators of the Compact believed that the natural flow of the Colorado River at Lees Ferry was 17.5 MAF. The Compact itself allocated 16.5 MAF – 7.5 MAF each to the Upper and Lower Basins, and 1.5 MAF held for an eventual arrangement with Mexico.<sup>92</sup> This was mistaken in two ways. It overlooked evaporation and operational losses, and it overestimated streamflow.

Because of evaporation and operational losses, there is a water deficit built into the Lake Mead Budget. With releases from Lake Powell upstream and side inflows, the annual inflow into Lake Mead would average 9.0 MAF. Lake Mead is intended to deliver 9.0 MAF to the Lower Basin and to Mexico. However, there is an evaporation loss of 0.6 MAF from Lake Mead itself, and there are evaporation and operational losses downstream of Lake Meade also amounting to about 0.6 MAF. The result is a structural deficit of 1.2 MAF.

At the time the Compact was negotiated, some government hydrologists had lower estimates of the average natural flow of the Colorado River over the prior period 1878-1920, including 14.2 MAF and 15 MAF.<sup>93</sup> These turned out to be closer to the mark. The average over the period 1906-2017 is 14.8 MAF, but with a clear downward trend. The average flow between 2000 and 2018 was only 12.8 MAF; extended through 2021, this average falls to 12.4 MAF.

At its maximum extent (Tier 3), the 2019 Drought Contingency Plan brought about a reduction of 1.1 MAF in total diversions by Lower Basin States, which more or less removed the structural deficit at Lake Mead with an average annual streamflow at Lees Ferry of 14.8 MAF. But, Tier Three is not adequate if the “new normal” average streamflow is 12.4 MAF. Closing that gap might require some cap on Upper Basin diversions along with a substantial increase – perhaps a doubling – in the reductions imposed on the Lower Basin states under a post-2026 Drought Contingency Plan.

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<sup>91</sup> The executive director of the Colorado River Board of California, which coordinates California's users of Colorado River water, was quoted last month as saying that the basin states must grapple with the “new normal” of reduced flows. “We're dealing with a new reality, and it's got to change the way we think about putting our long-term plans together” *FarmProgress*, September 17, 2021, accessed at <https://www.farmprogress.com/print/444857>.

<sup>92</sup> The treaty with Mexico was negotiated in 1944.

<sup>93</sup> The story of these estimates and their neglect by the parties negotiating the Compact is recounted by Kuhn and Fleck, *Science Be Dammed: How Ignoring Inconvenient Science Drained the Colorado River*. University of Arizona Press, 2019.

**Q. If MWD is forced to withdraw less water from the Colorado River, and at the same time faces a very much reduced SWP allocation, would that necessarily reduce the amount of water it will deliver to its member agencies, including EMWD?**

**A.** Not necessarily – it depends on several factors including, in the first instance, (i) how much MWD’s diversion of Colorado River water and allocation of SWP water are cut back, (ii) how much MWD is able – and decides -- to cushion that blow by drawing on its dry-year reserve of stored surface water and groundwater that year, and (iii) How MWD goes about allocating the remaining shortfall among its member agencies.

**Q. How large is MWD’s dry-year storage reserve?**

**A.** In the 1991 drought, MWD had a very small dry-year reserve<sup>94</sup> limited primarily to storage in within-district reservoirs. Following the end of the drought, MWD has actively built up a large portfolio of dry-year balances, using both groundwater storage and surface water storage, and located within Southern California, in the San Joaquin Valley, in Coachella Valley, and in Lake Mead. Coming in to 2021, MWD had about 3.2 MAF in dry-year storage, a record high level. Its total storage capacity now amounts to almost 6 MAF.

**Q. To what extent would MWD’s dry-year storage reserve cushion the blow of a reduced SWP and Colorado River supply?**

**A.** MWD’s annual delivery is about 1.6-1.75 MAF, so its beginning of year storage in 2021 represented a roughly two-year reserve supply. As late as early November, it was expecting to end 2021 with about 2.5 MAF in reserve storage, having drawn down about 700,000 AF of its reserve during 2021.<sup>95</sup> If the drought had continued into 2022 and beyond, MWD would have been able to rely on this storage reserve for a second and probably third year.

However, there are two potential complications. One is the fact that there can be some logistical constraints on MWD’s ability to access and deploy its reserves at particular times. With storage in groundwater banks, there are constraints on put/take capacity and there may be constraints arising from the need to coordinate with other conjunctive use partners; there is a capacity constraint on the CRA; and there may be a constraint on the amount that MWD can withdraw from storage in Lake Mead when the lake level is dangerously low. The other concern is longer multi-year droughts than we have experienced so far. The period 2014-2016 was the longest multi-year period of critical water shortage experienced so far in modern California. But projected climate change scenarios conducted for California indicate the possibility of significantly longer droughts in the future. It is not clear that MWD yet has the practical capacity to sustain a more severe drought and a longer run drought, especially on the Colorado River.

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<sup>94</sup> Dry-year storage balances are distinct from emergency storage balances which are reserved for emergency events such as supply interruptions from earthquakes or pipe ruptures etc. MWD currently aims to hold 0.75 MAF in emergency storage.

<sup>95</sup> MWD staff presentation to Board Water Planning and Stewardship Committee, item 6a, November 8, 2021.



**Q. If MWD is short of water, how does it limit the supply available to its member agencies?**

**A.** In 1990 (as noted above) MWD had adopted a first-ever drought management plan which called on member agencies to voluntarily cut their water usage. As that drought grew more severe, this became a mandatory requirement ultimately cutting back municipal water deliveries by 30% and agricultural deliveries by 90%. That rationing program ended when the drought abated.

In 2007, with the possibility of drought re-appearing, MWD initiated a process to develop what became its Water Supply Allocation Plan (WSAP), adopted in February 2008 and put into effect in April 2009, covering the period July 2009 – April 2011.

In 2014, when another dry year was anticipated, the WSAP was updated and then implemented in April 2015, covering the period July 2015 – June 2016.

The 2014 version remains MWD’s official policy for allocating supplies in the event of shortage.

Key features of the WSAP are that (1) it does not impose mandatory cutbacks but, instead, uses an economic incentive to encourage member agencies to achieve their targeted reduction in water use, and (2) the targeted reduction is tailored to the circumstances of each member agency based on several factors including its dependence on MWD at the retail level and its existing level of per capita use.

As in the 1990 program, there are tiers of reduction corresponding to the degree of regional water shortage. In Tier 3, which applied in 2015-2016, depending on their situation, member agencies received an allocation from MWD that at a minimum is 7.5% less than their baseline allocation and is no more than 30% below that baseline.<sup>96</sup> In Tier 5, MWD member agencies receive an allocation that at a minimum is 12.5% below their baseline allocation and is no more than 37.5% below that baseline.

However, if a member agency needs to exceed its WSAP allocation, it can do so on payment of a surcharge of \$1,480/AF above the MWD Tier 1 water rate<sup>97</sup> for excess water up to 15% over the WSAP allocation, or a surcharge of \$2,960/AF for excess water beyond 15% over the WSAP allocation.

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<sup>96</sup> Member agencies more heavily dependent on MWD received a smaller cutback.

<sup>97</sup> For comparison, the MWD Tier 1 rate for treated water is \$1,104/AF in 2021.

**Q. Isn't supply reliability for an urban water agency in California becoming a non-issue because in any future drought the governor will mandate a cutback in per-capita use, following Governor Brown's precedent in 2015-2016, and that will take care of a shortage arising from reduced supplies?**

**A.** No – that is likely too simplistic.

What happens will depend on multiple factors: (i) how severe the drought is and how great a shortage in supply it generates; (ii) whether the governor intervenes and how large a reduction in per capita consumption he mandates; and (iii) to what extent water users actually comply with the governor's mandate. Consumer compliance with a governor's conservation mandate should not be taken for granted. During Governor Brown's 2015-2016 conservation mandate there was less than perfect compliance. While RMWD met its conservation target during the period June 2015 – February 2016, FPUD did not; nor did EMWD. Moreover, during the drought this summer, there was significantly less conservation than had been requested by Governor Newsom.<sup>98</sup>

While SDCWA and MWD member agencies have experienced a remarkable reduction in per-capita water use since around 2010, one cannot necessarily count on that trend to be repeated indefinitely. Looking into the future, demand hardening may become more noticeable.

In short, I do not think it prudent to assume that, as a general proposition, having a more reliable water supply in the future – whether from a more senior right to Colorado River water or from desalination – will have no economic value and will no longer be worth paying for.

**Q. Suppose FPUD and RMWD join EMWD and, some time thereafter, MWD faces a shortage of water and imposes an allocation on its member agencies including EMWD. Will FPUD and RMWD experience the same degree of shortage as other member agencies served by EMWD?**

**A.** They may face a larger degree of shortage than some other EMWD wholesale customers.

EMWD is both a retailer and a wholesaler of water. While about half of EMWD's water supply is local supplies, those are used almost exclusively for EMWD's retail customers. EMWD's wholesale customers receive only M-water from MWD. However, there is a difference with respect to how different wholesale customers receive M-water. By virtue of its location, one existing wholesale customer, Rancho California Water District (RCWD), takes water directly from turnouts on an MWD pipeline, as would FPUD and RMWD if they join EMWD. Other wholesale customers receive M-water pumped by EMWD through EMWD-owned and operated booster stations and transmission lines. These other wholesale customers are therefore connected to

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<sup>98</sup> Kurtis Alexander "Californians fail to meet Newsom's water-savings target amid growing drought" *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 22, 2021.

EMWD's distribution system, while RCWD and also FPUD/RMWD if they join are isolated from EMWD's distribution system.<sup>99</sup>

While FPUD and RMWD would – like EMWD's other wholesale customers – receive only M-water from EMWD, their isolation from the EMWD distribution system might leave them a bit more vulnerable in the event that MWD cuts its supply to EMWD: being connected to EMWD's distribution system would make it possible to tap into EMWD's local supply if EMWD were willing to allow that.<sup>100</sup>

RMWD could be especially vulnerable in a shortage of MWD water since it has no local supplies, while most of EMWD's other wholesale customers have substantial local supplies. RCMWD would join the City of Perris as the only wholesale customers entirely dependent on MWD water from EMWD.<sup>101</sup>

**Q. Doesn't EMWD's Technical Memorandum of February 12, 2020, demonstrate that EMWD has adequate supplies such that even with a Regional Shortage Level 5 (a 30% cut in MWD deliveries) no wholesale customer, including FPUD and RMWD, would run short of supply or be forced to pay MWD's allocation penalty surcharge?**

**A.** EMWD's memorandum does reach that conclusion, but under some assumptions not all of which seem realistic.

In addition to the Regional Shortage level, which determines the magnitude of the reduction in MWD deliveries, the outcome depends on the base period consumption used by MWD and the adjustments applied to that baseline to account for population growth as well as other adjustments that MWD might apply when calculating the required reduction in member agency use (e.g., 30% reduction under Shortage level 5).

As explained in Appendix B, EMWD's analysis assumed that the baseline allocation to which MWD applied a 30% delivery cut was 47% higher than EMWD actually needed. That is why EMWD projected it had more than enough water for its member agencies, including FPUD and RMWD, in the event of a 30% cut by MWD.

Looking to the future, the notion that EMWD could absorb a 30% cut in MWD deliveries with no ill effect does not strike me as plausible.

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<sup>99</sup> The EMWD water rate proposed for FPUD and RMWD shown in Table 11 matches the rate currently paid by RCWD – the MWD Full-Service Tier 1 rate plus a share of MWD's RTS and Capacity charges plus an administrative fee of \$11/AF. Other wholesale customers who make use of EMWD's distribution system pay in effect the MWD Full-Service Tier 1 rate plus an EMWD charge of \$246/AF.

<sup>100</sup> Despite being isolated from EMWD's distribution system, FPUD and RMWD could in theory obtain virtual access to EMWD's local supply through an in-lieu arrangement under which EMWD forebears from taking some MWD water, substituting more local supply, while FPUD and RMWD divert the additional quantum of water from MWD turnouts. However, that is not presently incorporated and priced into EMWD's agreement with FPUD and RMWD.

<sup>101</sup> With the Santa Margarita Conjunctive Use Project online, about half of FPUD's total use is now local supply. About 58% of RCWD's total use is local supply; for the City of Hemet and Lake Hemet NWD, local supply is about two-thirds of the total use; for the City of San Jacinto, it is 98% of total use.

**Q. Is urban growth in EMWD's service area also a possible consideration here?**

**A. Yes.**

In 2019, Riverside County was identified as the fifth fastest growing county in the country. Based on data from the 2020 UWMP, EMWD's retail service population and its current wholesale service area population are each expected to grow by around 22% between 2020 and 2035. Demand for water is expected to grow more over this period -- by 46% in the retail service area and by 59% in the current wholesale service area. By 2035, EMWD will need to supply an additional 75,315 AF/yr (an increase of 49% overall).

While EMWD plans to increase its recycled water supply by 31% and its groundwater supply by 38%, it will also need an extra 24,920 AF/yr from MWD by 2035, an increase of 27% compared to now.

If FPUD and RMWD join EMWD's service area that adds an extra demand of about 17,600 AF/yr in 2030 and 2035, raising the need for extra MWD water to 42,543 AF/yr in 2035, an increase of 46% compared to now.

**Q. In summary, how does the reliability of supply for FPUD and RMWD differ if they join EMWD compared to the reliability they have with SDCWA?**

**A.** Riverside County is the fastest growing county in California. EMWD relies on MWD for half of its supply, and it is that half which will have to meet the needs of EMWD's growing wholesale population. SDCWA now relies on MWD for less than 20% of its supply, but it fully shares its non-MWD supply with its member agencies. SDCWA's non-MWD supply is QSA water from the Colorado River, which comes under a higher priority water right than most of MWD's Colorado River M-water, and water from the Carlsbad Desal facility which is fully protected against streamflow uncertainty.

**Q. Is it likely that FPUD and/or RMWD will find themselves running out of water if they detach from SDCWA and join EMWD?**

**A. No.**

While FPUD and RMWD are taking something of a gamble on supply reliability if they switch from SDCWA to EMWD, the gamble ultimately is not one of running out of water but, rather, paying a higher price than they had anticipated to get by during a drought.

For surface water users in Southern California (unlike some groundwater users) the risk is not that the tap runs dry but, rather, that a temporary solution in a drought emergency turns out to be a rather expensive proposition.

## **2.6 WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?**

The issue confronting LAFCO – the desire on the part of FPUD and RMWD to detach from SDCWA because of the high cost of SDCWA water – is obviously a serious problem. It raises issues that go beyond FPUD and RMWD, and beyond SDCWA. It points to some fundamental difficulties that are endemic to the economics of water supply in San Diego County that may need to receive more sustained attention.

### **Q. Is the problem that SDCWA is using water that is just too expensive?**

**A.** No.

Of course, the problem is the high cost of SDCWA water. But the fact is that there is *no* cheap water available in Southern California. All water is expensive and will become even more so in the future.

My analysis above indicates that SDCWA's QSA water is no more expensive than M-water from MWD.

Desal water from Carlsbad is significantly more expensive. But, desal has real economic value as an insurance against both drought and state-mandated conservation reductions in water use, and it proved its value during the drought in 2015-2016.

Like all forms of insurance, desal water becomes economically more valuable if it can be shared across a larger number of persons at risk – that is to say, if it can be shared across a wider swathe of Southern California water users, including other member agencies of MWD. If there is a will to do this on both sides and if a price can be agreed, the economic value of the Carlsbad facility could be enhanced through more widespread sharing using in-lieu arrangements with other MWD members.

As noted above, SDCWA's use of Carlsbad water accounts today for barely over half the cost differential between SDCWA's and MWD's wholesale water rates. Two other factors are at work besides the cost of SDCWA's water supply portfolio.

One major driver of water supply cost is the cost of distribution infrastructure. That varies with several factors including timing and age: with continued inflation in construction costs, older infrastructure built long ago provides cheaper water than infrastructure built recently – until the older infrastructure needs a major investment for maintenance or replacement. Due to the happenstance of timing, SDCWA was significantly upgrading its storage and distribution infrastructure at a time when MWD was not making any unusually large infrastructure investments. This will be reversed in the future as MWD engages with the Delta Conveyance Project.

Another major driver of water costs is the fact that the overwhelming portion of water supply costs are what economists call fixed costs – costs that are not reduced much when the agency delivers less water. Then, almost the same cost has to be spread across fewer units of water supplied, which propels the unit cost upwards.

Rather than the expense of the SDCWA’s water supply portfolio, these two factors are the main reason why the gap between SDCWA’s and MWD’s wholesale rates widened starting around 2010.

**Q. Would recycling treated wastewater be a much cheaper source of potable water supply?**

**A.** I do not think so.

Recycling treated wastewater for direct or indirect potable use is not necessarily a cheap source of supply. The cost depends on many factors, including location, treatment method, and the way in which the treated effluent is introduced into the potable distribution system. In some cases, recycled water is cheaper than desalinated water. In other cases, it may not be cheaper. In 2017, an MWD white paper assessed the cost of recycled water as a source of potable supply and found that it ranges from \$1,222/AF to \$3,224/AF in 2017 dollars.<sup>102</sup>

Even if it is not cost-effective as a source of water supply, recycled water has other important benefits that can justify its use, including environmental benefits and also economic benefits as a solution to overcapacity in wastewater collection, treatment and disposal systems.

**Q. If it is not SDCWA’s supply sources, what is the real problem with SDCWA water?**

**A.** There are two underlying problems: a problematic fiscal model and a problematic governance model.

**Q. What is problematic about SDCWA’s fiscal model?**

**A.** There is a structural imbalance in SDCWA’s finances. The imbalance arises from a mismatch between the share of revenues that are variable versus fixed and the share of expenditures that are variable versus fixed.<sup>103</sup> This imbalance is not unique to SDCWA. It is experienced by MWD and by many other water agencies.

If a water agency’s variable/fixed split between revenues does match the variable/fixed split between its costs, any variation in the quantity of water that it sells should have little impact on its net revenue. Otherwise, sales variation can have a significant impact.

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<sup>102</sup> MWD *California WaterFix Finance and Cost Allocation*, August 2017.

<sup>103</sup> I use “variable” and “fixed” in their economic sense. If an expenditure is fixed in this sense, this does not mean that it cannot be reduced; it means that it cannot be reduced *just by selling less water*. Some of the comments on my October Draft Report seem to have misunderstood that distinction.

For most water agencies in practice, the share of their costs that is fixed is far larger than the share of their revenues that is fixed. This is good news if there is a rising trend in water sales. Selling more water raises revenues more than it raises costs (because their revenue has a larger variable cost component than their expenditure). But, for many water agencies in Southern California, the sales trend is downwards, not upwards.<sup>104</sup> With a downward sales trend, revenue falls by more than costs, causing net revenue to drop.

Tables 11 and 12 above showed the split between variable and fixed components of expenditure for SDCWA and MWD. Table 23 below presents MWD's split between variable and fixed components of revenue, which can be compared with SDCWA's split shown in Table 17. Table 24 uses these data to compare the variable/fixed split between expenditures and revenues overall for SDCWA and MWD.

**TABLE 24 | MWD Revenue Breakdown**

				<b>Revenue</b>
	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>\$ millions</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Type</b>
	<b>Water Related Revenue</b>			
a	Water Sales	\$1,188.0	75.7%	<b>Variable</b>
b	Readiness to Serve Charge	\$134.5	8.6%	Fixed - short-run
c	Capacity Charges	\$30.5	1.9%	Fixed - short-run
d	Subtotal Operating Revenue	\$1,353.0	86.2%	
	<b>Other Revenue</b>			
e	Property Tax	\$146.9	9.4%	Fixed
f	Power Sales	\$15.9	1.0%	Fixed with regard to water sales
g	Investment Income	\$28.9	1.8%	Fixed
h	Other Revenue	\$24.5	1.6%	Fixed
i	<b>TOTAL REVENUE &amp; OTHER INCOME</b>	<b>\$1,569.2</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	
NOTE: "Variable" means that this revenue varies directly with the quantity of water delivered that year by MWD its member agencies. "Fixed" means that the revenue does not vary directly with the quantity of water delivered that year.				

<sup>104</sup> With EMWD and Riverside County being notable exceptions.

**TABLE 25 | Shares of Fixed vs Variable Revenue & Cost, SDCWA and MWD**

		SDCWA		MWD	
		% VARIABLE	% FIXED	% VARIABLE	% FIXED
<b>REVENUE</b>					
a	As Share of Operating Revenue	72%	28%	88%	12%
b	As Share of Total Revenue	63%	37%	76%	24%
<b>EXPENDITURE</b>					
c	As Share of Operating Expenditure	15%	85%	16%	84%
d	As Share of Total Expenditure	11%	89%	12%	88%
<b>SOURCE</b>					
a	Table 17, row a/row f. Table 23, row a/row d.				
b	Table 17, row a/row p. Table 23, row a/row i.				
c	Table 11, row d/row i. Table 12, (rows a + c)/row i.				
d	Table 11, row d/row o. Table 12, (rows a + c)/row l.				

SDCWA and MWD are in a very similar position with respect to expenditures: the fixed costs of water supply account for about 85% of the cost of operations in the case of SDCWA and 84% for MWD. On the revenue side, fixed revenue sources account for only 28% of SDCWA’s revenue but for significantly less – 12% -- in the case of MWD.

The difference in variable/fixed revenue split between SDCWA and MWD is testimony to SDCWA’s foresight in introducing the Infrastructure Access Charge in 1998 and the Supply Reliability Charge in 2015. However, even though SDCWA’s mismatch between the variable/fixed split of revenue and expenditure is less severe than MWD’s mismatch, it still constitutes a serious financial problem for SDCWA in an era of declining deliveries to member agencies.

Consider the following hypothetical example. In FY 2020, SDCWA earned water operating revenue of \$585.1 M (Table 17) and it delivered 354,007 AF of water. That corresponds to an ex post all-in revenue rate of about \$1,653/AF.<sup>105</sup> Suppose SDCWA delivered 1,000 AF less to some member agencies. About 72% of the all-in rate is variable revenue which will be lost when sales decline by 1,000 AF, leading to a revenue loss of about \$1.2M (= 0.72\*1653\*1000). On the expenditure side, about 15% of the \$1,653/AF is variable cost, so SDCWA’s saving in expenditures when it delivers 1,000 AF less to member agencies amounts to only about \$0.25M (= 0.15\*1653\*1000). Using these figures, when SDCWA deliveries decline by 1,000 AF its net revenue falls by \$0.94 M – unless the rate structure is altered to offset this.

<sup>105</sup> This is an ex post all-in rate which will differ from the all-in rate stated when the next year’s rates are announced, since that is based on a projection of sales. Also, \$1,653 is the all-in rate averaged over all member agencies. Because the balance of fixed and variable charges varies among member agencies, one member agency’s all-in rate will be different from another’s – as exemplified by the difference between FPUD and RMWD in row n of Table 16.



This back-of-the envelope calculation is intended as an illustration of the phenomenon that is in play not only with detachment by member agencies but also with demand roll-off when member agencies substitute increased use of local recycled water for SDCWA delivery. Such roll-offs are projected to occur between now and 2030 in an amount exceeding 60,000 AF.

Detachment is certainly different than demand roll-off because, with a roll-off, the agencies are still members of SDCWA and can in theory be assessed charges that would offset the net revenue loss; with detachment the members cannot be assessed charges except in the case of a departure fee. However, the difference between detachment and roll-off may turn out not to be that large in practice: both phenomena are financially detrimental to SDCWA.

### **Q. What is problematic about SDCWA's governance model?**

A. Just as SDCWA's fiscal model is essentially the same as that of many other water agencies including MWD so, too, its governance model is not particularly different from that of other water agencies, including MWD. Under this common model, member agencies are represented on the Board of Directors, and the Board decides infrastructure investments through some form of majority voting. But investment decisions are made without any upfront commitment by member agencies to take and pay for the water that will be generated. This strategy commits current resources without guaranteeing the future revenues to pay for new investments. Almost thirty years ago, this was flagged as a problem for MWD by a 1993 Blue Ribbon Task Force.<sup>106</sup> The Task Force stated that it was

“troubled to learn, for example, that some of the member agencies most strongly supporting big-ticket projects like the [Eastside] reservoir also had the most aggressive plans to reduce their future MWD water purchases and develop independent supplies. In effect, such agencies appear to want MWD to develop costly backup capacity-or insurance-for their local supply strategies, while seeking to shift the costs for these benefits on to Metropolitan and other agencies and consumers.”<sup>107</sup>

A consequence was that:

“Current users-which control the Board-will have incentives to define new and future capacity investments in ways that may shift the costs of system improvements that actually benefit both current and future consumers exclusively onto future users.”<sup>108</sup>

This is ultimately a problem of governance. The Task Force asserted that “regional governance concerns are at the heart of MWD's planning, pricing, and strategic implementation activities” and it concluded that:

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<sup>106</sup> I served as a consultant to the Task Force's Subcommittee on IRP and Rate Structure.

<sup>107</sup> Metropolitan Water District Blue Ribbon Task Force, *Final Report*, January 1994, p.23.

<sup>108</sup> Op cit., p 17.

“Governance skills also will determine if MWD can actually pay for its future projects. With bond and property tax revenues limited, and in an era of high business and consumer rate sensitivity, MWD can no longer afford to build major facilities and hope that member agencies will buy enough water to pay for them over several years.”<sup>109</sup>

In the same vein, MWD’s 2010-2011 Blue Ribbon Committee remarked:

“The challenge going forward for MWD, and its members is to develop a business model, and associated governance approach, that manages risks associated with investments in both imported and local resources and infrastructure.”<sup>110</sup>

It is certainly understandable that member agencies of an organization like SDCWA or MWD like the flexibility to change their supply portfolio in the future without being tied down by purchase commitments. But this can also be financially detrimental to the wholesaler organization and to other member agencies. Water supply infrastructure is massively capital intensive and very long-lived. It cannot be funded on a PayGo basis; it needs a long-term financial commitment. The problem was less severe in the past when property tax revenues provided the main repayment source for water infrastructure investments. That source of revenue stability is now lacking.

MWD’s 2010-2011 Blue Ribbon Committee identified two elements of a solution: (i) MWD should aim for water supply security through diversity in the supply portfolio, and (ii) MWD should play an increased role in facilitating and managing transfers and trades in water among member agencies. MWD and SDCWA have both made great progress with respect to (i), but almost none with respect to (ii).

**Q. Are water transfers a solution?**

**A.** It depends. There are two different conceptualizations of urban water marketing in Southern California, a top-down conception and a bottom-up conception.

**Q. What is the difference between the top-down and the bottom-up conceptions of water marketing?**

**A.** In the top-down conception, SDCWA and MWD are the principal actors in the water transfer activity in Southern California, initiating and implementing transfers through the water distribution networks that they control.

The drawback with this approach is the fact that the necessity for water transfers arises increasingly from the local needs of member agencies reflecting a diversity of local factors – their changing customer mixes, their different potentials for water conservation, and their different opportunities for demand management and for increasing local supply through new recycling

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Metropolitan Water District, *Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee*, April 12, 2011, pp 50-51.

and/or groundwater development. This diversity creates differences in the need for, and economic value of, water supply reliability. Differences in the individual circumstances of SDCWA and MWD member agencies create the potential for a significant regional economic benefit from water transfers. In economics, gains from trade are generated, and markets thrive, where there is sufficient heterogeneity among the potential market actors. That level of heterogeneity now exists in Southern California – not so much as the aggregate regional level (SDCWA versus MWD) but at the level of individual water agencies – for example, RMWD versus the City of San Diego.

To take advantage of the variety in individual member needs and to overcome the financial challenges confronting Southern California's water at a time of climate change, it will be important that local member agencies step up, take more responsibility for the water they obtain through regional wholesalers, commit financially on a long- rather than short-term basis, and become leading actors in shaping their individual supply portfolios through water transfers and exchanges as needed. In that scenario, SDCWA and MWD will to some degree become facilitators and providers of assistance rather than the principals. For this to work, it will also be essential to have a strong degree of cooperation and collaboration between SDCWA and MWD as Southern California's two premier water supply agencies.

## APPENDIX A

### REVIEW OF LONDON MOEDER ADVISORS “RAINBOW MWD & FALLBROOK PUD COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SDCWA MEMBERSHIP”

The LMA Report contains three sections, each of which I consider in turn.

#### 1. Fixed Charge Analysis

LMA note that, over the period 2010 – 2019, SDCWA received approximately \$1.233 billion in revenue from fixed charges from member agencies – the customer service charge, storage charge, supply reliability charge and infrastructure access charge. The charges paid by FPUD and RMWD over that period amounted to approximately \$56 million, or 4.5% of the SDCWA total.

LMA go on to observe that between 2010 and 2019 there were a total of 908,302-to-925,093-meter equivalents served by the SDCWA system. FPUD and RMWD consistently comprised approximately 2.7% to 2.9% of all meter equivalents served by SDCWA.

LMA note that had FPUD and RMWD’s share of all SDCWA member agency fixed charges been the same as their share of meter equivalents (2.8%), FPUD and RMWD would have paid a total of \$34.5 million in fixed charges to SDCWA over the period 2010 – 2019, instead of \$56 million. LMA imply that FPUD and RMWD paid more than their fair share of SDCWA fixed charges.

I disagree.

While SDCWA allocates the total fixed charge revenue to be raised through the infrastructure access charge among member agencies in proportion to their share of the meter equivalents served by the Authority, it allocates the total revenue to be raised through each of the other three fixed charges in proportion to member agencies’ share of the three- or five-year rolling average of all water purchases or M&I water purchases.

That FPUD’s and RMWD’s combined share of all fixed charges is 4.5% while their combined share of meter equivalents is 2.8% reflects the fact, on average, *FPUD and RMWD customers use more water per meter equivalent than do customers of the other SDCWA member agencies.*

By way of example, in FY 2019, FPUD and RMWD together accounted for 5.9% of the water supplied by SDCWA to member agencies, while at the same time accounting for 2.9% of the meter equivalents. Specifically, In FY 2019 FPUD and RMWD received 22,253 AF from SDCWA for use by their 26,542-meter equivalents (ME), amounting to a usage of 0.8384 AF per ME. In FY 2019, the other member agencies combined received 356,277 AF for use by 898,551 ME, amounting to an average usage of 0.3965 AF per ME. *The average usage of SDCWA water per meter equivalent within the FPUD and RMWD service areas in FY 2019 was more than twice that of the other member agencies (0.8384 AF/ME versus 0.3965 AF/ME).*

Based on my own experience of analyzing the costs of municipal water supply systems in California, I see no reason for apportioning the fixed costs of water supply among wholesale customers of a supply agency like SDCWA based on the member agencies' shares of the total number of meter equivalents serviced by the wholesale agency.

From an economic perspective, it is more appropriate to allocate fixed costs among member agencies based on (i) their share of annual water deliveries, or on something like (ii) their share of peak hourly or daily deliveries. Those variables are more likely to drive the fixed costs experienced by SDCWA than the number of meter equivalents serviced by the individual member agencies.

## **2A. Benefits Received by FPUD and RMWD**

The LMA report equates the degree to which FPUD and RMWD benefit from their membership in SDCWA to the share of their water supply *not* "received from" MWD.

For example, the report states that, prior to 2020, 85% of FPUD's water supplies "were received directly from MWD facilities," the remaining 15% being received from SDCWA facilities. From this, the report infers that FPUD benefits from SDCWA membership only for 15% of its water supply.

LMA makes a parallel argument with respect to RMWD.

This argument is not correct.

Even if FPUD and RMWD were to receive *all* of their water supply as treated water from MWD's Skinner Water Treatment Plant delivered to them via flow control facilities owned by MWD, all of that water is a benefit of their SDCWA membership. FPUD and RMWD would not be in a position to receive a single drop of water from the Skinner Plant if (1) SDCWA were not a member agency of MWD, and (2) had not contracted with MWD to receive that water.

Some of the water from Skinner is QSA water that belongs to SDCWA, not MWD. The rest of the water from Skinner is MWD water (from the State Water Project or obtained under MWD's rights to Colorado River water) which has been purchased by SDCWA from MWD as a member agency. Either way, all of the water received by FPUD and RMWD from Skinner belongs to SDCWA and comes to FPUD and RMWD as a benefit of their membership in SDCWA. FPUD and RMWD cannot assert a sort of riparian right to water flowing in MWD-owned facilities through their service areas.

Therefore, LMA's conclusion that, over the period 2010 – 2019, FPUD and RMWD benefited from their membership of SDCWA only in the amount of \$6.5 million is not correct.

## **2B. Benefit – to – Cost Ratio**

The LMA Report's benefit-cost analysis is not correct.

The measurement of the benefits received by FPUD and RMWD is not correct for the reason I have stated above (in 2A).

The measurement of the "fair share of fixed charges" attributed by LMA to FPUD and RMWD is not correct for the reason I have stated above (in 1).

Consequently, the estimate in the Report that FPUD and RMWD have subsidized the remaining member agencies by \$49.5 million over the period 2010 – 2019 lacks foundation and is incorrect. The same observation applies to the statements in the LMA report that (1) during the years of 2010 through 2019, FPUD and RMWD achieved a benefit-to-cost ratio of 0.12 from the payment of fixed charges, and (2) the remaining MDCWA member agencies have benefited from this imbalance representing a benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.04. Both statements lack foundation and are incorrect.

## **3. Reallocation of Fees**

The LMA Report assesses the financial impact of FPUD and RMWD de-annexation on the remaining member agencies. The report observes that, between 2010 and 2019, FPUD and RMWD paid SDCWA an average of approximately \$5.6 million annually in fixed charges. The report goes on to state that \$5.6 million per year "represents the hypothetical amount that SDCWA will have to re-allocate to the remaining member agencies in order to avoid an increase in variable water rates."

The statement just cited is not correct, for two reasons.

First, under de-annexation, in addition to the loss of revenues from the fixed charges considered by LMA (the customer service charge, storage charge, supply reliability charge and infrastructure access charge), SDCWA would also lose some quantum of revenue from property taxes, capacity charges and the availability standby charge. These revenues are used to finance some of SDCWA's fixed costs of operation that would still be incurred by SDCWA for the benefit of its member agencies after de-annexation.

Secondly, SDCWA also uses a large portion (in fact, the majority) of the revenue from its variable water rates to cover fixed costs of operation. Under de-annexation, SDCWA's water rate revenue would go down, but it would still incur the same fixed costs that are paid for through variable water rates.

With a reduced volume of water delivered due to the de-annexation of FPUD and RMWD but the same fixed costs, SDCWA would have to raise not only its fixed charges but also its variable water rates in order to offset the revenue loss.

Consequently, LMA's estimate of \$5.6 million for the annual financial impact of de-annexation on the remaining SDCWA member agencies is a significant understatement.

## **APPENDIX B**

### **REVIEW OF EMWD TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM “ANALYSIS OF EASTERN MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT’S WATER SUPPLY AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY WITH THE POTENTIAL ANNEXATION OF FALLBROOK PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT AND RAINBOW MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT” FEBRUARY 12, 2020.**

This EMWD memorandum evaluates how annexation of FPUD and RMWD into EMWD’s wholesale service area would impact EMWD’s water supply portfolio under three planning scenarios and in three alternative Regional Shortage Levels (1, 3 and 5) as defined in MWD’s Water Supply Allocation Plan (WSAP).

The memorandum finds that, under all of the conditions evaluated adequate supplies existed such that no single EMWD retail agency, including RMWD and FPUD, would be subject to the MWD allocation surcharge even at a Regional Shortage Level 5.

#### **Context**

In 1990, MWD had adopted a first-ever drought management plan which called on member agencies to voluntarily cut their water usage. As that drought grew more severe, this became a mandatory requirement ultimately cutting back municipal water deliveries by 30% and agricultural deliveries by 90%. That rationing program ended when the drought abated.

In 2007, with the possibility of drought re-appearing, MWD initiated a process to develop what became its Water Supply Allocation Plan (WSAP), adopted in February 2008 and put into effect in April 2009, covering the period July 2009 – April 2011.

In 2014, when another dry year was anticipated, the WSAP was updated and then implemented in April 2015, covering the period July 2015 – June 2016.

The 2014 version remains MWD’s official policy for allocating supplies in the event of shortage.

Key features of the WSAP are that (1) it does not impose mandatory cutbacks but, instead, uses an economic incentive to encourage member agencies to achieve their targeted reduction in water use, and (2) the targeted reduction is tailored to the circumstances of each member agency based on several factors including its dependence on MWD at the retail level and its existing level of per capita use.

As in the 1990 program, there are tiers of reduction corresponding to the degree of regional water shortage. When MWD has a shortage, this is said to be an “allocation” situation. In a Tier 1 Shortage, depending on their situation member agencies face a reduction in the amount of water allocated to them by MWD amounting to between 5% and 7.5% of the amount that would



have been allocated in the absence of shortage.<sup>111</sup> In a Tier 3 Shortage, which applied in 2015-2016, member agencies face a reduction in the amount of water allocated to them by MWD amounting to between 15% and 22.5% of the amount that would have been allocated in the absence of shortage. In a Tier 5 Shortage, member agencies face a reduction in the amount of water allocated to them by MWD amounting to between 25% and 37.5% of the amount that would have been allocated in the absence of shortage.

However, if a member agency wishes to exceed its WSAP allocation, it can still do so on payment of a surcharge. The surcharge amount is \$1,480/AF above the MWD Tier 1 water rate<sup>112</sup> for excess water up to 15% over the WSAP allocation, or \$2,960/AF for excess water beyond 15% over the WSAP allocation.

Thus, rather than placing an absolute limit on the amount of water it will deliver to a member agency in a shortage situation, as in 1990, with the WSAP program MWD employs stiff financial incentives to constrain the demand for its water during an allocation year.

### **EMWD'S Analysis**

EMWD analyzed three shortage scenarios.

One scenario was the 2015 Drought. This scenario considered how EMWD's customers, along with FPUD and RMWD, would have fared during the severe drought conditions resulting in 2014-2016 under the emergency conservation order issued by Governor Brown.

Another scenario was current day conditions, as of 2019 (the report was finalized in February 2020). This scenario considered how EMWD's customers, along with FPUD and RMWD, would have fared had MWD implemented an allocation during 2019.

The final scenario was future conditions in 2035. This scenario considered how EMWD's customers, along with FPUD and RMWD, would fare in the future, using projections for 2035 taken from EMWD's 2015 Urban Water Management Plan.

For my purposes, the current day conditions (2019) scenario seems most relevant. I confine my remarks here to that scenario. For that scenario, EMWD used several assumptions, the most important being the following:

1. The base period used to calculate MWD's allocation was calendar year 2013 and 2014 – this is the base period previously used for an allocation by MWD and it represents the most recent period where demands were not influenced by drought response both at the

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<sup>111</sup> Member agencies more heavily dependent on MWD receive a cutback at the lower end of the scale. In addition, there is a reward for having lowered per capita water use as between a baseline period and the current year, which takes the form of a small additional allocation based on the amount of the reduction in per capita water use. Member agencies also receive a credit (in the form of a larger allocation) for "extraordinary" local supply being put to use during an allocation period.

<sup>112</sup> For comparison, the MWD Tier 1 rate for treated water is \$1,104/AF in 2021.

local and state level. That is consistent with MWD's intent to define a base period that reflects non-drought conditions.

2. The allocation year is 2019.
3. The adjustment for population growth between the base period and the allocation period was based on population estimates generated by the California Department of Finance. Since the base period was 2013-2014, the growth rate was calculated as the growth from the 2013-2014 average population value to the 2019 population value.
4. Allocation year local supplies were assumed to be equal to actual local supply usage in calendar year 2019.
5. No adjustments permitted by the WSAP for conservation demand hardening or low per-capita use were applied.
6. No extraordinary local supplies were considered.
7. While 2019 was actually a wet year rather than a dry year, the hydrology still resulted in reduced service area demands – accordingly, 2019 totals were assumed to reflect a dry year with some degree of customer conservation in place.

EMWD's technical analysis demonstrated that, under these conditions in 2019, EMWD and all the agencies it served (plus FPU and RMWD if it served them) would be in compliance with MWD's shortage allocation, regardless of whether the Shortage Level was Tier 1, Tier 3 or Tier 5. Neither EMWD nor its member agencies (including FPU and RMWD) would be in a situation where they have to pay MWD's allocation surcharge.

### **Some Limits to EMWD's Analysis**

EMWD's technical analysis is thoughtful and painstaking. It is certainly to be commended.

However, there is one important issue.

In an email dated October 15, 2021, responding to some questions I had emailed the day before, Nick Kanetis forwarded to me comments made in response by EMWD's Gordon Ng. Gordon Ng indicated that, while he couldn't be absolutely sure, he guessed that the cutback in MWD supplies imposed on EMWD during an allocation would likely be around the middle of the range – i.e., an 18% cutback in the case of a Tier 3 Shortage. Extrapolating, this implies a 6% cutback in the case of a Tier 1 Shortage, and a 30% cutback in the case of a Tier 5 Shortage.

Combining those percentage cutbacks with the resulting MWD allocations as projected by EMWD for the current day conditions scenario in Tables 5, 6 and 7 allows me to back out the implied allocation of water by MWD to EMWD in the absence of a shortage. This comes out to around 124,000 AF.

As reported by MWD, the amount of water actually delivered by MWD to EMWD in 2019 was about 84,000 AF. That figure is also consistent with the data in the first two columns of Tables 5, 6 and 7 in EMWD's Technical Memorandum. Those columns show EMWD's projected total

potable demand in 2019 and EMWD's local potable supply in 2019. The difference between the two numbers is what EMWD would have obtained from MWD, and that amounts almost exactly to 84,000 AF.

Thus, the current day conditions scenario in EMWD's Technical Memorandum has MWD allocating 124,000 AF for EMWD under non-shortage conditions, and then reducing that by 6%, 18% or 30% depending on whether there was a Tier 1 Shortage, a Tier 3 Shortage or a Tier 5 Shortage. But, EMWD actually needed only 84,000 AF from MWD in 2019. This difference is why EMWD turns out to have more than enough water for its member agencies (including FPUD and RMWD) in the face of a Tier 1, Tier 3 or Tier 5 shortage: MWD was basing the cutback on a presumed demand from EMWD for MWD water of 124,00 AF, which is about 47% larger than the actual demand from EMWD.

Some discrepancy between MWD's projection of a member agency's demand for MWD water in the absence of shortage and the agency's actual demand in a shortage year is inevitable for two reasons:

- (1) Under the WSAP protocol, MWD is basing its projection of demand for MWD water on updates of information from a previous base period, and the updating can introduce some error.
- (2) Because it is a shortage year, the demand for water in the member agency will be depressed by drought restrictions on water use and conservation requirements whether at the local or state levels.

In this case, however, drought restrictions *alone* are unlikely to explain a 47% gap between the actual member agency demand for MWD water in a shortage year and the non-shortage member agency demand from which MWD thought it was cutting back its delivery.

## **Implications**

MWD and its member agencies are much better prepared for drought today than they were in 1990. MWD has vastly more reserves in storage today than it did in 1990. MWD's WSAP protocol is, in my view, a superior approach to handling scarcity than what MWD did before WSAP was introduced. However, it is also true that in past droughts MWD and Southern California were shielded from the effects more than Northern California because of their access to water from the Colorado River – in all of California's droughts up to now, including 2012-2016, Colorado River water was Southern California's bulwark.

As of this year, that has changed. The vulnerability of the Colorado River to climate change is being dramatically re-assessed, as reflected in the Bureau of Reclamation's new supply projection methodology introduced in the last month or two.

We know how painful a 30% cut in MWD deliveries was back in 1990. Therefore, the notion that EMWD could today absorb a 30% cut (Tier 5) in MWD deliveries with no ill-effect is quite striking. The technical analysis in EMWD's memorandum is impressive. But, I do not consider it conclusive proof that EMWD could not be significantly affected in the future by reduced MWD deliveries on the scale of a Tier 5 Shortage, or even a Tier 3 Shortage.

**The workgroup was tasked with and attempted to answer the following:**

- 1. What are the cost impacts to Poway, Valley Center, and City of San Diego of detachment based on the Hanemann report?**
- 2. Do detachment and roll-off have the same impacts?**
- 3. Are there any offsets to the cost impacts?**

**Baseline reasonable assumptions need to be formulated in order to move forward with an estimate of impacts on the three agencies identified (City of San Diego, Valley Center, and Poway).**

The assumptions are:

1. That there is no increase in water sales by the remaining water agencies after a deannaxation to offset any of the lost revenue. This is a reasonable assumption because of recent flat and/or decreasing water sales and the mandatory implementation of new conservation measures required by the state in the next 5 years.
2. That rates will be allocated in the same manner that they are currently allocated by SDCWA. This is a reasonable assumption as it is impossible to predict how future Boards will vote to allocate rates and the current SDCWA Board recently voted to postpone any changes to fixed and variable rate allocation until at least 2024. *(\*One subcommittee member noted that SDCWA would likely change its rates if there were a detachment. This is also a reasonable assumption as the SDCWA has a responsibility to ensure its sustainability for the entire region and adequate revenues to protect its financial viability is paramount. This subcommittee does not know what those changes might be and as a future SDCWA board holds rate autonomy, we did not venture to make a guess.)*
3. The Hanemann report is being used as the basis for the numbers and costs.

### **Estimate of impacts on Poway, Valley Center, and City of San Diego**

The best predictor of future cost allocations amongst water agencies from SDCWA is to look at past rolling averages of cost allocations and contributions. Each member agency of SDCWA has a different mix of fixed versus variable rates based on past purchases and also has different customer bases that purchase differing amounts of agricultural or Municipal & Industrial water.

SDCWA's fixed costs vary in allocation time periods from 3 to 10 year rolling averages. A 5 year time period takes into account both high water and low water demand years. (IE, rainy and dry years)

Based on information received from SDCWA in the chart below, Poway has a 5 year contributed asset share of 2.2%, City of San Diego has 37.2% and Valley Center has 4.2%. If none of those agencies significantly roll off of SDCWA in the near future, their cost allocation percentages from SDCWA for the next five years should be similar to the past five years.

	5-year Contributions (\$)	% Share (1yr)	% Share (5Yr)	% Share (10Yr)	% Share (Lifetime)
Carlsbad	\$166,400,036	4.9%	4.8%	4.5%	3.7%
Del Mar	\$10,665,817	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Escondido	\$101,156,513	3.1%	2.9%	3.3%	3.5%
Fallbrook	\$71,558,859	2.1%	2.1%	2.2%	2.2%
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Padre Dam	\$98,251,567	2.9%	2.8%	2.8%	2.7%
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Poway	\$74,690,419	2.3%	2.2%	2.2%	2.1%
Rainbow	\$133,246,992	3.9%	3.9%	4.0%	3.9%
Ramona	\$44,190,254	1.2%	1.3%	1.3%	1.5%
Rincon	\$52,328,006	1.6%	1.5%	1.6%	1.4%
San Diego	\$1,285,972,646	35.9%	37.2%	37.0%	39.7%
San Dieguito	\$35,493,779	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%
Santa Fe	\$58,041,000	1.7%	1.7%	1.6%	1.6%
South Bay (SWA)	\$49,983,992	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	1.9%
Vallecitos	\$157,741,869	4.5%	4.6%	4.2%	3.0%
Valley Center	\$146,368,851	4.2%	4.2%	4.6%	5.0%
Vista	\$92,909,811	2.7%	2.7%	3.0%	3.0%
Yuima	\$33,945,773	1.1%	1.0%	0.8%	0.5%

Of note: Poway’s lifetime contributed assets equate to 2.1%, which is only .1% off of its last 5 year average. Valley Center has been purchasing significantly less water over the past 5 years based on its water use profile (heavy agriculture), therefore its 5 year average is .8% less than its lifetime average.)

Dr. Hanemann produced a report that stated that “*The purpose of imposing some financial obligation on FPUD or RMWD if they are permitted to detach from SDCWA is to provide a level of financial protection for SDCWA and the remaining member agencies in the short run while they adjust to the changed financial situation of a detachment.*” Specifically, Dr. Hanemann included the following calculations in his report for a detachment exit fee with a suggestion of 10 years as a reasonable planning timeline:

### Annual Financial impact of detachment (CY 2022)

Item	FPUD	RMWD	FPUD + RMWD
<b>REDUCTION IN REVENUE</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$8,590,141	\$24,329,127	\$32,919,268
With property tax loss	\$8,750,141	\$24,519,127	\$33,269,268
<b>REDUCTION IN EXPENDITURE</b>			
Short-run	\$4,686,300	\$16,002,000	\$20,688,300
Long-run	\$5,047,100	\$17,234,000	\$22,281,100
<b>CHANGE IN NET REVENUE</b>			
<b>SHORT-RUN</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$3,903,841	\$8,327,127	\$12,230,968
With property tax loss	\$4,063,841	\$8,517,127	\$12,580,968
<b>LONG-RUN</b>			
Without property tax loss	\$3,543,041	\$7,095,127	\$10,638,168
With property tax loss	\$3,703,041	\$7,285,127	\$10,988,168

Based on the numbers provided by Dr. Hanemann, a change in net revenue of \$12.58 million would happen in the short run if there were no detachment exit fee and both Fallbrook and Rainbow detached. Based on the assumptions above, and assuming SDCWA collected the reduction in revenue from all remaining agencies and water purchases remained somewhat consistent with the past 5 year rolling average, Poway would see an increase of \$276,781 per year in the short term; City of San Diego would see \$4,654,958; and Valley Center would see \$528,400 as its annual increase. All of these are estimates, as no one can predict the exact volume of water each agency will purchase in any given year.

The committee did not delve into what the rates impacts would be for each of the retail ratepayers at the three identified agencies, as every member agency has different cost of service studies based on their customer base (agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, etc. ), meter sizes and different cost tiers for water use. Each retail member agency would need to determine for themselves how they would allocate their annual respective cost impacts noted above to their ratepayers.

## **The elephant in the room – Are the impacts of detachment and roll off the same?**

It is important to note that there is no obligation for any member agency to take any amount of supply from SDCWA. However, a member agency that remains as a member of the SDCWA will still have to pay fixed costs to SDCWA, even if they do not take a drop of water. The elephant in the room is not if detachment and roll off are the same. They are not. The impacts of detachment and roll off are different in that an agency that rolls off will still be a member agency of the SDCWA and will be contributing to future cost increases and rates set by the SDCWA board. A detachment, once completed, means that a member agency is no longer a member agency of SDCWA and will not be contributing to future costs – unless an exit fee is conditioned by LAFCO for a certain time period.

The true elephant in the room is that unless SDCWA reduces (or leverages to others) its fixed take or pay supplies; it will have more fixed take or pay supplies than it will have demand in the next ten years if its member agencies fully develop all of their local supply projects. Dr. Hanemann also noted in his presentation to the LAFCO Detachment Workgroup that there is a *“Financial exposure to reduction in water sales. With current rates, I estimate that for every 1,000 AF less that SDCWA delivers to member agencies, its net revenue falls on average by almost \$1M. This is of some concern given that SDCWA is projected to experience a reduction of about 60,000 AF in deliveries to member agencies by around 2030.”* If member agencies roll off to the tune of 60,000 acre feet by 2030 through the development of local supplies, (according to Dr. Hanemann) this will reduce the SDCWA net revenue by \$60,000,000. By way of comparison, FY 2022 Net Water Sales Revenue by SDCWA (in its annual budget) is \$108,586,236. A loss of \$60 million in net revenue is more than half of SDCWA’s total current annual net revenue. This is not a sustainable future and does not bode well for future rate affordability. This topic should be explored in depth via the upcoming SDCWA MSR. Any MSR review of SDCWA should also include a review of MWD and its operations and agreements within the SDCWA region.

## **Is there an offset to Fallbrook and Rainbow for ESP North County Pump Station that was never built? (Need more information.)**

Fallbrook and Rainbow assert that there is a cost savings to the remaining member agencies if they detach as the ESP North County Pump Station does not need to be built if they detach. SDCWA asserts that there is no cost savings, as construction of the ESP North County Pump Station is not included in their current budget. Both of these statements are true. However, almost \$21 million was identified in the SDCWA 2010/2011 Budget for the ESP North County Pump Station. According to a mid-term budget review, this project was deferred in 2011, however bond documents appear to show inclusion of this project in 2008. If debt was already issued to pay for this project and rates were set accordingly, there should be some costs that are avoided by not having to build this pump station. SDCWA should look at its older documents to identify and address this issue. This was a project included in the CIP (and some funds were spent on design) that set rates and debt issuance over a decade ago to pay for construction this project. Further information is needed to answer this question.

August 10, 2022

MEMBER AGENCIES

Carlsbad  
Municipal Water District

City of Del Mar

City of Escondido

City of National City

City of Oceanside

City of Poway

City of San Diego

Fallbrook  
Public Utility District

Helix Water District

Lakeside Water District

Olivenhain  
Municipal Water District

Otay Water District

Padre Dam  
Municipal Water District

Camp Pendleton  
Marine Corps Base

Rainbow  
Municipal Water District

Ramona  
Municipal Water District

Rincon del Diablo  
Municipal Water District

San Dieguito Water District

Santa Fe Irrigation District

South Bay Irrigation District

Vallecitos Water District

Valley Center  
Municipal Water District

Vista Irrigation District

Yuima  
Municipal Water District

OTHER  
REPRESENTATIVE

County of San Diego

**VIA EMAIL**

Mr. Adam Wilson, Moderator  
San Diego County LAFCO  
(adwilson858@yahoo.com)

RE: Response to Sub-Committee Report

Dear Adam:

Thank you very much for the draft Working Group on Rate Impacts Report (Report) which will be discussed at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting this coming Thursday. Having this information in advance is very helpful so we can respond to the Committee at the meeting. We ask that you share this letter with all Committee members.

First, we agree with some of the conclusions in the Report, including that the "SDCWA Board holds rate autonomy" and that detachment and roll-off are not the same thing.

However, there are important factual errors to be corrected, and some confusion to address, including the following:

- In regard to the annual financial impacts by member agency, accurate data was submitted with our Response in September 2020, and updated in June 2022 at your request. A copy of the update is attached to this letter. The information used by the Working Group is not accurate.
- The loss numbers the Working Group cite from Dr. Hanemann as to supposed future revenue losses, such as in 2030, are too general for the manner in which they use them and are also used inconsistently. The Water Authority's Finance Department analysis that is attached is more accurate, and we look forward to providing further explanation at the meeting on Thursday.
- This statement in the Report that the Water Authority "will have more fixed take or pay supplies than it will have demand in the next ten years if its member agencies fully develop all of their local supply projects," is incorrect. No facts or analysis are cited for this premise. The Water Authority's 2020 Urban Water Management Plan is based on current facts and demonstrates in Table 9-1 that even with development of all of the member agencies' verified local supplies (including Phase 2 of Pure Water San Diego) online by 2035, demands on the Water Authority will still be more than its take-or-pay



Mr. Adam Wilson  
August 10, 2022  
Page 2

contracted supplies, out through the planning horizon of 2045. A copy of Table 9-1 from the UWMP is attached.

- Regarding the potential ESP project for Fallbrook and Rainbow, some de minimus amounts have indeed already been spent in initial planning. However, no debt has been issued and none of these costs has been included in our rates and charges or budget. Per our Board direction and with the concurrence of Fallbrook and Rainbow, the project has been deferred until we know what happens in detachment.
- The report references a future MSR of the Water Authority. That is not an issue relevant to this detachment process. Moreover, we must respectfully disagree that LAFCO has any authority or expertise whatsoever with regard to either water supply planning or rate-setting by the Water Authority. Rather, as noted elsewhere in the Report, that subject is under the exclusive autonomy of the Water Authority's board of directors.

Thank you again for your efforts in coordinating this Committee, and we look forward to discussing these matters in more detail on Thursday.

Sincerely,



Sandra L. Kerl  
General Manager

Enclosure(s)

cc: LAFCO Ad Hoc Advisory Committee Members  
Water Authority Board of Directors  
Mark Hattam, Water Authority General Counsel

June 9, 2022

**MEMBER AGENCIES**

- Carlsbad  
Municipal Water District
- City of Del Mar
- City of Escondido
- City of National City
- City of Oceanside
- City of Poway
- City of San Diego
- Fallbrook  
Public Utility District
- Helix Water District
- Lakeside Water District
- Olivenhain  
Municipal Water District
- Otay Water District
- Padre Dam  
Municipal Water District
- Camp Pendleton  
Marine Corps Base
- Rainbow  
Municipal Water District
- Ramona  
Municipal Water District
- Rincon del Diablo  
Municipal Water District
- San Dieguito Water District
- Santa Fe Irrigation District
- South Bay Irrigation District
- Vallecitos Water District
- Valley Center  
Municipal Water District
- Vista Irrigation District
- Yuima  
Municipal Water District

**VIA EMAIL**

Adam Wilson  
San Diego LAFCO Consultant  
(adwilson858@yahoo.com)

**RE: Follow-Up to May 10 CWA Presentation**

Dear Mr. Wilson:

This letter is in response to your correspondence emailed May 26<sup>th</sup> and its attached memorandum. In your memo, you outlined three additional questions resulting from my May 10<sup>th</sup> presentation to the AD Hoc Working Group.

I appreciate the opportunity to address these questions in written form, as they require detailed responses. The questions are more complex than they appear, and thus the responses are multifaceted and require appropriate context.

While some of the information requested is based on actual data, other responses are founded on projections and a presumption of the status quo. As with all industries, the water industry (both operationally and financially) continues to adapt to new technologies, regulatory pressures, and climate change. However, what has and never will change, is the vital role water plays to all life and constitution of the San Diego economic framework. As Surgeon General Scheele stated in 1952, "Water is essential to life—the life of a city as well as the life of a human being. Without water, a [person] dies. Without water, a community faces the same fate."

**OTHER  
REPRESENTATIVE**

County of San Diego

*[continued on the following page]*

1) *What are the total contributed assets, broken down by member agency (in dollars) over the last five years?*

As stated in my May 10<sup>th</sup> presentation, water is an infrastructure driven utility that is not accurately reflected in a narrowly and baselessly assigned time-series. The following table provides the percentage share of total revenue collected recorded for the past 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, and the historical lifetime of each agency. By enumerating multiple ranges, one can better identify and communicate the results of the requested data.

	5-year Contributions (\$)	% Share (1yr)	% Share (5yr)	% Share (10yr)	% Share (Lifetime)
Carlsbad	\$166,400,036	4.9%	4.8%	4.5%	3.7%
Del Mar	\$10,665,817	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Escondido	\$101,156,513	3.1%	2.9%	3.3%	3.5%
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Vista	\$92,909,811	2.7%	2.7%	3.0%	3.0%
Yuima	\$33,945,773	1.1%	1.0%	0.8%	0.5%

The vast majority of the revenue contributions are related to the direct purchase and delivery of water (treated and untreated). In 2022, roughly 72% of the Water Authority's budget was comprised of the cost of water (supply or treatment). The remaining 28% recovers the Water Authority's O&M expenses, CIP, and debt service obligations.

2) *What would the SDCWA Rate increases to (each individually) Valley Center, City of Poway, and City of San Diego be if Rainbow and Fallbrook detachment occurred using the Hanemann dollars (numbers)?*

Before a specific response is defined, it is necessary to outline the limitation and context of “the Hanemann dollars” (presented in Dr. Hanemann’s Final Report). While the Final Report itself details a range of options, including annual amounts and annual terms, the “Hanemann dollars” provide but a single *sample* calculation and suggests that “[t]hese calculations could be modified in any manner that LAFCO sees fit. In particular, the FPUD/RMWD share could be calculated for a different set of years.” As discussed above, selective framing and a baseless narrowing of datum can skew results. As was demonstrated in Dr. Hanemann’s Table 22, there is a 3% to 6% difference (increase) between using a 3-year review (which Hanemann uses for his calculation) rather than the 5-year or 10-year review. Without defining why a 3-year window was selected for his sample, Dr. Hanemann’s 3-year singular number shifts millions of additional detachment impacts to the rest of the county.

For a utility, such as the Water Authority, that is so infrastructure driven and volatile to annual hydrological demand impacts, a 3-year snapshot gives an unfairly limited perspective as to whether that reflects a true and reasonable indication of an agency’s average, historical, or forecasted use. This may be one reason why Dr. Hanemann did not recommend using a 3-year figure, but just provided it as an exemplar. Furthermore, a 3-year snapshot remains static, remaining unchanged for the entirety of the 5 or 10-year period. Moreover still, the “Annual Payments” are based on a 2021 amount and are not shown to reflect inflation or rate adjustments – thus giving another undue discount to rates if allowed to be paid (unadjusted) over the set of years.

To understand impacts to member agencies, the Water Authority’s existing rate structure must be contextualized. The Water Authority’s rate structure currently consists of a variety of fixed and variable rates. However, given the significant and material impact of Detachment on the Water Authority’s finances, a complete review and overhaul of the existing structure would likely be required. As stated by law, our Board would make decisions as to cost recovery allocations. For the purposes of this request, the forecast cost increase is passed through to each agency proportional to total forecasted CY ‘22 rate contributions, though of course that might not be what would actually occur.

As defined in the Water Authority’s September 2020 Response to LAFCO, the Water Authority’s financial impact isn’t simply calculated on a single determinate -CY 2021’s \$284M QSA commitments (which increased to \$305M in CY 2022) - but rather the entirety of its nearly \$2 billion in outstanding debt, historical pension liabilities, and other incurred liabilities (indebtedness). Dr. Hanemann also acknowledged that his “estimate will understate the revenue lost due to FPUD/RMWD detachment” should the use of reserves (existing rate reduction efforts) be considered. Additionally, 75% of the Water Authority’s rates are collected

Mr. Adam Wilson

June 9, 2022

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variably, while 90% of the annual costs are fixed. Dr. Hanemann presents a singular best-case (low impact) outcome.

Dr. Hanemann's 2021 estimate of \$13M to \$18.5M has been increased by 7% to reflect actual cost increases incurred since 2021. Using the same limited and prescribed data as he did in his example, the defined impact is now \$13.9M or \$19.8M. These costs will continue to increase to account for planned MWD rate increases and escalation variables detailed in the QSA agreements.

The estimated Detachment Impact Table provided at the end of this memo defines the estimate cost impact, by agency, assuming demands continues in the same manner as the prior year. As the Water Authority's rates are set annually to recover the actual costs, the narrowly defined and static "annual payments" are likely to be insufficient, and thus will necessitate greater increases/impacts than defined below. The impact was calculated for all agencies, not just those requested, as a dollar not collected from one of highlighted three will need to be recovered from some other agency.

*[continued on the following page]*

In the following paragraphs I provide the approximate annual numbers for each of the agencies identified in the question. In order to ground the magnitude of these dollars, I then divided the impact (cost increase) of each by agency's service population to get a rough per capita impact. I then extrapolated that to a rough per household impact. All numbers are annualized and for a single year.

For Valley Center, the estimated single-year impact is between \$672,362 and \$894,871 every year. Based on their estimated service population, this equates to a \$26.26 to \$34.96 annual rate impact to every resident in the Valley Center. For a typical household of 4, this is effectively an annual \$105 - \$140 rate increase for no additional benefit or service being provided. The below table shows the amounts that would be paid for 5 to 10 years. However, the table does not capture one key fact: *the losses continue on year after year after year*. This is because the proposed detachments are not for 5 or 10 years but are permanent – thus increasing costs for all other member agencies for all years moving forward.

For Poway, the estimated single-year impact is between \$357,201 and \$475,412 every year. Based on census data, this equates to a \$7.38 to \$9.82 annual rate impact to every resident in the City of Poway. For a household of 4, this is an annual \$30 - \$39 rate increase for no additional benefit or service being provided.

For the City of San Diego, the estimated single-year impact is between \$5,531,072 and \$7,361,498 every year. Based on census records, this equates to a \$4.00 to \$5.33 annual impact to every resident in the City of San Diego. For a family of 4, this signifies an annual \$16 - \$21 rate increase for no additional benefit or service being provided.

In California, 1 in 8 households had water debt as of January 2021.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the consideration that 98% of San Diegans should be unduly burdened with hundreds of millions in additional costs – with no corresponding benefit - is clearly problematic.

3) *Do the San Diego County Water Authority's current rates take into account the funding for capital improvements that are specifically intended to benefit both Fallbrook and Rainbow, which have not been built to date?*

The Water Authority's rates and charges are set annually based on extensive and transparent budget and rate process with its Board and its member agencies. The rates are set to recover costs detailed in the Water Authority's Adopted 2-year Budget. While FPUD/RWMD benefit from the Water Authority's extensive capital program (past and present), the North County ESP Pumping Station project *is not* included in the adopted budget and therefore *is not included* in any fashion in the Water Authority's existing rates and charges (including the proposed CY 2023).

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<sup>1</sup> Botts. 2021. 'The most basic form of PPE': 1.6 million households face water shutoffs.

Mr. Adam Wilson

June 9, 2022

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Additionally, as the Water Authority does not have funds (cash/reserves) available to fund this project (should it be budgeted and approved) – the project would be funded with additional debt issuances. It is an industry best practice and common for new facilities to be funded with new debt, as it provides generational equity benefits alignment of the facilities use (benefit) with its cost (service).

As Dr. Hanemann adeptly described, “[t]here seems to be a degree of inconsistency in the position adopted by FPUD/RWMD - past financial commitments incurring ongoing payments and debt service appear not to be relevant when assessing FPUD/RMWD detachment, but future invests that would not be incurred *are* relevant to that assessment.” The “Hanemann dollars” only reflect the Water Authority’s QSA obligations and no share or obligation of the Water Authority’s nearly \$2 billion of outstanding debt (due to historical system investment).

Therefore, the simple answer is that the current rates do not include payment of the ESP project that will benefit Fallbrook and Rainbow. If this approximately \$30-million project were debt financed, as is typical, then the estimated impact on Water Authority rates and charges would equate to roughly a small one-time 0.3% increase applicable over the life of the debt.

Or, to frame it in a manner of what might be of most interest to LAFCO and our other member agencies, if Rainbow and were to detach without compensation to the Water Authority, in a base year we estimate about a 6.0-7.0% annual loss in revenue. If the ESP debt financing were not necessary, this annual loss in revenue would only be offset by a much smaller 0.3%, thus minimally reducing our annual loss to be made up by other member agencies to an annual base year loss of 5.7-6.0%.

Sincerely,

Pierce Rossum  
Rate & Debt Manager

Cc via email:

Adam Wilson, Ad Hoc Committee Moderator  
Keane Simonds, Executive Officer, San Diego LACFO  
Sandra L. Kerl, General Manager, San Diego County Water Authority  
Water Authority Board of Directors  
General Managers of Water Authority Member Agencies

The following table defines the forecasted rate impact of detachment, using escalated figures of those defined in Dr. Hanemann’s Final Report. The results reflect a high-level approximation. Should detachment be approved, and once final financials are known, the Water Authority foresees the need to complete a comprehensive cost-of-service and rate structure study, validated by an independent cost of service consultant, to incorporate the millions in added rate burden.

Detachment Impact	'22 Estimated Revenue Share	Detachment Impact		Detachment Impact (5-year)		Detachment Impact (10-year)	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
		\$13,900,000	\$18,500,000	\$69,500,000	\$92,500,000	\$139,000,000	\$185,000,000
<b>Carlsbad M.W.D.</b>	4.02%	\$559,125	\$744,159	\$2,795,624	\$3,720,795	\$5,591,249	\$7,441,590
<b>Del Mar, City of</b>	0.27%	\$37,758	\$50,254	\$188,792	\$251,270	\$377,584	\$502,540
<b>Escondido, City of</b>	3.28%	\$456,123	\$607,070	\$2,280,615	\$3,035,351	\$4,561,230	\$6,070,702
<b>Fallbrook P.U.D.</b>							
<b>Helix W.D.</b>	6.60%	\$917,784	\$1,221,511	\$4,588,918	\$6,107,553	\$9,177,836	\$12,215,106
<b>Lakeside W.D.</b>	0.99%	\$138,085	\$183,782	\$690,425	\$918,911	\$1,380,850	\$1,837,822
<b>Oceanside, City of</b>	5.94%	\$825,251	\$1,098,356	\$4,126,256	\$5,491,780	\$8,252,513	\$10,983,560
<b>Olivenhain M.W.D.</b>	4.91%	\$682,514	\$908,382	\$3,412,568	\$4,541,908	\$6,825,137	\$9,083,815
<b>Otay W.D.</b>	9.27%	\$1,288,829	\$1,715,348	\$6,444,144	\$8,576,739	\$12,888,288	\$17,153,477
<b>Padre Dam M.W.D.</b>	3.17%	\$441,105	\$587,082	\$2,205,524	\$2,935,410	\$4,411,048	\$5,870,820
<b>Pendleton Military</b>	0.01%	\$1,782	\$2,371	\$8,908	\$11,856	\$17,815	\$23,711
Poway, City of	<b>2.57%</b>	<b>\$357,201</b>	<b>\$475,412</b>	<b>\$1,786,006</b>	<b>\$2,377,059</b>	<b>\$3,572,012</b>	<b>\$4,754,117</b>
<b>Rainbow M.W.D.</b>							
<b>Ramona M.W.D.</b>	1.27%	\$176,686	\$235,158	\$883,430	\$1,175,788	\$1,766,860	\$2,351,577
<b>Rincon Del Diablo</b>	1.60%	\$222,570	\$296,227	\$1,112,852	\$1,481,134	\$2,225,704	\$2,962,267
San Diego, City of	<b>39.79%</b>	<b>\$5,531,072</b>	<b>\$7,361,498</b>	<b>\$27,655,359</b>	<b>\$36,807,492</b>	<b>\$55,310,718</b>	<b>\$73,614,985</b>
<b>San Dieguito W.D.</b>	1.07%	\$148,126	\$197,147	\$740,632	\$985,733	\$1,481,264	\$1,971,467
<b>Santa Fe I.D.</b>	1.78%	\$247,737	\$329,721	\$1,238,683	\$1,648,607	\$2,477,366	\$3,297,214
<b>Sweetwater Authority</b>	1.17%	\$162,854	\$216,749	\$814,272	\$1,083,743	\$1,628,544	\$2,167,487
<b>Vallecitos</b>	3.51%	\$487,635	\$649,010	\$2,438,173	\$3,245,051	\$4,876,347	\$6,490,101
Valley Center	<b>4.84%</b>	<b>\$672,362</b>	<b>\$894,871</b>	<b>\$3,361,811</b>	<b>\$4,474,353</b>	<b>\$6,723,622</b>	<b>\$8,948,706</b>
<b>Vista I.D.</b>	2.57%	\$356,694	\$474,736	\$1,783,468	\$2,373,680	\$3,566,936	\$4,747,361
<b>Yuima M.W.D.</b>	1.32%	\$184,095	\$245,019	\$920,477	\$1,225,095	\$1,840,953	\$2,450,189
<b>Contract Water</b>	0.03%	\$4,612	\$6,139	\$23,062	\$30,693	\$46,123	\$61,387



**Table 9-1. Normal Water Year Supply and Demand Assessment (AF/YR) <sup>a</sup>**

	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045
<b>Water Authority Supplies</b>					
Imperial Irrigation District Water Transfer	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000
AAC and CC Lining Projects	78,700	78,700	78,700	78,700	78,700
Carlsbad Desalination Plant	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>328,700</b>	<b>328,700</b>	<b>328,700</b>	<b>328,700</b>	<b>328,700</b>
<b>Member Agency Supplies (Verifiable)</b>					
Surface Water	43,957	43,957	44,659	44,659	44,659
Water Recycling	41,963	45,513	45,628	45,749	45,854
Groundwater	21,900	23,100	23,100	19,600	19,600
Brackish Groundwater Recovery	8,400	8,400	8,400	8,400	8,400
Seawater Desalination	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Potable Reuse	33,042	53,202	112,562	112,562	112,562
San Luis Rey Water Transfers	15,800	15,800	15,800	15,800	15,800
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>171,062</b>	<b>195,972</b>	<b>256,149</b>	<b>252,770</b>	<b>252,875</b>
Metropolitan Water District Supplies	55,996	53,572	13,625	32,765	49,196
<b>Total Projected Supplies</b>	<b>555,758</b>	<b>578,244</b>	<b>598,474</b>	<b>614,235</b>	<b>630,771</b>
<b>Total Long-Range Demand Forecast with Conservation</b>	<b>555,758</b>	<b>578,244</b>	<b>598,474</b>	<b>614,235</b>	<b>630,771</b>

<sup>a</sup> Normal water year demands based on 1960–2018 hydrology. See Section 2 Water Demands.

Source: San Diego County Water Authority, 2020 Urban Water Management Plan, page 9-3.



**STAFF REPORT**

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Lisa Soto  
**Approved By:** Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: ELECTION OF OFFICERS

RECOMMENDATION: Discuss the Board of Directors' process for electing the Board President and First Vice President.

PRIOR BOARD ACTION: None.

FISCAL IMPACT: None.

SUMMARY: At its July 20, 2022 meeting, the Board requested that an item be placed on a future agenda (after Election Day, November 8, 2022) to discuss the process for electing the Board President and First Vice President.

DETAILED REPORT: The process for electing the President and First Vice President as well as the terms of office is set forth in Section 1.5.5.A of the District's Rules and Regulations; below is an excerpt from said section that generally describes the process:

*The President and First Vice President of the Board shall each serve a one-year term and shall be elected to such term by the members of the Board at the last meeting of the prior calendar year, provided that in an election year the meeting occurs after any newly elected members are sworn-in. The remaining directors shall serve equally as Vice Presidents for the same term.*

Following the above guidance, the Board has typically considered the previous year's First Vice President for nomination to be elected as Board President; the Board member who has served the longest in the position of Vice President is to be considered for nomination to be elected as First Vice President. The previous year's Board President along with any newly elected Board members become Vice Presidents equally.

Staff surveyed neighboring water agencies regarding their process for electing President and First Vice President (or Vice President); ten of the eleven responding agencies followed a practice similar to the District. Vallecitos Water District's Board reorganization process specifies that the office of President and Vice President be rotated by division in a stated order, describes what happens if a Director chooses to forgo his/her opportunity to be President, and allows the Board to elect the President and Vice President at its Pleasure.

ATTACHMENT: Vallecitos Water District Board reorganization process

## **Vallecitos Water District Board Reorganization Process:**

*Excerpt from*

ORDINANCE NO. 221

ORDINANCE OF THE VALLECITOS WATER DISTRICT  
ESTABLISHING THE GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR  
CONDUCTING THE BUSINESS OF THE BOARD AND  
REPEALING ORDINANCE NO. 216

### **Section 1. 9: Board Reorganization**

B. In addition to the minimum reorganization requirement, Board policy determines that the Board will reorganize annually. The Directors shall annually elect one of its members as President and one of its members as Vice President. It is the intent of the Board that Directors will rotate into the office of the President in the following order: Division 5, Division 1, Division 4, Division 3, and Division 2, and that Directors will rotate into the office of Vice President in the following order: Division 1, Division 4, Division 3, Division 2, and Division 5. If a Director chooses to forgo his/ her opportunity to be President, the rotation for President and Vice President will skip over their divisional sequence. Notwithstanding the rotation described above, the Board may elect the President and Vice President at its pleasure. The President and Vice President serve at the pleasure of the Board.



**Agenda Item: 11**

**STAFF REPORT**

**Board Meeting Date: November 16, 2022**  
**Prepared By: Brett Hodgkiss**

SUBJECT: MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY

SUMMARY: Informational report by staff and Directors concerning the San Diego County Water Authority. No action will be required.



## STAFF REPORT

Agenda Item: 12.A

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Lisa Soto  
**Approved By:** Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: REPORTS ON MEETINGS AND EVENTS ATTENDED BY DIRECTORS

SUMMARY: Directors will present brief reports on meetings and events attended since the last Board meeting.



**STAFF REPORT**

**Agenda Item: 12.B**

**Board Meeting Date: November 16, 2022**  
**Prepared By: Lisa Soto**  
**Approved By: Brett Hodgkiss**

**SUBJECT:** SCHEDULE OF UPCOMING MEETINGS AND EVENTS

**SUMMARY:** The following is a listing of upcoming meetings and events. Requests to attend any of the following events should be made during this agenda item.

	<b>SCHEDULE OF UPCOMING MEETINGS AND EVENTS</b>	<b>ATTENDEES</b>
<b>1 *</b>	<b>CSDA Quarterly Meeting</b> <i>Nov. 17, 2022, 6:00 p.m.; The Butcher Shop Steakhouse, Kearny Mesa</i> <i>Registration deadline: Closed</i>	Miller** Vásquez (R)
<b>2</b>	<b>ACWA Fall Conference</b> <i>Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2022; Indian Wells</i> <i>Registration deadline: 11/29/2022</i>	Miller (R, H) MacKenzie (R, H) Sanchez (R, H) Vásquez (R, H) Kuchinsky (T, R, H)
<b>3 *</b>	<b>Vista Chamber Government Affairs</b> <i>Dec. 1, 2022; Noon-1:30 p.m.; The Film Hub, Vista</i> <i>Registration deadline: None.</i>	
<b>4</b>	<b>Winter Outlook Workshop</b> (Water Education Foundation) <i>Dec. 8, 2022; Beckman Center, Irvine</i> <i>Registration deadline: None indicated.</i>	
<b>5</b>	<b>Colorado River Water Users Association Conference (CRWUA)</b> <i>Dec. 14-16, 2022; Las Vegas</i> <i>Registration deadline: 11/30/2022</i>	Miller (R, H) MacKenzie (R, H) Sanchez (R, H) Vásquez (R, H) Kuchinsky (T, H)
<b>6</b>	<b>Urban Water Spring 2023 Virtual Conference</b> (Urban Water Institute) <i>Feb. 22-24, 2023; Hilton Palm Springs</i> <i>Early Bird Registration deadline: 1/22/2023</i>	
<b>7</b>	<b>ACWA Spring Conference</b> <i>May 9-11, 2023; Monterey</i> <i>Registration deadline: TBD</i>	
<b>8</b>	<b>Special Districts Legislative Days (CSDA)</b> <i>May 16-17, 2023; Sheraton Grand Sacramento Hotel; Sacramento</i> <i>Registration deadline: TBD</i>	

\* Non-per diem meeting except when serving as an officer of the organization

\*\*Attending under the auspices of the San Diego County Water Authority

The following abbreviations indicate arrangements that have been made by staff:

**R**=Registration; **H**=Hotel; **A**=Airline; **S**=Shuttle; **C**=Car; **T**=Tentative; **◊**=Attendee to Self-Register



Agenda Item: 13

## STAFF REPORT

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Brett Hodgkiss

**SUBJECT:** ITEMS FOR FUTURE AGENDAS AND/OR PRESS RELEASES

**SUMMARY:** This item is placed on the agenda to enable the Board to identify and schedule future items for discussion at upcoming Board meetings and/or identify press release opportunities.

*Staff-generated list of tentative items for future agendas:*

- Annual Organizational Meeting (December)
- Assembly Bill 2449 – new teleconference procedures (December)
- 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Ad Hoc Committee Report (December)
- Wildfire Resiliency
- Long-term Harmful Algal Blooms mitigation and management methods
- Rename Edgehill Reservoir after former Director Paul Dorey



## STAFF REPORT

Agenda Item: 14

Board Meeting Date: November 16, 2022  
Prepared By: Lisa Soto

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY DIRECTORS

SUMMARY: This item is placed on the agenda to enable individual Board members to convey information to the Board and the public not requiring discussion or action.





## STAFF REPORT

Agenda Item: 15

**Board Meeting Date:** November 16, 2022  
**Prepared By:** Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY GENERAL COUNSEL

SUMMARY: Informational report by the General Counsel on items not requiring discussion or action.



## STAFF REPORT

Agenda Item: 16

Board Meeting Date: November 16, 2022  
Prepared By: Brett Hodgkiss

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY GENERAL MANAGER

SUMMARY: Informational report by the General Manager on items not requiring discussion or action.

*I N T E R O F F I C E   M E M O R A N D U M*

**DATE:** November 16, 2022  
**TO:** Board of Directors  
**FROM:** Brett Hodgkiss  
**RE:** Pass Through of Wholesale Water Fees and Charges

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Per the District Rules and Regulations Section 4.4.3(A), all San Diego County Water Authority (CWA) fees and charges for wholesale water and water-related services are to be passed through to its customers. In January 2022, the Board approved the pass through of these costs for a period of five years, terminating on December 31, 2026. An explanation of the CWA pass through calculation is attached for the Board's information.

During 2021 and 2022, CWA was successful in its decade-long rate case litigation against MWD and received payments for damages interest and legal fees from MWD totaling over \$91.1 million. Consistent with a decision made by the CWA Board of Directors in 2012, the total amount of monies received was distributed pro-rata to its member agencies. The District received its pro-rata share of the disbursements totaled just over \$3.183 million; the Board approved using the monies (rebates) received to offset the financial impact of CWA rate increases beginning in April 2022 and continuing over a five-year period.

Staff has calculated the impact of new wholesale water fees and charges on the District's water rate. The impact is 27 cents per unit (36.6 cents per unit minus the 9.6 cents per unit rebate), resulting in the District's Tier 1 water rate increasing from \$4.72 to \$4.99 per unit and the Tier 2 water rate increasing from \$5.19 to \$5.46 per unit. CWA's monthly Infrastructure Access Charge, shown as "County Water Authority Emergency Storage Fee" on District water bills, did not change.

CWA is adjusting its fees and charges on January 1, 2023. Since the District bills most of its customers two months in arrears, the new rates will be effective on bills mailed on or after March 1, 2023.

See tables on the reverse side of this memorandum showing the cost drivers of the pass through rate increases and the rates effective March 1, 2023. A typical residential customer's water bill (3/4" meter and 24 units/bi-monthly billing) will increase by about 3.0% as a result of the pass-through increases.

Attachment: CWA Pass through calculation explanation

**Vista Irrigation District  
CWA Pass Through  
January 1, 2023**

**Pass Through Components**

	<b>Amount</b>
CWA	16.1¢
IID	1.7¢
QSA Canal	4.2¢
Operational Storage Utilization	0.0¢
Desalination	9.3¢
MWD	5.3¢
<b>Total Pass Through</b>	<b>36.6¢</b>
Less Rebate	-9.6¢
<b>Final Pass Through Increase</b>	<b>27.0¢</b>

**Rates Effective March 1, 2023**

	<b>Before Pass Through</b>	<b>After Pass Through</b>
Tier 1	\$ 4.72	\$ 4.99
Tier 2	5.19	5.46
Emergency Storage Fee <sup>1</sup>	\$ 4.24	\$ 4.24

<sup>1</sup> Charge per equivalent meter.

## **Vista Irrigation District San Diego County Water Authority Pass-through Calculation**

### **Overview**

The San Diego County Water Authority (Water Authority) is responsible for supplying water to 24 member agencies within San Diego County. Not simply a water provider, the Water Authority is also responsible for the construction and maintenance of regional storage, delivery and treatment infrastructure necessary to ensure the reliable delivery of water to local water agencies like Vista Irrigation District (District). The District seeks to pass-through any increases or decreases in the cost of purchased water directly to the ratepayer when the changes occur.

The Water Authority has both fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs are allocated to member agencies based on each agency's percentage of demand in prior years, which are updated annually. Variable costs are charged based on actual water purchased by a member agency and have separate charges for raw milled supply, treatment and transportation.

The District uses a fiscal year ending June 30; The Water Authority uses a calendar year with increases effective January 1 each year. The District typically increases its rates for the pass-through on March 1 because the District bills the majority of its customers every two months and usage starting January 1 would be seen on billings mailed on or after March 1.

The calculation for the pass-through compare the increases/decreases in fixed and variable charges against the volume of water purchased to create a per unit charge.

### **Explanation of Pass-through Calculation**

**Water Authority Fixed Costs** - The Water Authority typically calculates fixed costs that will be charged to each member agency effective January 1 each year. The fixed charges are divided by 12 months and billed to member agencies regardless of the volume of water purchased in the calendar year. This part of the calculation totals the fixed costs.

**Prior Fiscal Year True Up Between Budget and Actual for Fixed Costs** - The pass-through must be spread across the volume of water purchased to get to an amount per unit. The budgeted water volume (in acre-feet) is used to determine the fixed costs per unit. Once actual units are known, the rate is adjusted in the current year to make up for the difference between budgeted and actual volumes. If the amount results in a large increase, the District spreads the amount across several years to help stabilize the increase/decrease to ratepayers. The line "i prior" presents any amounts not adjusted for in the prior year in order to smooth rates.

**Fixed Costs Change between Prior Actual and Current Budget** - The section above adjusts the rate from prior year's budget to prior year's actual volume purchased. This section takes the prior year actual volume and adjusts it to the District's current year budgeted volume.

Water Authority Variable Costs - Each year, the Water Authority calculates variable costs for actual water purchased. This section compares the prior calendar year costs of raw water, treatment of water and transportation of water against the current year costs per unit. Since the District has its own local water supply (Lake Henshaw), it calculates the percentage of purchased water against total water and adjusts the amount per unit lower to account for the volume of local water delivered.

Summary - The summary adds up the various increases and decreases and then adjusts for lost water; every year the District must buy more water than is sold because of water loss. Starting in 2022 and for the next five years, the District will be applying a rebate against the rate increases (see below); the difference between the calculation and the rebate is rounded to the nearest cent. This increase/decrease is added to billings starting March 1 of each year. If the Water Authority was to increase/decrease at another point in time during the year, the District would also complete that calculation and adjust rates accordingly.

Rebate (Credit) Details - During 2021 and 2022, the Water Authority was successful in its decade-long rate case litigation against Metropolitan Water District (Metropolitan) and received payments for damages interest and legal fees from Metropolitan totaling over \$91.1 million. Consistent with a decision made by the Water Authority Board of Directors in 2021, the total amount of monies received was distributed pro-rata to its member agencies. The District received its pro-rata share of the disbursements totaled just over \$3.183 million; the Board approved using the monies (rebates) received to offset the financial impact of the Water Authority rate increases.

**VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT  
2023 WATER AUTHORITY PASS THROUGH CALCULATION**

<b>WATER AUTHORITY FIXED COSTS</b>		<b>Calendar 2022</b>	<b>Calendar 2023</b>
(a)	MWD - Net Ready to Service	\$ 366,837	\$ 383,868
(b)	MWD - Capacity Reservation	349,692	268,325
(c)	CWA - Customer Service	843,729	903,758
(d)	CWA - Storage	2,124,313	2,230,766
(e)	CWA - Supply Reliability Charge	1,474,004	1,556,797
(f)	<b>Total Fixed Costs (a) + (b) + (c) + (d) + (e)</b>	<b>\$ 5,158,575</b>	<b>\$ 5,343,514</b>
			<b>3.6%</b>

<b>PRIOR FY TRUE UP BETWEEN BUDGET AND ACTUAL FOR FIXED COSTS</b>		<b>Budgeted 2022</b>	<b>Actual 2022</b>
(g)	FY Water Sales (Budgeted/Actual)	15,800	16,444
(h)	FY Fixed Costs to Rate Per AF (f) / (g)	326.49	313.71
(i)	FY True Up Pass Through Per HCF ((h) Actual - (h) Budgeted) / 435.6		\$ (0.029)
(i prior)	Prior Year Calculation hold over if any		\$ -
(i.1)	<b>True Up</b>		<b>(0.029)</b>

<b>FIXED COSTS CHANGE BETWEEN PRIOR ACTUAL AND CURRENT BUDGET</b>		<b>FY 22 Actual</b>	<b>FY 23 Budgeted</b>
(j)	FY Actual & FY Budgeted Water Sales	16,444	15,700
(k)	Fixed Costs to Rate Per Acre Foot (f) / (j)	313.71	340.35
(l)	<b>Fixed Cost Pass Through Per HCF ((k) Budget- (k) Actual) / 435.6</b>		<b>\$ 0.061</b>

<b>WATER AUTHORITY VARIABLE COSTS</b>		<b>Prior FY 2022</b>	<b>Current FY 2023</b>
(m)	Raw Melded Supply (A/F)	\$ 1,009	\$ 1,085
(n)	Treatment (A/F)	310	350
(o)	Transportation (A/F)	173	173
(p)	<b>Total Variable Charges Per AF (m) + (n) + (o)</b>	<b>\$ 1,492</b>	<b>\$ 1,608</b>
(q)	<b>Variable Costs Per HCF ((p) Current - (p) Prior) / 435.6</b>		<b>\$ 0.266</b>
(r)	10 Year Average Local Water Production	1,904	11%
(s)	Imported Water	14,896	89%
	FY 2022 Budgeted Total Water Supplied	16,800	100%
(t)	<b>Variable Cost Pass Through - HCF (q) x (s)</b>		<b>\$ 0.236</b>

**SUMMARY**

(u) Pass Through Per HCF (i.1) + (l) + (t)	\$ 0.268
Adjusted for 6% Water Loss (u) / .94	\$ 0.285
Rebate Credit Refund	\$ (0.015)
<b>Total Adjusted for Water Loss</b>	<b>\$ 0.270</b>
<b>Pass Through Per HCF Rounded</b>	<b>\$ 0.270</b>

<b>Rebate Calculation</b>	
Amount Per year	\$ 655,860
Current Year Budget af	15,700
Amount Per AF	\$ 41.77
Amount Per Unit	0.096
<b>Total Rebate Available</b>	<b>0.096</b>
Last Year Rebate still in effect	0.081
Additional Rebate this year	0.015
<b>Total Rebate</b>	<b>\$ 3,183,171</b>
Rebate Amount Year 1 (April 2022-February 2023)	(559,730)
Rebate Amount Year 2 (March 2023-February 2024)	(655,860) Current Calculation
Rebate Amount Year 3	
Rebate Amount Year 4	
Rebate Amount Year 5	
Rebate Amount Remaining	1,967,581





SAVE THE DATE

# EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION EVENT

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2022  
PRESENTATION AND LUNCH AT THE BAYS  
12:00 P.M. TO 2:00 P.M.

ITALIAN FARE SERVED BUFFET STYLE